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ABSTRACT
In the history of historical writing, the eighteenth
century is an age of considerable importance, for it was
during this time that both the philosophical and the theo¬
retical interpretations were developed. The former, depend¬
ing in part on modern science, on the belief that society
must be interpreted through regular patterns of causes, and
that human history was essentially secular, sought to study
man through his institutions. Yet, although the philoso¬
phies attempted to establish laws through which we could
relate the past and the present, they were unable to do so
to any considerable extent. With the exception of the
Physiocratic school, the French philosophical historians
show little evidence of having replaced those very works
which they condemned. They made some valuable suggestions
as to the manner in which connecting factors should be
sought, and they did attempt to work by strict 'scientific'
standards. But, as is shown particularly in the work of
Voltaire, they depended to a considerable extent on the
actions of the individual as cause, and had no developed
theory of human nature or of the means by which society in
general advanced or changed. Because of this, they were
unable to postulate any general laws by which the universal
could replace the unique or the 'historical'.
Although theoretical history is also concerned with
the study of man and his institutions, and although it is
'philosophical' in this sense, it is nonetheless able to
overcome many of those difficulties which the French writers
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contended with. This is so because it is based on two
principles which conform more closely to the idea of gen¬
eral and universal laws - the heterogeneity of ends and
the capacity of man to progress. Such principles, derived
from observation of men in various societies and at differ¬
ent ages, fulfilled the demands of the theoretical concept
of philosophical history: that it should deal with major
issues and work along regular lines. Instead of being con¬
cerned with the isolated, therefore, theoretical history is
able to deny the validity of unique or 'historical' factors.
Although it may owe much to the works of many earlier
writers, such as Machiavelli, Montesquieu, and the common¬
wealth school, it also goes beyond these. It has absorbed
the idea of property/power correlation and that of the
necessary limitation of men by the form of society in which
they live, and developed these to suggest a stadial progress
of human nature which is closely related to the division of
land or means of subsistence of any society. Through this
it is able to show not only that societies must differ as
they change from one type of property to another, and that
man's nature is developed or repressed according to the de¬
gree to which he is free to express his natural self-inter¬
est; but also that each stage of development has character¬
istics which will be found in all similar stages. It can
therefore relate the past to the present in terms of gen¬
eral laws of property division; and at the same time it
can also show that each stage of progress expresses a part
of the human experience, and that these parts come together
in a whole that is human nature.
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That diversity could be made into a whole was further
demonstrated by the theoretical historians in their belief
that man, when left to himself, was able to advance from
one stage to the next because of his self-interest. This
principle, they felt, though often expressed in ways that
might seem irrational, was an integral and permanent fea¬
ture of human nature and remained so in all ages; and when
man was allowed to so act he often achieved considerable
ends without having any intention of so doing because of
the process of heterogeneity of ends. The economic and
political philosophy of the theoretical historians, then,
was one of laissez faire, a philosophy which they felt
ought to be applied in the study of the modern or more
philosophical age as well as in the assessment of the sa¬
vage and barbarous ones. Man neither thought in rational
terms nor acted in a conscious manner, and any degree of
the philosophical in his society has been produced through
the natural coming together of a multitude of events.
Such an interpretation is of considerable importance,
not only because it links all ages of human history through
general patterns, but also because it denies those theories
which cannot accept all forms of human action. As all de¬
velopment and interaction must be based on a general social
level, not on any concept of what society 'ought' to be,
so also should we see that all expressions of human nature
are valid in that they reflect man's nature, though his ac¬
tions may not always be beneficial. In particular, the
theoretical historians believed that there was considerable
merit in the commercial society in particular, and this
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because it permitted a greater number of men to become in¬
dependent and thus free to benefit from, and express, their
natural self-interest. Older theories that suggested com¬
merce was detrimental to man were dismissed, and it was
felt that if society was maintained in a manner beneficial
to all, the commercial state could hardly be seen as deny¬
ing or perverting man's nature. Furthermore, it was thought
that men could correct some of the faults which might exist
in the more philosophical state through an awareness that
it was in one's own interest to do so; thus, although the
theoretical writers do not believe that all wrongs can be
rectified, indeed, that we must accept inequities, they
emphasise that those that can, are changed through the
natural operation of the human mind, not through some pro¬
cess or set of ideas outside the social experience. All
correction of faults, when correction was permitted by the
tenets of laissez-faire, must be based on what is natural
to man, not on what some think he ought to become. Through
such means the theoretical philosophy was able also to dis¬
miss many other philosophical and historical theories which
had attempted to create general laws through a study that
encompassed only a part of man's experience and nature.
The theoretical interpretation had a considerable im¬
pact on historical interpretation in the eighteenth and
later centuries, and this impact can be traced especially
in the works of William Robertson. It is apparent, cer¬
tainly, that Robertson had accepted the theoretical corre¬
lation of property and power, and believed too that man's
nature was limited through the misuse or lack of property,
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even if he did not always explain the actions of men in
terms of 'moral sentiments' as Smith did. Yet although we
can trace in his writings some interest in the idea of sta-
dial growth and in the relationship between man's nature
and institutions, the greater part of his work shows the
application of the theoretical principles to particular
historical situations, and uses these principles to chal¬
lenge much of the earlier, more ideological, writing.
Like all theoretical writers, Robertson is generally
concerned, to demonstrate that all developments of men that
are seen to be beneficial are not produced intentionally
or consciously but are a product of man's nature in his
situation and have effects much beyond his own time. As
he, like his fellows, had seen that greater freedom develop¬
ed when land or means of subsistence was distributed more
equally, so he also believed that balance between nations
resulted from interest and not from generosity or benevo¬
lence. Much of his work Charles V, then, is devoted to
studying the development of the concept of balance of power
in Europe in the sixteenth century, and of indicating how
much such a concept was a result of necessity of situation
and not of any great disinterested wisdom or the plan of
any individual. Since the power of property was the major
factor in determining form of rule, the awareness by men
that their ends were best served by some regulation of pro¬
perty led them to forego their immediate interest, and thus
produced or helped to produce a stability which was of con¬
siderable benefit. In such a thesis Robertson reveals
clearly that ideas as such cannot become a permanent part
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of any society's institutions and must always be seen as
unique factors. If we are to interpret the past along
general lines, he believes, we must rather see that ideas
only have effect when institutionalised by property.
Such a philosophy is also the basis of part at least of
his study of the Reformation, which he sees as becoming an
integral part of the German society in particular only when
its philosophy was supported by men of substance. Property
and its power then, is a crucial element in his interpreta¬
tion of societies, and this is even more so in his first
work, Scotland. In this book his aim is to study many of
the disputed issues of the Scottish past in light of the
major principles of the theoretical philosophy, dismissing
much of the fabulous and legendary as unphilosophical, and
attempting to replace it with the concept that property is
the basis of valid government. The unique must give way to
the general, and the Scottish traditions interpreted in light
of their origins. In particular, this analysis in terms of
property also leads Robertson to make some suggestions con¬
cerning certain of the constitutional problems of sixteenth-
century Scotland. By a comprehensive study he establishes
that it is the nobility which possesses the greater part of
the land and influence, and the government is thus pre¬
dominantly aristocratical. This being so, he believes, our
assessment of the validity of actions against Queen Mary,
for example, must depend in part at least on the degree to
which she can be seen as having attempted to usurp powers
that the property situation did not grant to the monarchy.
This interpretation, he felt, would at least give more gen-
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eral explanations for many disputed matters.
Such theories seem philosophical and theoretical, but
there are also instances in which the non-philosophical
approach is evident and forms an integral part of Robertson's
interpretation. This is particularly so in his study of the
Reformation. While his assessment of the role of the pro¬
vidential in the history of man is generally influenced by
his belief in the existence of general physical laws, he
also suggests a manipulation by God of human affairs when
such affairs concern the advancement of 'true' religion.
Certain matters, he appears to think, are so important and
so necessary that the actual coming together of the events
producing or encouraging these is directed by providence.
Although Robertson also emphasises that all ideas must be
institutionalised in property, and although he also explains
the events preceding the Reformation entirely within the
theoretical laws and the idea of property and power, the
role which he gives to the providential does distinguish
his work from the general approach of this school.
We may further see in his remarks on government that
he does not always appear to believe - as Smith and Millar
do - that men can only act as their situation permits. He
examines the various elements which comprise the major forms
of government - democracy, monarchy, aristocracy - and sees
in all three distinctive faults which, though produced by
situation, also seem to be permanent characteristics. If
man is to develop a system of rule that will bring greater
benefits, if he is to maintain traditional 'virtues' in the
midst of political morality, then, Robertson believes, these
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distinctive faults must be curbed. This, he suggests, can
be done by the imposing of restraints from above - as far as
the democracy or popular element is concerned - or by cre¬
ating a sense of office or pride in rank for the other two
classes.
Some of Robertson's statements concerning government
and morality, then, though based on the belief that property
division will determine the nature of rule, also appear to
imply that men must go beyond the 'justice' or laws of any
society to act through 'benevolence'. This is very much
the case when he judges earlier, much more unsettled and
violent ages, by the 'timeless' and 'immutable' principles
of morality that seem to have been produced by his own age,
and which certainly formed little part of the attitudes of
men in those ages he discusses. Thus, by applying the ideas
of a more philosophical era to less perfect stages, by stat¬
ing that men should have acted by these same principles, by
attempting to judge men in the light of theories of 'virtue'
quite foreign to them, he detracts considerably from the
force of the theoretical argument, and introduces elements
which make part of his work similar to that of the unphilo-
sophical writers he soundly condemned.
This unphilosophical interpretation is also to be seen
to a considerable degree in Robertson's first work, Scotland.
On the one hand, he seems to adhere to the laws of theoreti¬
cal history, to the standards of investigation developed by
the theoretical school. He makes a considerable effort to
relate the major events of the sixteenth century to the
ideas of property and power, and to discredit the more ro-
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mantic theories of earlier Scottish writers. He shows the
distribution of political power in the nation, and reveals
at some length the characteristics which such a distribu¬
tion of property produces: violence, discord, lack of re¬
spect for the laws, constant attempts by the nobility to
increase its power - factors which are all very natural but
which are also unphilosophical in that they inhibit the de¬
velopment of men and of a more perfect form of government.
Such qualities, Robertson also shows, must be recognised
not only as destructive but simply as reflecting the spirit
of the age; they are not values or virtues which should be
maintained in all subsequent ages, as earlier writers had
implied.
But on the other hand, Robertson's prejudices -
against corrupted monarchs, in favour of the Reformation
principles - lead him also to present another interpreta¬
tion of the warlike nobility in this same work. To some
extent he does still continue his use of the theoretical
concepts in this interpretation, in that he attempts to re¬
late the actions of Queen Mary, and those of the nobility,
to the various rights and property which both possessed;
yet he also consistently misuses his sources so as to give
a distorted impression of the Queen's actions, and is suf¬
ficiently vague and imprecise about the nobility and its
motives as to suggest that its character is not violent
and destructive, but unselfish and beneficial. He depends
to a considerable extent on works - such as those of Buchanan
- which are extremely biased against the Queen, while stat¬
ing, in the Dissertation especially, that he is not inter-
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ested in making judgments, only in presenting the evidence
which will permit the reader to make his own conclusions.
Most importantly, his belief that the Reformation had intro¬
duced new principles - 'republican' in nature - into the
society, which affected the attitudes of the confederate
nobility in particular, may be the means by which he seeks
to explain the apparent discrepancies between his inter¬
pretations of the aristocracy. But he presents no evidence
to support his contention that new principles have made the
lords more philosophical. While he points out that the no¬
bility, especially the confederate lords, consistently act
to maintain 'national' liberties and are otherwise to be
seen demonstrating some rather sophisticated beliefs, he
fails to make clear that the division of property is such
that the 'nation' is little other than the aristocracy,
and that the 'national liberties' are rarely more than the
prerogatives of the nobles. The contrast which he contin¬
ually seeks to make between the actions of Queen Mary and
those of the nobility is thus based on a very unphilosophi-
cal manipulation of material, and does no more than present
the old anti-Marian interpretation in a somewhat more
'scientific' guise.
The existence of two concurrent philosophies, or two
different sets of influences in one body of work, must ne¬
cessarily detract from the impact of both; and it is likely
that the force of the theoretical ideas in Robertson's
writings was considerably undermined by his emphasis on the
more traditional moral virtues, on the providential, by his
bias and misuse of material. We cannot deny that Robertson
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is a theoretical historian, or at least makes use of the
theoretical ideas; but he also has other loyalties which
prevent him from making any major contribution to the de¬
velopment of the theoretical philosophy.
SECTION I
CHAPTER ONE
THE ELEMENTS OF PHILOSOPHICAL HISTORY
In one sense all history is philosophical in that it is
based on a particular attitude concerning the past, present,
or future"'". The meaning of the word 'philosophical' as
applied to eighteenth-century historical writing, however,
is somewhat more specialised. The philosophical history of
the Enlightenment is a study of what are seen as the meaning¬
ful factors in human development, a search for the factors
which make for the emergence of freedom of mind, an attempt
to ascertain the causes of qualitative change in man's social
structure. In essence, this form of history examines human
institutions in an effort to reveal the spirit of man in its
journey through historical time, yet it goes beyond earlier
institutional studies where, although the relationship between
men and their laws was stressed, there was always an emphasis
2
on the individuality of each society . The philosophical
history, in contrast, is much more cosmopolitan, less pro¬
vincial, more concerned with the universal, with the regular
and uniform rather than with the unique. Historical writing
to the philosophically inclined did not mean the study of
one society or nation from a viewpoint centred within that
country's past, for however interesting such inquiry was,
it was nonetheless fragmented and disjointed: it revealed
1. See, for instance, Frank E. Manuel, Shapes of Philoso¬
phical History (Stanford, 1965) .
2. See especially George Huppert, The Idea of Perfect
History (Urbana, 1970), Donald R. Kelley, Foundations of
Modern Historical Scholarship (New York, 1970), and
J. G. A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal
Law (Cambridge, 1957) .
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only the actions of men over a limited period of time and
did not seek to establish those general patterns which helped
to form a science of humanity. The philosophical historian
must be concerned with the universal, must study general
history which 'embraces the consideration of the successive
progressions of the human race and of the detail of the
causes that have contributed to them'"'".
This dislike of the particular and the isolated in the
philosophical attitude is not confined to the span of his¬
torical investigation. The new history seeks not only to
reject restricted concepts of time but also to deny the
validity of studies which present fragments of the past as
the whole because of the limitation of their sources to the
2
traditional annals and chronicles . Such works merely con¬
tinued the older concept of history as a detailing of the
actions of rulers, a listing of kings, battles and treaties,
and failed to consider the possibility of the importance of
factors other than the political. Not only must the philo¬
sophical writer extend the scope of his field of study to
many ages and many nations, but he must study human society,
must concentrate on the actions and achievements of men in
general; universal history embraces not only 'the origin,
the revolutions of governments' but also 'the progress of
languages, of physics, of morals, manners, of sciences and
3
arts' . History en philosophe, then, is in essence social
history, a study of human institutions, laws, customs, in-
1. Turgot, Notes on Universal History, in W. Walker Stephens
(ed.) The Life and Writings of Turgot (London, 1895,
hereafter cited Life) p. 175.
2. See, for instance, Quesnai, quoted in Ronald L. Meek,
The Economics of Physiocracy (Cambridge, Mass., 1963)p.66.
3. Turgot, Notes on Universal History, Life, p. 175.
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ventions, commerce, arts, sciences and philosophies, which
reveals the social as opposed to the individual achievement,
which indicates the causes of human advance and of the
emergence of a gentler, more humane society in which the
public benefit, rather than the ruler's glory, predominates.
By such standards much earlier work must be rejected as be¬
ing superficial, as Voltaire's criticism of Daniel, for
instance, indicates: 'II devait m'apprendre les droits de la
nation, les droits des principaux corps de cette nation, ses
lois, ses usages, ses moeurs, et comment ils ont changd' .
The philosophical historian does not reject political annals,
court gossip or military achievements, but he incorporates
such material into his synthesis rather than seeing it as
the only acceptable form of history; his scope is wide, his
examination more profound than the traditional, because he
2
is interested not in the few but in the many .
History en philosophe, then, was a conscious break with
older traditions of historical writing, seeking as it did to
expand the scope of historical investigation and sources, to
establish the general social achievements of man. It also
breaks with this tradition in that the philosophical historian
1. Voltaire, Dictionnaire Philosophique (hereafter cited
Dictionnaire) in Oeuvres Completes(Paris, 1878)XIX, p.365;
see also his La Philosophie de 1'Histoire (ed. J.H. Brum-
fitt, SV, XXVIII,1963, hereafter cited Philos.de l'Hist.)
p. 87. Useful secondary sources on the nature of philo¬
sophical history include Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy
of the Enlightenment(Boston, 1955), Paul Hazard, European
Thought in the Eighteenth Century (Harmondsworth, 1965),
Peter Gay, The Enlightenment(New York, 1967,1969),Rene
Hubert, Les Sciences Sociales dans 1'Encyclopedie (Paris,
1923), Friedrich Meinecke, Historism (London, 1971) and
Ira O. Wade, Intellectual Origins of the French Enlight¬
enment (Princeton, 1971).
2. See Hume,'Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences'
in Essays Moral, Political and Literary (London, 1963,
hereafter cited Essays) p. 115.
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is not content merely to list events, to suggest that what
had occurred can be safely relegated to a dusty tome; on the
contrary, he sees it as an integral part of the philosophical
approach to comment, to analyse, to point out how the general
social forces about which he is writing have emerged with
difficulty and are constantly threatened by those 'un-
philosophical' factors which have previously limited the
growth of man's mind. Hence, the philosophical interpretation
is based on an attitude or spirit fundamental to the every¬
day life of its practitioners, a spirit which was reflective
and critical and devoted to the continuation and preservation
of those values produced by general human development -
toleration, 'moderation', 'justice', 'rights'for all"'" - a
spirit which is an active and aggressive one: 'It will re¬
main the philosopher's duty', Diderot wrote, 'to preach the
2
truth, to sustain it, to promote it, and to illustrate it' .
The new historian makes the past live, because it is the
past which reveals to him what man's needs are in the present;
so that, far from simply listing dry facts, he seeks to dis¬
til, from his material a living theory of human nature, to
ascertain what men need from their societies in order to be
fully themselves. Anti-pyrrhonist, furthermore, he reserves
his scepticism for the criticism of earlier historical works,
for those philosophies which have failed to really observe
1. There are some variations, however, in the nature of
this 'philosophical' spirit - see Appendix A.
2. Quoted in Gay, The Enlightenment (New York, 1967) I,
p. 129.
man as he is in society"'". He does not deny the values of
informed and intelligent observation, he does deny that man
can know nothing of his past, can learn nothing from the
study of his own and earlier societies, is unable even to be
sure of what he 'knows'. Indeed, on the contrary, he be¬
lieves that truly 'philosophical' - informed, 'detached',
'scientific' - observation is the basis of those theories
of human nature which are in fact the very essence of the
philosophical history: 'as the science of man is the only
solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only solid
foundation we can give to this science itself must be laid on
2
experience and observation' . As well as discarding the
obsolete concepts concerning the nature and scope of history,
therefore, the modern historian must also discard those
philosophies which throw doubt on the possibility of know¬
ledge itself, and must substitute a 'scientific' evaluation,
must depend on his awareness of an observed continuity of
human experience. 'We must therefore glean up our experi¬
ments in this science from a cautious observation of human
life', Hume declared:
'and take them as they appear in the common
course of the world, by men's behaviour in com¬
pany, in affairs, and in their pleasures. Where
experiments of this kind are judiciously collected
and compared, we may hope to establish on them a
science, which will not be inferior in certainty,
and will be much superior in utility to any other
of human comprehension.' 3
1. Richard Popkin, 'Scepticism in the Enlightenment', SV,
XXVI (1963) pp. 1321-1345; see also Popkin and David
Fate Norton (eds.) David Hume Philosophical Historian
(New York, 1965) ppT ix-xxxi.
2. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford, 1888, here¬
after cited Treatise) Introduction, p. xx.
3. Hume, Treatise, Introduction, p. xxiii.
6
The new history, in short, is wholly concerned with man
and with his experience.
Philosophical history, therefore, actively challenges
the traditional and the customary, and does so through what
it sees as a detached and realistic evaluation untainted by
obscurity, by a dependence on older and more limited forms
of thought. Its observation of man, of his social institu¬
tion^, together with its belief in the repressive effects
of certain types of institution as revealed by such obser¬
vation, is given practical expression by the challenge issued
to those political and religious doctrines considered inimi¬
cal to true human development. In such challenges the criti¬
cal/spirit of the philosopher was given an added strength by
the long-established traditions of radical religious and
political thought which provided both method of attack and
the illustration of the limitations imposed by a super¬
stitious and uncritical acceptance of what was"*". In the
battle for the freedom of the human mind, and for a 'moderate'
society in which men were governed by 'just' laws, and were
no longer at the whim of tyrannous and 'unphilosophical'
superiors, it was seen to be of major importance to reveal
the basis and development of institutions so that their un¬
philosophical foundations and spirit were obvious; and in
this undertaking the established 'radical' philosophies
served the new philosophical spirit very well.
1. See especially H. T. Mason, Pierre Bayle and Voltaire
(Oxford, 1963), Norman L. Torrey, Voltaire and the
English Deists (New Haven, 1930), Ira 0. Wade, The
Clandestine Organization and Diffusion of Philosophic
Ideas in France From 1700 to 1750 (New York, 1967).
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The widening of the scope of historical inquiry was of
considerable importance in this undertaking, particularly
with regard to religious criticism; and the attempt to challenge
the dominant influence of Christianity gained strength from
the philosophical effort to consider the history and insti¬
tutions of all mankind, to show that all religions were a
product of their society, that 'morality' was not a pre¬
rogative of one religion but was produced by every form of
society and must be considered from this viewpoint - an
attitude which is seen especially in Voltaire's La Philo-
sophie de l'Histoire. Furthermore, although there was some
effort to establish that unintended benefits had resulted
from the actions of the established Church"'", most writers
sought to point out that its faults were inimical to human
2
growth and to the development of freedom of thought .
Christianity was merely one religion among many and, if its
origins had been pure - and not all agreed with this,
attempting to reveal the pagan and unpure elements in its
makeup - it had nonetheless lost this original purity, its
development and strength being linked to political changes
in society. The Church had become,in effect, a political
institution, made great by possession of land and the power
resulting from this, a greatness augmented by tradition,
supported by rulers unaware of their duties to their state,
1. Robertson, The History of the Reign of the Emperor
Charles V (hereafter cited Charles V) in Works
(Edinburgh, 1813) V, pp. 39, 54-55.
2. See, for instance, Voltaire, Dictionnaire, articles
"Lois civiles et eccl^siastiques', 'Papisme', 'PrStres',
in Oeuvres Completes, XIX, pp. 625-626, XX, pp. 166,
272-273.
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and unable either to make religion a part of the state's
policy"'", or to separate church and state entirely. Some
writers, such as Robertson, were philosophical while remain-
2
xng within the Christian tradition , and saw pagan belief
and Catholic doctrine as equally inimical, equally against
. . 3
the spirit of true religion ; it was not to the principles
of Catholicism, he felt, that men owed their freedom from
4
servitude in feudal Europe , nor can we see sophisticated
religious belief in the first primitive expressions of wor¬
ship: 'men, in their savage state, pass their days like the
animals around them, without the knowledge or veneration of
5
any superior power.' Others, particularly many of the
French authors, were sceptical of any religion based on
dogma, on authoritarianism, on a separation of beliefs into
those suitable for the mass and those appropriate for the
more intellectual; and while the desire to challenge the
Europeocentric viewpoint led them to accept the peculiar¬
ities of other religions, they were in general convinced
1. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws (ed. Franz Neumann,
New York, 1949, hereafter cited SL) II, pp. 27-37.
2. Such a position is not unusual, particularly given the
diversity of thought among those whom we might consider
as 'philosophical' because of their challenge to estab¬
lished and privileged authoritarianism: see, for in¬
stance, Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the
American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass., 1967) and Hazard,
op. cit., Part I, Chapter 4. It does create some prob¬
lems, however, particularly as regards the maintenance
of a philosophical causal theory: see below, Chapter V.
3. See below, pp. 181, 188, 191-192, 266, 507.
4. Charles V, Works, V, p. 500 (Note XX).
5. Robertson, The History of America (hereafter cited
America) Works, III, p. 331.
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that 'true' religion could only be Deistic^. Biblical
criticism had made them sceptical of human interpolations,
scientific observation had made them wary of the claims made
by men for intervention and revelation on which so much dogma
was based - a wariness, indeed, which is not peculiar to
those who refuse to accept either old or new Christianity,
for the principles of science were used also by the
2
'scientific' Christians •
Although there is some difference of opinion concern¬
ing the constitution of 'true' religion, then, the philo¬
sophical writers are nonetheless equally convinced that it
must be based on the principles of natural science, that it
must conform to the regular and constant laws which obser¬
vation has made apparent. It was the aim of 'Philosophy'
'to allay that wonder, which either the unusual or the
3
seemingly disjointed appearances of nature excite' , and the
study of astronomy and physics revealed that active inter¬
vention by God in human affairs was a concept which must
either be denied or else very carefully qualified. 'Le
monde est arrange suivant des lois mathematiques', declared
Voltaire, and such laws, which established the presence of
4
'une intelligence', could not be invaded, even by God himself .
Other writers, if more reluctant to deny that intervention
1. See, for instance, Hazard, op. cit., Part II, Chapter
I, Mason, op. cit., Torrey, op, cit., See also W. H.
Barber, 'Voltaire and Quakerism: Enlightenment and the
inner light', SV, XXIV (1963) pp. 81-109.
2. Hazard, op. cit., Part I, Chapter 5, Part II, Chapter I.
3. Smith, Essays on Philosophical Subjects (hereafter cited
Essays) in The Early Writings of Adam Smith (ed. J.
Ralph Lindgren, New York, 1967) p. 75.
4. Quoted in J. H. Brumfitt, Voltaire Historian (Oxford,
1970) p. 121. See also Voltaire, Philos. de l'Hist.,
pp. 188-190.
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had ever taken place, were nonetheless convinced that it
was now no longer necessary - God, one radical writer had
stated, 'has already discovered his Mind to Men and made his
Meaning manifest'"'". In the philosophical history, the
2
Supreme Being is limited to first cause , and, having es¬
tablished set laws and regular patterns for the operation
of the material world, He no longer has an active, revelatory
role to play. Providence as causal explanation, then, must
be severely if not wholly limited, and interpretations
which attempt to explain the unusual as an expression of
divine action are seen as evidence of an unphilosophical
age when men were ignorant of those general laws and series
3
of causes that modern man has been privileged to discover .
The particular cannot be explained in a manner which ig¬
nores these general and all-embracing laws.
As traditional religions and the unscientific type of
'fact' on which these were based were under constant attack
by the philosophical historians particularly because they
continued the limitations of earlier thoughts, so also
were authoritarian political theories and forms of govern¬
ment criticised for their emphasis on 'privilege' and on
a continued limitation of 'rights'. This is not to say that
there is necessarily any uniformity in the philosophical
attack, for varying types of government elicited varying
reactions and differing demands for reform. In some works,
1. The Independent Whig, No. IX, in David L. Jacobson (ed.)
The English Libertarian Heritage (New York, 1965) p. 20.
2. See below, pp. 175-176. See also Hazard, op. cit. ,
Part II, Chapter I.
3. Robertson, Charles V, Works, V, pp. 39, 43-44.
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particularly in the earlier English radical tradition,
"Si-
there is a greater emphasis on the natural quality of men:
'Whoever pretends to be naturally superior to other Men',
stated 'Cato', 'claims from Nature what she never gave to
any Man'"*", and such a philosophy led to a demand for greater
public participation in government, greater emphasis on the
2
capacity of the ordinary man for a share in political life .
In others, especially where the commonwealth influence is
strong, philosophical challenge to traditional forms of
government is expressed in the controversy concerning the
3
mixed state and the benefits which this may bring . For
still others, even though it was accepted that we must often
depend on influential and important men where the social
structure has established the power of these, there is none¬
theless an awareness that it was the historian's duty to
point out the dangers of such a system, to indicate that
4
though individual rule could be acceptable and even good ,
it must be directed towards the general social benefit.
Though the various authors whom we could describe as philo¬
sophical found many types of government to be acceptable,
they nonetheless share a common preoccupation. They are
concerned that man become more free to be himself rather
than be limited by circumstances created or maintained by
authoritarianism. If they do not all demand a greater
active share in the operations of political life, they
1. Cato's Letters, No. 45, in Jacobson, op. cit., p. 103.
2. Ibid., No. 24, p. 61.
3. See, for instance, Bailyn, op. cit.
4. See below, pp. 27-33.
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nonetheless demand a social awareness from those who do
possess political authority. Their concerns, therefore,
are not Utopian or wholly unrealistic; they are able to
accept imperfections and discrepancies, they do not expect
the end of all injustice, but they do believe that it is
possible for the benefits of government to be directed to¬
wards the many and not the few. As always, the philosophical
writers are concerned with the needs of the many, of the
growth of men in general; and, if the study of the past re¬
vealed that men search for regularity and order"'", then it
was clearly the concern of the philosophic writer to point
this out, to establish clearly that nations remain in dis¬
order until 'good' laws are securely established.
The theoretical historians, if more concerned to relate
'equity' and 'justice' to the particular economic level of
any society, rather than to indicate that such concepts can
be absolutes, nonetheless also support the general philo¬
sophical attitude concerning government and its ends; and
many of the philosophical values are incorporated into the
2
theoretical 'natural course of things' , those factors which
are necessary if man's nature is to develop properly. The
right to work, to retain the fruits of one's labour, the
creation of a more equal distribution of taxes, the reform
of law, the full and proper operation of the specifically
human qualities, the institutionof general, not individual,
rights, are the demands of a wide variety of writers who
1. Voltaire, Recapitulation of Essay, in Works (Paris,
London, 1901) XXX, p. 141.
2. See below, pp. 37-39.
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shared the basic philosophical values. The acceptance of a
diversity of talents, distinction of ranks, variations in
wealth - 'where would society be if every man laboured only
at his own little field'"'" - can hardly be taken as an accept¬
ance of an inequality before the law. Government must seek
to end repression of thought, must end torture as a legal
2
weapon , must break away from the interference of the church
3
m social and political affairs ; and even while we can see
that each society produces only those laws which it can
afford, this fact does not invalidate our observations that
only particular sorts of social institutions lead to the
development and maintenance of the best aspects of man's
4
nature . Whatever sort of government we support, then, it
must be one which is aware of these philosophical principles;
for the continuation of repressive, limited rule, devoted
to special interests, is a form of government which is
against the spirit of the age.
The aim of philosophical history, then, is particularly
to break down the effect and power of the traditional when
tradition is seen to be detrimental to man's development,
and to establish also a continuity between past and present
by revealing the effects of the former on the latter. Yet
this aim cannot really be said to have been fulfilled in the
works of a philosophical historian such as Voltaire, because
1. Turgot, Life, p. 195; see also below, Chapter III.
2. See particularly Marcello T. Maestro, Voltaire and
Beccaria as Reformers of Criminal Law (New York, 1942)
and Peter Gay, Voltaire's Politics (Princeton, 1959).
3. Ibid., passim.
4. See especially Chapter IV below.
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his capacity for finding such continuity is affected by his
lack of a synthesising thesis, by the continuation in his
work (and in that of many other of the philosophes) of the
traditional historical fragmentation and periodisation, and
by a tendency to separate the past into philosophical and
unphilosophical ages. Such characteristics mean that one's
understanding of the past, and, hence, one's ability to see
it reflected in the present, is rather limited. This fact,
indeed, is a major distinguishing factor between the French
and the Scottish philosophical history, for, apart from the
Physiocrats, the only major French writer who is concerned
with man as he has been observed, and not as he 'ought' to
be, who explains man's past in terms of regular and primarily
'moral'"'' factors, is Montesquieu.
2
Montesquieu's two major works, Spirit of the Laws and
3
Considerations are of particular importance in the develop¬
ment of philosophical history - especially that form of it
4
employed by the theoretical writers - because they connect
the present of any society to its past in very general terms,
and because they trace the extent to which physical situation
determines forms of government, forms, which in general are
believed to possess constant or regular features. There is
not in Montesquieu's work any developed theory of the con¬
stant relationship of the parts of any society to its whole,
this concept being at the most implicit and certainly not
1. 'Moral' here means 'social' or 'human' institutions,
which are to be distinguished from physical causes.
2. See above, p. 6, note 3.
3. Considerations on the Causes of the Greatness of the
Romans and their Decline (trans. David Lowenthal, New
York, 1965, hereafter cited Considerations).
4. See below, Appendix B, pp. 518-525.
15
traced in any detail. There is, however, a suggestion that
all of a society's past helps to form its present nature,
and that the physical causes which predominate in the early
history of a state have a profound effect on those social
institutions which are later the main determinants of human
behaviour. Thus, while we cannot state that Montesquieu
established a synthesis of the past through revealing constant
laws which affect all human action, it is true that he does
show that all laws and institutions are a reflection of sit¬
uation, or physical factors. This is a vital element in the
development of a philosophy which sought to show the unity
between past and present, and Montesquieu was recognised by
the Scottish writers as very much a philosophical author1.
The philosophical desire to establish regularity and
uniformity in human history was only to be more thoroughly
developed by the theoretical philosophy which is able to
give a more profound meaning to the concept of 'philosophical'
history by its greater capacity for understanding the past
in its own terms. While it is true that the Scottish school
does not necessarily find the whole of the past acceptable,
per se, true too that its greater capacity for relative
assessment barely hides a dislike of the unphilosophical
elements of other times, the theoretical historians' employ¬
ment of all historical facts as meaningful and revealing is
1. See, for instance, Robertson, Charles V, Works, V,
p. 515 (Note XXII): 'two talents T7T dTstinguish that
illustrious author - industry in tracing all the cir¬
cumstances of ancient and obscure institutions, and
sagacity in penetrating into the causes and principles
which contributed to establish them ...'
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an integral part of their ability to connect all parts of
the past into a whole. Man's nature operates on constant
principles, they believed, and he retains certain vital
qualities throughout his experience in time; yet, changes
produced through variation in economic subsistence over the
centuries meant that the more destructive elements of these
qualities are moderated, and 'philosophical' changes come
into being"*". Human nature, then, is both constant and yet
continually changing and refining itself, and all the ex¬
pressions of this nature, along with the variations in
economic basis which produce such changes, are historical
facts, which must be taken into account in our interpretation.
Most importantly, these facts permit us to see a continuity
between one age and another, to relate the particular -
each society - to the general - human society - to see, in
2
short, that diversity produces uniformity .
Acceptance of all stages of human change, therefore,
permitted the theoretical writers to accept all facts, and
to relate them to general patterns; hence, the theoretical
version of philosophical history does not break up the past
into ages which are defined as philosophical or unphiloso-
phical, does not attempt to present history solely as a
record of beneficial eras interspersed between detrimental
ones. Because of this concept of history as a stadial pro¬
cess, because it is able to account in economic terms for
the changes that are seen to occur in man's nature, the
theoretical interpretation gives a greater depth to the idea
1. 'Philosophical' here meaning 'just','moderate' etc.
See Appendix A.
2. See below, Chapters II - IV.
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of institutional or social studies; and the word 'philoso¬
phical' as applied to the investigatory techniques that un-
derly this interpretation,means also the capacity to re¬
produce the process of change and development in one's work
so as to enable men to understand other ages, and, through
this, to understand their own times. In the theoretical
historian's view, to be philosophical, then, is not only to
be tolerant and humane; but it also means that one is able
to understand the causes of past intolerance and inhumanity
as expressed in institutions, to relate these, through the
conjectural process"'", to the general and major causal factor
of subsistence, and thereby to produce a wholly new form of
historical writing.
Voltaire's inability to find general and interrelated
factors is quite in opposition to this synthesising capacity
of the theoretical philosophy, and this is expressed in the
fact that he cannot accept the totality of human experience
and the complexity of human nature. It is true that he de¬
nies we can study the past from the point of view of theories
which are not based on observation or on the close study of
man in many types of social setting; his criticism of
Rousseau, for instance, is based on his belief that man's
having become more 'philosophical' reveals the development
2
of his nature, not the corruption of it . Yet his own view
of human nature and the manner in which it changes is some¬
what limited. This is not necessarily to say that this
general type of philosophical history considers that man's
nature is wholly fixed, that he is seen to have been the
1. See below, pp.BO, note 1, 340 ff.
2. Philos. de l'Hist., p. 106.
3. That is, as distinct from the theoretical development
of philosophical, or social, history.
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same at all times; Voltaire himself, for example, was aware
that the progress of the human mind was slow, and that many
faculties apparently take time to develop and ripen, so that
while he may state that man has always been the same, that
all history 'c'est la meme piece qui se joue tous les theatres
avec quelques changements de noms'\ he is really only saying
that passions remain constant amidst diverse situations.
Nonetheless, such a thesis differs from the theoretical in
that it suggests there are merely arrangements of passions
which differ in order to produce variations in human history,
as opposed to the theoretical belief that passions themselves
are dependent on the situation of society; the latter inter¬
pretation attempts to establish cause rather than simply to
note variations. Voltaire does, indeed, make an effort to
bring the past within the understanding of the present by
2
referring to constancies m human nature ; yet his pronounce¬
ments on this concept do not go much beyond a recognition of
certain consistencies in human feeling, as well as of varia¬
tions and the variety of causes which have somehow produced
the alternation between good and evil in the past. It is
not that there is an inability on his part to accept change
which distinguishes his work from that of the theoretical
historians; it is rather that his limited capacity to es¬
tablish major causal factors inhibits the establishment of
general causal patterns in his interpretation. He cannot
go beyond the change which he does see as having occurred
1. Theodore Besterman (ed.) Voltaire's Correspondence, XLI
(Geneve, 1958) p. 47.
2. Philos. de l'Hist., p. 107.
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in the past in man's nature and institutions, in order to
discover the constant elements in all change; he can only
suggest some 'meaning' in the very alternation between
superstition and the philosophical eras.
Voltaire's theories of explanation are also limited by
his inability to accept that man is an extraordinary complex
being - he is unable, for instance, to understand the phenom¬
enon of Joan of Arc or the apparently contradictory behaviour
of the crusaders"'" - and also his belief that each action has
a direct and limited relationship with its end. To achieve
good, we must have actions which are concerned with general
benefit, and the past dominance in society of war, of the
search for glory and the desire for heroism, coupled with an
indifference to such vital factors as agricultural develop¬
ment, has meant the creation of a tradition which is basi¬
cally non-productive — a theme which is seen especially in
Si^cle de Louis XIV. If the past is basically unphilosophi-
cal, he implies, it is unlikely that the philosophical can
emerge with ease, and there is little indication in his work
that he sees unplanned benefits eventually emerging'from
actions which had an explicit and quite different end in
view.
Certainly it is obvious that Voltaire's use of the idea
2 .
of heterogeneity of ends is limited, and, while he may show
1. Essai sur les moeurs ... (Paris, 1963) I, pp. 566,
751-752. However, see Mason, op. cit., pp. 68-74.
2. For the theoretical employment of this concept, see
below, Chapter II.
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some tendencies towards using this concept as a causal fac¬
tor^, the very isolation of such instances indicates that
the theory of cumulative and unintended effects is not an
2
integral part of his theory of change . The concatenation
of events which he sometimes uses as an explanatory factor
is never extended to the degree which the theoretical his¬
torians employed, nor does Voltaire have any concept of eco¬
nomic and social 'laws' of development which permit the
theoretical idea of heterogeneity to be used to show that
pattern rather than chance is a basic element in human his¬
tory. If Voltaire sees that particular factors must occur
before there is change - even though this change may be sim¬
ply the expression of a hitherto dormant 'national spirit' -
the special rather than the general causes emphasised in such
change means that chance itself is of considerable importance,
and the emergence of active and beneficial individuals
appears very much dependent on 'accident'. There is no means
in Voltaire's theory,- by which progress, or advance towards
a philosophical society, can be explained in regular or con-
1. See Si^cle de Louis XIV (hereafter cited Siecle) Chap¬
ter XXXVI, in Oeuvres Historiques (Paris, 1957) p. 1005.
See also Voltaire's Lettres sur les Anglais (Cambridge,
1961) No. 9, 'Sur le gouvernement': 'la liberte est nee
en Angleterre des querelles des tyrans; les barons for-
cerent Jean sans Terre et Henri III a accorder cette
fameuse charte, dont le principal but etait a la verite
de mettre les rois dans la dependence des lords mais
dans laquelle la reste de la nation fut un peu favorise,
afin que dans 1'occasion elle se rangeat du parti de ses
pretendus protecteurs. Cette grande charte, qui est
regardee comme l'origine sacree de libertes anglaises,
fait bien voir elle meme combien peu la liberte etait
connue.'
2. See Paul Sakman, 'The Problems of Historical Method
and of Philosophy of History1 in Voltaire', History and
Theory Beiheft II (1971) p. 40.
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sistent terms. If the necessary causes are missing or are
interfered with, if there are no prominent individuals,
there is little possibility of change or of explaining the
causes of any change which does in fact occur.
Voltaire's search for the philosophical or useful truths
in prior ages did lead to an emphasis on the importance of
studying all types of societies, all types of institutions,
yet it also meant a denial of much of what he discovered.
The sole factor uniting past and present in his work is the
idea of progress, the advance of the beneficial, and this
unity is precarious when the search for the philosophical tends
to separate past facts into two groups. The theoretical
suggestion of laws of similar stages of growth, of similar
progress of societies at different moments in time"*", is not
an integral part of Voltaire's work and only rarely does he
indicate a belief in such universal laws or truths. Hence,
while he may be said to search for laws in the past, he does
not find these to exist in any positive sense. Man only
learns from the past how much the unphilosophical has domi¬
nated, and how much it is necessary to break down religious
and political repression before society can become free.
There is no understanding in his histories of the ways in
which such ideology and beliefs can be seen as an expression
of human nature, as related to the economic situation of man,
as a necessary part of the growth towards the emergence of
the philosophical itself.
While some French writers were able to accept all of the
1. See below, Chapter III.
past, even accepting, as Turgot did, the need to distinguish
between the rigid and repetitive patterns typical of nature
and the laws that are seen in human society, this approach
is not typical of the sort of philosophical history which
Voltaire wrote. When there is no constant reference to pro¬
perty as a basis of change, there is a greater dependence on
seeing a relationship between cause and discernible effect,
on revealing correlation between good actions and beneficial
ends: the absence of general and unintended causes precludes
the emergence of a theory of unplanned and widespread develop¬
ment. Hence, although there is some indication in Essai sur
les Moeurs that trade and manufactures are important to the
development of freedom of thought and action, and although
the actual progress of these is seen as instinctive rather
than conscious, Voltaire cannot really go much beyond this'!'
The continuation of such beneficial factors in times of chaos
is not explained through any theories as to the nature of man
2
or the strength of the trading instinct .
Furthermore, while there is some suggestion in Voltaire's
work that commerce and changes in the division of land, for
instance, are productive of a spirit of liberty, such factors
are not a part of any all-embracing theory as in the theo¬
retical philosophy; the connection between the possession of
land or the development of trade, and the emergence of po¬
litical freedom, is only lightly indicated. Material factors
are not seen as leading to changes in human nature or to other
1. Essay on Manners (hereafter cited Essay) in Works
(Paris, 1901) XXVI, p. 42.
2. Essay, Works, XXVI, pp. 42-65; see also Sakmann, op. cit.
p. 40.
unplanned, changes at a later stage of man's history. There
is a suggestion that the arts and a certain 'human' spirit,
the capacity to survive and to prosper are important in the
renewal and continuation of life"*"; and Voltaire also suggests
that industry is useful in the development of the philoso¬
phical society. But this is not the same as saying that there
is a continued interaction between the development of commerce
and the emergence of a free society, which is the theoretical
position, and one developed in great detail. Thus, the
association of wealth and liberty in Voltaire's remarks on
the flowering of genius in Italy - merely one of the many
suggestions which were to be examined more fully by the theo¬
retical school - is tantalisingly abrupt; in addition, it
suggests again that Voltaire's work is one which, however
liberal in interesting speculation, is devoid of a basic,
interconnecting theory. Although we must be careful, there¬
fore, not to over-emphasise the importance of conscious
rational action as causal element in this early type of philo¬
sophical writing, it is true to say that explanations of
change in work such as Voltaire's are primarily intellectual
in nature; as such they differ further from the theoretical
which is concerned to show that the intellectual is depend¬
ent on the social subsistence level, that planned and con¬
scious action is both limited in its intended effect, and is
also an effect rather than a cause of the society in which
it is expressed^.
1. 'Thoughts on the Panorama of History', in Works, XXX,
p. 315.
2. See below. Chapter IV.
Philosophical history of the sort that Voltaire wrote
is not thereby dependent on a theory of 'accident', how¬
ever; he agrees with Gibbon that history revealed 'a system,
connexions and consequences, where others can discern only
the caprices of fortune'^, and that there is some pattern in
life itself. Yet such agreement did not mean an adherence
to a theory in which all past events could be seen as form¬
ing a united whole, and his acceptance of this philosophical
principle is expressed primarily in the belief that we must
interpret the past in a secular, anti-providential, anti-
accident fashion. He believed that all events had a cause
and are connected in at least broad terms, that nothing is
accidental in the sense of being without cause - 'rien ne
2
peut exister sans cause' . But, lacking a theory by which
he could trace these hidden connections of events, he was
driven to interpret the past by a means which to the theo¬
retical writers was merely another form of accident -
through seeing the unphilosophical challenged by the emergence
of the great man, a thesis which is a fundamental part of
the concept that there is a close relationship between cause
and end.
In his major historical works, therefore, it is apparent
that Voltaire sees fortune has a large part to play in life
eventhough this dominance of fate over man is related to the
1. Gibbon, Essay on the Study of Literature (hereafter
cited Essay) in The Miscellaneous Works of Edward
Gibbon ... Illustrated . by John, Lord Sheffield
(London, 1837) p. 655.
2. Quoted in Brumfitt, Voltaire Historian, p. 121.
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nature of the particular society which he is examining. In
his study of the past, with its emphasis on chaos, misery,
cruelty and destruction1, he sees society to be vulnerable
in proportion as beneficial laws and stability are missing.
In such a thesis, which is certainly one basic to the theo¬
retical history also, any improvements (whatever may be their
cause) mean that society is less likely to be affected by
the incidental and accidental. The regularity and order
which stabilise the social system limit the possibility of
permanent effects resulting from isolated incidents. This
philosophy is by no means any explanation of the development
of man, or even of the existence of the individuals who make
for change, but it does at least reveal that Voltaire's
interpretation of human society contains some hope for a
better future if past gains are not wiped out.
Furthermore, this philosophy also stresses how much
the institutions existing in a society must necessarily play
some role in determining the likelihood of successful change,
and Voltaire states that 'every man is formed by the age he
lives in, and few are there who can rise above the manners
2 . . . .
of the times' . Yet his posxtion on the role of society m
forming the individual is not wholly clear, for he remarks
that men have been unable to change the system in which they
3
live , but at the same time he also suggests that those
1. See Philos. de l'Hist., p. 141, also Besterman (ed.)
Voltaire's Correspondence (Geneve, 1958-1961) XXXVIII,
pp. 55-56, XLVI, p. 295, XLIX, p. 131, LV, p. 194,
LXII, p. 116.
2. Essay, Chapter LXIX, Works, XXVI, p. 59
3. Essay, Chapter LXIX, Works, XXVI, pp. 58-59. See also
Recapitulation of Essay, Works, XXX, p. 137.
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prominent individuals who possess political acumen can in
fact implement major innovations, often in the face of major
difficulties. Hence he sees that change may often come about
in part because of a social situation which permits the rise
and development of a powerful individual, but that primarily
it occurs through men who possess qualities that enable them
to overcome many obstacles. If so, if this is really what
Voltaire means, then it is clear that chance continues to
play a role in the evolution of such a situation. And, al¬
though Voltaire suggests that we are to study the spirit of
an age rather than the actions of individuals"'", this is main¬
ly a warning against dependence on isolated and unconnected
2
events . Much of his causal theory, then, depends on the
great men who can often form the spirit of an age itself by
their own actions, an explanation of change which the theo-
3
retical history attempts to do away with . They do see that
the individual may have considerable importance in particular
social stages, but they continually seek to connect the iso¬
lated with the general and to show the influence of past ages
on the actions of any one man.
This is not to deny, however, that Voltaire does make
some attempt to suggest some background in the history of
both France and Russia which would explain the existence of
1. Siecle, Oeuvres Historiques, p. 616; see also Essay,
Chapter LXVIII, Works, XXVI, p. 34.
2. Sakmann, op. cit., p. 33.
3. See below, pp. 164-165.
certain powers of those individuals whom he considers most
thoroughly, Louis XIV and Peter the Great. In France, the
monarchy is the long-established form of government and is
supported by the national spirit; and in Russia the people
are easily manipulated by a powerful ruler because of the
primitive state of the society and the traditional authority
of the czar"'". But it is not the existence of such insti¬
tutions or power in themselves which explains the develop¬
ment of the philosophical society under particular individ¬
uals, for it is clear that there have been rulers in the past
of both societies who have held similar authority but have
nonetheless done little to benefit the state. The limits
of any nation, in Voltaire's opinion, can be overcome only
by those who are concerned with the positive development of
the state, whether from self-interest or love of grandeur,
or from more traditionally 'benevolent' motives - an abso¬
lute monarch, anxious to do good, succeeds without diffi-
2
culty in everything he may undertake . Thus it is the na¬
ture of the ruler which is of greatest importance, a theory
which gives the individual, whether 'good' or 'bad', a
great deal of influence on his society.
In Siecle particularly it is apparent that Voltaire sees
that the detrimental spirit of earlier ages is closely re¬
lated to the absence of a strong government, that during
the Fronde, for instance, society is marked by flippancy,
1. Histoire de Charles XII (hereafter cited Charles XII)
Chapter I, in Oeuvres Historiques, pp. 70-76; see also
Robertson's review of Alexander Gordon's work on Russia
under Peter in Edinburgh Review, I (1755) p. 1.
2. Siecle, Chapter X, Oeuvres Historiques, p. 705.
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vulgarity, treason, that this is a period of 'licence
effrenee, de troubles, d'iniquites, et meme d' impietes . It
is obvious, also, that as long as the society or individual
in power is concerned with the pursuit of a 'glory' that
does not involve a material betterment for all, this un-
philosophical spirit will continue to erode those useful in-
2
stitutions which do actually exist . It is only those who
have the personality and the talents to rule firmly and to
the advantage of the state, who do not permit their indi¬
vidual nature to intrude on the needs of the society, who
can be seen as achieving a philosophical development.
That Voltaire considers Louis XIV to be of this nature
is suggested not only by his endorsement of the king in all
matters but also in his belief that Louis' devotion to
amusements never interfered with his performance of his
3
duties . On the other hand, in clear contrast, he sees
Charles XII's actions as fundamentally disadvantageous to
the state and this is so because Charles truly belongs to
the ranks of those who are concerned with honour and glory
and not with the philosophical. The monarch who is no ser¬
vant to his country is not truly a ruler and this dictum
applies equally to the idealistic and the 'good' who lack
the authority or qualities necessary to overcome a degraded
national spirit. The involvement in war and religious con¬
troversy such as the dispute between the emperors and the
1. Siecle, Chapter IV, Oeuvres Historiques, p. 656.
2. See Theodore Besterman, 'Voltaire, absolute monarchy
and the enlightened monarch', SV, XXXII (1965) pp. 7-21;
Lionel Gossman, 'Voltaire's Charles Xllrhistory into
art', SV, XXV (1963) pp. 691-720.
3. Steele, Chapter XXV, Oeuvres Historiques, p. 908.
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popes, which Voltaire considered exhaustively in the Essay,
may have a seeming glory, but this is real only if our stan¬
dards are based on the unphilosophical. As Voltaire traces
the actions of men throughout time he finds predominant a
concern for the vainglorious, and although this is not al¬
ways detrimental if accompanied by other achievements, it is
noticeable that those events which make for glory are also
the means by which any genuine growth is itself prevented'*'.
War destroys trade and commerce, inhibits the growth of in¬
dustry, decimates populations, wastes great sums of money
that might well have been applied to some more profitable
end; religion interferes with the state's control of its
citizens, upsets the flow of money within a nation, denies
to the society large numbers of men and women who might
otherwise be employed in more beneficial ways and, worst of
all, leads to meaningless controversies which are among the
2
most bitter form of war known to men . Even war carried out
during more philosophical ages such as that of Louis XIV
3
achieves nothing, not even in material terms . Peace is al¬
ways better than glory, a concept which Voltaire promulgated
4
even in his early works , and although he occasionally gave
value to the idea of honour, this was so only when this term
meant something positive, as under Louis XIV. In kings who
have no real concern with the benefit of their state, honour
and glory are simply the reasons given for indulging the self.
1. 'Thoughts on the Panorama of History', Works, XXX, p. 314.
2. This is a theme to be seen in both Sidcle and Charles XII.
3. Sidcle, Chapter XXIX, Oeuvres Historiques, p. 978; see
also Recapitulation of Essay, Works, XXX, p. 135.
4. See Charles XII, Oeuvres His toriques, p. 272; this does
not mean that Voltaire expects war to end, only that it
will be less destructive; see Si&cle, Chapters XII, XXIX,
Oeuvres Historiques, pp. 737, 977, 979.
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This is to be seen particularly in the case of Charles
XII, none of whose actions appear to Voltaire to have had
any lasting merit, certainly none that was of benefit to Swe¬
den. Because of this Charles is contrasted unfavourably with
a ruler such as Peter the Great whom we might otherwise have
thought of as a personality not likely to gain Voltaire's
approval. Charles certainly has many good qualities, a
strong sense of honour, rare expressions of cruelty only, an
outstanding martial spirit; yet many of his virtues are so
excessive and rigid that they are in effect faults, such as
the totally unproductive stubbornness that led him to remain
in Turkey, an action which did not even lead to individual
glory; 'Ses grandes qualities, dont une seule eut pu im-
mortaliser un autre prince, ont fait le malheur de son pays. '
The importance of a solid philosophical spirit or of a
tendency to act in such a manner as to bring about philoso¬
phical ends is nowhere so clearly illustrated as in the
careers of both Louis XIV and Peter the Great. As we have
seen above, Voltaire believes that the period prior to
Louis' effective reign was one of social disorder and this
is seen to lead to a situation in which the apparently un-
2
important or the accidental had a considerable effect , and
gave authority to those who lacked the experience to handle
it. But under the all-embracing and strong influence of the
king whose personality and power combined to produce ef¬
ficiency and order, the power of incompetent individuals
1. Charles XII, Oeuvres Historiques, p. 272.
2. Si^cle, Chapter V, Oeuvres Historiques, p. 657.
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declined, and the effect of the unexpected was proportion¬
ately reduced. The king's individuality was everywhere
apparent, from the increase in a truly martial spirit"'", to
the instituting of reforms which affected every aspect of
life; and if some of the success which his efforts met with
was due to the basic French spirit, it is nonetheless obvious
that this spirit itself could only have been regenerated and
guided by a man of Louis' distinctive capacities: all these
2
actions needed to be both thought of and carried out . The
national spirit could not have been awakened, the nobles
could not have become aware of their duties spontaneously;
and it is the king himself who initiates or manages the
growth of trade, arts, the navy and finance, national build-
3
ings and the police , all of which are clearly beneficial to
the people4.
Such changes are themselves evidence of a true glory,
which is genuinely beneficial, and this glory obviously be¬
longs to Louis. Similarly, in Charles XII, it is Peter the
Great who receives most of Voltaire's praise, and Peter alone
who is believed to have been a man able to achieve a massive
re-structuring of the society on philosophical principles.
Because the benefit of the czar's actions is for the whole
of the society, the uncouth, sometimes cruel Peter is be¬
lieved to be a monarch who genuinely serves his people. Al¬
though Voltaire does not approve of the less pleasant
Siecle, Chapter V, Oeuvres Historiques, p. 652 (in
comparison with that of the Fronde).
2. Si^cie, Chapter XXIX, Oeuvres Historic;ues, p. 977.
3. Ibid., Chapters XXIX-XXXII, Oeuvres Historiques, pp.
963-1018.
4. Ibid., Chapter XXIX, Oeuvres Historiques, pp. 979-980.
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characteristics of this ruler, and never condones them, he
finds that Peter is superior to the more gentle, more seem¬
ingly philosophical-mannered Charles: the thorough reform of
his society from a barbarian to a more civilised one, the
establishment of enlightened institutions, of a system of
defence, of arts, the active watchfulness over the church
and the limitations imposed on it"*", are the actions of a ser¬
vant of the people. Even Peter's involvement in war, an
institution which Voltaire generally disapproves of, is
seen to bring some benefit to the state, unlike the unpro-
2
ductive battles of Charles .
This is not indeed to suggest that Voltaire sees the
evolution of philosophical society to depend predominantly
on a lack of self-interest, or on important individuals
possessing 'goodness'. Although his use of theories of
self-interest is very limited in comparison with the theo¬
retical history, it is nonetheless obvious that he sees
political virtu or skill as necessary and as an integral part
of the philosophical society, and also finds that goodness
itself is often unproductive. He is thus able to make a
clear distinction between those who rule and the means which
they can and do use, and the morality of the ordinary citizen.
Enlightened ends, he feels, are not necessarily brought about
by, or dependent on, those who are themselves philosophical:
we must always distinguish between the monarch as a human be¬
ing, and his actions as a ruler of men. Thus he is able to
1. Charles XII, Oeuvres Historiques, pp. 68-77, 125-126,245.
2. Ibid., Oeuvres Historiques, p. 245.
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both criticise Peter the Great for some of his actions, yet
also to see that his statecraft was generally beneficial;
although he remained savage in the midst of his attempts to
civilise his people"*", he is nonetheless entitled to a place
alongside other rulers who have achieved much for their
2
societies in the manner which was best suited to this .
Voltaire indeed wishes that men were different, that they
were less prone to violence and superstition, yet he agrees
with the position of Machiavelli that we must deal with what
is, and establish standards that are in accordance with this.
To do so, indeed, is an integral part of the philosophical
history.
But at the same time it still remains true that Voltaire's
dependence on the individual as explanation for qualitative
change in society meant that his version of philosophical
history differs substantially from that of the theoretical
school. We must distinguish, then, between an acceptance of
the philosophical values and of the study of the past through
an examination of social institutions, and the particular
interpretations and conclusions which separate Voltaire's
work from that of the theoretical writers. In one sense, in¬
deed, both are writing philosophical history of a similar
nature; yet, as will be shown in the following chapters, the
1. Charles XII, Oeuvres Historiques, p. 76.
2. See, for instance, Voltaire's assessment of William
III and Leopold of Lorraine (Siecle, Chapter XVII,
Oeuvres Historiques, pp. 790-791,808; and of the Duke
of Burgundy (Siecle7 Chapter XXI, Oeuvres Historiques,
p. 852.
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theoretical usage of ideas which Voltaire suggested goes far
beyond the possibilities of philosophical history as seen and
written by him. The Scottish works have a depth which is
peculiar to themselves.
This is not to deny that in the French philosophical w
writing there is some attempt to relate the general and the
particular; such efforts can be seen particularly in the be¬
lief that providence must be dismissed as a causal factor,
in the attempts made to relate specific events to what was
known to be regular and constant. Yet at the same time it
is undeniable that in much of the French writing there is
none of the more profound and detailed study of the past that
we see in the theoretical work and little of the intricate
connecting of particular facts to general principles of in¬
vestigation which results from the belief in the dominance
ofeconomic factors in human life and progress. With the
notable exception of the Physiocratic school, there is no
awareness of the concept of stages of development which re¬
lates each aspect of the past to a theory of constant human
response and to patterns of economic development, thereby
uniting the apparently isolated. The French philosophical
writers were doubtless influenced by modern ideas of science,
by the concept of regular laws, yet there seems to be no
profound influence of these on the actual historical writing
they produced. In the theoretical work, on the other hand,
there is a synthesis of the part and the whole, of the past
and the present greater than that which Voltaire could have
hoped to accomplish through his more fragmented view; and
it is this synthesis which enables theoretical history to
accept the totality of human experience and to explain all
35
°f it in terms of general and universal laws.
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CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL HISTORY I - THE OPERATION OF HUMAN NATURE
The general philosophical interpretation of the past,
however much it attempted to make man the centre of histori¬
cal investigation, was nonetheless unsuccessful in this aim
through its inability to provide an explanation of the means
by which man gained control of life. Its emphasis on the
role of the unexpected and of the individual in particular,
its explicit connecting of acts and ends, its lack of a
theory of progress or of an interpretation of man's nature
which accounted for consistent advance given certain broad
conditions, meant that it still retained some aspects of
older philosophies in which the uncertain dominated. It is
this particular aspect of the general philosophical writing
which the theoretical historians appear to have overcome,
and this because of the two major tenets of their philosophy,
the inherent capacity of man to progress, and the process
of the heterogeneity of ends1.
1. Some suggestions have been made as to the particularly
Scottish background of the theoretical history's philo¬
sophical basis, and though these suggestions do not ex¬
plain the development of similar work elsewhere - such
as that of Turgot - it is possible that the mingling
of disciplines in Scottish education, and the contrast
of highland and lowland societies, for instance, may
have provided an impetus to comparative studies. See,
in general, Duncan Forbes, ' "Scientific" Whiggism:
Adam Smith and John Millar', Cambridge Journal, VII
(1954) pp. 643-670; A. L. Macfie, 'The Scottish Tra¬
dition in Economic Thought', in his The Individual in
Society (London, 1967) pp. 19-41; Ronald L. Meek, 'The
Scottish Contribution to Marxist Sociology', in his
Economics and Ideology and Other Essays (London, 1967)
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'One of the most remarkable differences between man
and the other animals', Millar wrote:
'consists in that wonderful capacity for the im¬
provement of his faculties with which he is en¬
dowed. Never satisfied with any particular attain¬
ment, he is continually impelled by his desires
from the pursuit of one object to that of another;
and his activity is called forth in the prosecution
of the several arts which render his situation more
easy and agreeable.' 1
These qualities, which are always expressed in economic
terms, and, through this, in particular social achievements,
are supplemented and aided by the process of heterogeneity
by which particular actions with limited intended ends are
believed to achieve also far greater and more profound un¬
intended results. Man's acting as freely as possible in
his own interest, which is naturally the manner in which he
acts, and expressing his actions in economic terms, auto¬
matically produces certain beneficial relationships. Any
interference with man's freedoms, with his ordinary advance¬
ment of the self, will result in a corresponding limitation
of economic and social development - slavery and monopoly,
for instance, always interfere with ordinary economic re-
2
turns from land and industry . When he is left alone, the
heterogeneous process permits the development of human
pp. 34-50; A. Skinner, 'Economics and History - The
Scottish Enlightenment', and 'Economics and the Problem
of Method' , S'JPE, XII (1965) pp. 1-22, 267-280; Peter
Stein, 'Law and Society in Eighteenth-Century Scottish
Thought', in N. T. Phillipson and R. Mitchison (eds.)
Scotland in the Age of Improvement (Edinburgh, 1970)
pp. 148-165. For a consideration of the emergence of
some aspects of historical thought which may have in¬
fluenced the theoretical philosophy, see Appendix B.
1. John Millar, The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks
(hereafter cited Origin) in W. C. Lehmann, John Millar
of Glasgow, 1735-1801: His Life and Thought (Cambridge,
1960) p. 218.
2. See below, pp. 93-94, 112-113, 122-125.
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nature to occur normally. The force of human inherent
capacities leads 'imperfect' or 'incomplete' institutions
of one age to gradually change, with time, and through man's
gradual achieving of stability, into beneficial systems in
another age without any conscious action or thought being
involved:
'Nations which in later periods of their history,
become eminent for (their) wisdom and justice,
had, perhaps, in a former age, paroxyms of lawless
disorder ... The very policy by which they
arrived at their degree of national felicity, was
devised as a remedy for outrageous abuse. The
establishment of order was dated from the commission
of rapes and murders; indignation and private re¬
venge, were the principles on which nations pro-
ceded to the expulsion of tyrants, to the emanci¬
pation of mankind, and the full explanation of
their political rights.' 1
These two interrelating factors of inherent capacity
to progress and the heterogeneity of ends together comprise
what the theoretical writers saw as 'the natural course of
things', and form the basis of an historical philosophy
which emphasises the necessity of an economic and political
laissez-faire - a philosophy which differs considerably
from earlier philosophical emphasis on individuals and on
the obvious connection between actions and ends. 'Man',
Smith complained, 'is generally considered by statesmen and
projectors as the materials of a sort of political mechanics.'
These 'projectors', he felt, 'disturb nature in the course
2
of her operations in human affairs' because they had no
knowledge of the basic principles which governed man and
1. Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History of Civil Society
(ed. Duncan Forbes, Edinburgh, 1966, hereafter cited
ESS ay) pp. 242-243.
2. Smith, quoted in Dugald Stewart, Collected Works (ed.
Sir William Hamilton, Edinburgh and London, T85T,here¬
after cited Works) X, p. 68. See also Ronald Meek,
'Smith, Turgot, and the "Four Stages" theory', Hist.
Pol. Econ, 3 (1971) pp. 9-27.
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which led to the unaided development of his mind and society.
Simple observation of past and present societies, however,
indicated that all governmental interference is unnecessary,
that 'nature' was in fact simply what man was; and, he
decided, 'it requires no more than to let her alone and give
her fair play in the pursuit of her ends that she may estab¬
lish her own designs':
'Little else is requisite to carry a state to the
highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbar¬
ism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable admin¬
istration of justice; all the rest being brought
about by the natural course of things. All govern¬
ments which thwart this natural course, which force
things into another channel, or which endeavour
toarrest the progress of society at a particular
point are unnatural, and to support themselves are
obliged to be oppressive and tyrannical.' 1
It is 'nature', then, the way in which man acts and
the manner in which his mind operates that is the material
of the theoretical writers, not the study of abstract ideolo¬
gies or theories of 'what might have been'; and such a philo¬
sophy leads the Scottish historians, particularly Smith in
2
Moral Sentiments , towards an acceptance of the totality of
human life and experience, towards an awareness that each
part of the history of man has contributed something towards
his development. An understanding of the theoretical beliefs
as to the nature of man is therefore of considerable impor¬
tance; for their ideas as to the operation of the human mind
are not only one of the most obvious differences between
their historical philosophy and that of earlier schools, but
are also fundamental to their major principles of man's
capacity to progress, and the heterogeneity of ends.
1. Smith, in Stewart, Works, X, p. 68.
2. Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (London,
1861, hereafter cited MS)
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The theoretical version of the philosophical interpre¬
tation of man seeks to clear away the former misconceptions
concerning human behaviour, and rather to base all such study
on the two inter-connecting principles that are seen as the
basis of human life - the capacity to progress and the
heterogeneity of ends. Through these factors it hopes to
be able to establish that there are no obscurities in our
knowledge of man, that we can in fact show 'connexions' and
rational sequences in the manner in which man acts, and par¬
ticularly that all parts of the human experience can be
shown to have clear relationships to each other. These re¬
lationships reveal that within variations there is a con¬
stancy of behaviour, and it is these constant elements in
the human mind, as well as the variations which are reflect¬
ed in them, that the theoretical writers attempt to trace.
In man's life, they believe, there are sequences and con¬
nections which explain all of his complex behaviour in
relatively simple terms.
Smith's philosophy of the human mind - which appears
to be the one which underlay the general theoretical approach -
reflects his and other theoretical writers' belief that man
is not affected by 'philosophical' or rational causes, but
is motivated to act through his own interest, and that it
is this interest, along with the principle of heterogeneity
of ends, which allows him to advance. What he is really
showing in Moral Sentiments, therefore, is both the quali¬
ties of man and the manner in which they normally develop
through time, even though much of his emphasis is on the
operations of the mind in the more advanced societies.
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In all cases, he sees that it is the natural qualities
of man, or the natural relationships produced by his situa¬
tion, which affect his behaviour; his advances are not based
on 'philosophical' factors, but are always based primarily
on his desire to advance himself, a desire which is often
expressed in most unphilosophical ways. The appearance in
society of what are considered philosophical thought and
actions, then, must necessarily be heterogenous, produced
by the gradual awakening and flowering of the human capaci¬
ties, which are dependent on improvement in the economic
situation. But although certain qualities are dependent up¬
on the emergence of a more secure social system"'", the philo¬
sophy of Moral Sentiments reveals the constant and continu¬
ing presence of certain factors in the manner in which men
act, the manner in which their natural interest is curbed
and moderated, and the way in which interest itself leads
to a process of constant change. In this way, the aims of
theoretical history to remove obscurity, to lessen the im¬
portance of the isolated, to show consequences and inter¬
connections between events, to reveal the presence of con¬
stant factors, are implemented.
2
In Smith's thesis, man is motivated neither by reaon
1. See below, Chapter III. See also Ralph Anspach,
'The Implications of The Theory of Moral Sentiments
for Adam Smith's Economic Thought', Hist. Pol. Econ.,
4 (1972) pp. 176-206.
2. MS, p. 470.
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nor by utility . The forces which move us can never be
only those which are produced by time, as these are, for
such a causal explanation would fail to account for the ear¬
lier stages of human society and our growth and development
from these to something more sophisticated, more truly
philosophical. Rather, he believes that man is moved by
his passions and learns through his senses, and the extent
of his response is never some abstract standard but is guided
by that which both society in general and various groups with¬
in that society deem to be appropriate. This standard it¬
self is always determined by the economic situation of
2
socxety , and is made known through the principle of sympathy.
This principle is one which is basic to man, therefore,
and it is distinguished by two features: first, it is
eminently social in nature, and, secondly, it communicates
all forms of passions: 'Sympathy ... may, without much
impropriety, be made use of to denote our fellow-feeling
3
with any passion whatever.' Men have a natural concern
1. MS, pp. 267-268, and see also pp. 21, 129-130, 263.
Certain factors may possess qualities of usefulness
to us without our being aware of the manner in which
this develops; we may have a sense of system, of the
appropriateness of things, which is of no real benefit
to us, or at least would not be if man were wholly
rational; but such factors, by encouraging the devel¬
opment of economic, through political, change, are in
fact very useful to human growth, even if we are un¬
aware of this heterogeneous process.
2. See below, Chapter III.
3. MS, p. 5.
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with their fellows because of the social grouping of human¬
kind , and desire to gain approval from them of their actions,
desire to avoid condemnation, to participate in general
social actions:
'Nature, when she formed man for society, endowed
him with an original desire to please, and an
original aversion to offend his brethren. She
taught him to feel pleasure in their favourable,
and pain in their unfavourable regard. She ren¬
dered their approbation most flattering and most
agreeable to him for its own sake; and their dis¬
approbation most mortifying and most offensive.' 2
The qualities which we ourselves value, furthermore,
are always produced by the system in which they are ex-
3
pressed , and thus are dependent on basic material factors,
not on some abstract standard. There is, for instance,
some limitation as to the actual form of sympathy in prim¬
itive society in general, where economic circumstances are
characterised by insecurity and men are able to be little
more than individuals concerned with the self and with
4what society deems necessary for upholding its standards .
It is only in the civil society that there are two forms
5
of sympathetic process , and even here sympathy can some¬
times be seen as a matter of duty, of habit, rather than a
g
spontaneous expression of feeling . Nonetheless, the very
1. MS_, pp. 10, 277, 466.
2. Ibid., p. 170.
3. Ibid., p. 296.
4. See Chapter III.
5. MS, p. 26.
6. MTllar, An Historical View of the English Government,
from the Settlement of the Saxons in Britain, to the
Revolution in 1688. To which are subjoined, some Dis¬
sertations Connected With the History of the Govern¬
ment, from the Revolution to the Present Time (London,
1818. hereafter cited Hist. View) IV, pp. 246-247.
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presence of one form at least in savage society indicates
that it is natural to man however much it is dependent on
material factors for degree of expression; and, as Smith
points out, this principle is seen not only in all ages, but
in all types of men - 'the greatest ruffian, the most hard¬
ened violater of the laws of society, is not altogether
without it'^ - linking us with each other. We always re¬
main men, capable of feeling, or at the least of trying to
blend in with the sentiments of society; and this constancy
of response, of our dependence on others, whether we may wish
it or not, strengthens the continuity and uniformity of hu¬
man responses: 'Our continual observations upon the conduct
of others insensibly lead us to form to ourselves certain
general rules concerning what is fit and proper either to
2
be done or to be avoided.' Sympathy itself, then, is based
on a sense of what is appropriate and what deserves merit,
and these factors form the moral approbation of all human
actions, which is dependent on what any system can afford
to make 'moral'.
The social nature of the principle of sympathy is
further developed by Smith's concept of the impartial spec¬
tator, a concept which also strengthens the idea that sym¬
pathy is always what any society can afford, as opposed to
being an absolute standard. The principle must always be
1. MS_, p. 3.
2. Ibid., p. 224, and see also p. 476. See also Millar,
Hist. View, IV, p. 246: 'Individuals form their notions
of propriety according to a general standard, and fash¬
ion their morals in conformity to the prevailing taste
of the times.'
45
more regular and stringent than any individual in the society
and thus it exists in its proper relationships and the ends
which these bring about even if men may be unable to act
according to its demands. Thus the bystander or the impar¬
tial spectator will often have a response which is not shared
by the persons directly involved:
'we sometimes feel for another, a passion of which
he himself seems to be altogether incapable; be¬
cause, when we put ourselves in his case, that
passion arises in our breast from the imagination,
though it does not in his from the reality.1 1
The impartial spectator or bystander or observer who
is not involved in any action, who is not personally concern¬
ed - and limited by such concern - represents the general
level of social awareness, approbation, disapproval and so
on. He can never achieve any standard above this norm, and
in this sense cannot be considered as an 'ideal', as detach¬
ed from ordinary standards. To see him in this sense would
be to endorse a belief in the possibility of particular
'moral' levels which have no relation to the general social
situation, and thereby to ignore Smith's constant emphasis
on what is normal or average for any given society or group.
The spectator reacts to, sympathises with, all the actions
of man which are amenable to the sympathetic process; and
stands for the general in any social body. He is always
limited by his surroundings, is partial, and is involved in
the society itself; he represents and expresses that which
'every human heart is disposed to beat time to, and thereby
1. MS, p. 7.
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applaud", and also identifies with any resentment 'which the
breast of every reasonable man is ready to adopt and sym¬
pathize with.'"'" Indeed, it is because of his limitations,
his lack of extra sensitivity or perception that the spec¬
tator often mistakes particular situations or accepts the
non-rational basis of social change. This concept, there¬
fore, is an integral part of Smith's emphasis on the extent
of the unphilosophical process in human society, of the
irrational manner in which the acceptable standard of any
group is determined.
We may also see the social nature of the principle of
sympathy in Smith's belief that particular passions may
have to be moderated or increased for us, for the impartial
2
spectator, to be able to sympathise with them ; and thus,
the appropriateness of response is determined not by ration¬
al thought but by what we have come to find is acceptable.
Because of the social rather than the individualistic nature
of the capacity of sympathy, we do not enter into all
passions equally; and while our sympathy for the social ones
is doubled because we identify both with the benefactor and
with the recipient, the unsocial passions such as hatred and
resentment receive a lower level of response from us - we
do not know, and cannot enter into, the precise situation
from which they arise.
This splitting, however, is not the result of lack of
interest in such situations, but rather of divided loyalties:
1. MS, p. 97.
2. See MS_, p. 31: 'the pitch which the spectator can go
along with, must lie, it is evident, in a certain medio¬
crity' .
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we see ourselves in both situations and feel both passions,
thus our sympathy is with both the person who feels them,
and the person who is the object of them1. Yet this is in
fact an advantage to society, even though it is hardly in¬
tended as such; for if we cannot share the same heightened
passion of either party, then both must be lessened to be
accepted by us, and sentiments which we consider as 1philo-
2
sophical' come into being quite unplanned . The principle
of sympathy is not a one-way process depending only on the
capacity of the spectator to become a part of any situation;
and because there cannot always be a precise correspondence
of feelings, the person principally concerned is also
obliged to participate to an extent beyond the mere express-
3
ion of his emotional situation .
Because of the social nature and heterogeneous effect
of this concept of sympathy as it is used to determine the
extent of morality or moral sentiments in society, it follows
that the idea of'conscience' in Smith's philosophy cannot be
something which is external to the norms of society, just
as the spectator himself is never the 'ideal'man. While
it is apparent that man may have problems in the actual
modification of his passions since these must always appear
4
important to him , it is also apparent that the need which
we have to gain the approval of others will affect the degree
1. MS, p. 44.
2. Ibid., pp. 33-39. See also Smith, Lectures on Justice,
Police, Revenue and Arms (ed. Edwin Cannan, Oxford,
1896, hereafter cited Lectures) p. 232.
3. For the variation in the extent of sympathy, see below,
Chapter III.
4. MS, p. 221.
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of our response to particular situations. We may find it
easy to deceive ourselves, but our observations upon the
actions of others and our need to be a part of society, will
correct such deception; furthermore, the desire which most
of us have to actually be what others think us to be also
aids in the development of our conscience, which is clearly
very much a social institution^. While our actions and
appearance may deceive even the spectator, then, we our¬
selves often correct such a situation:
'If the man without should applaud us, either for
actions which we have not performed, or for motives
which had no influence upon us; the man within
can immediately humble that pride and elevation
of mind which such groundless acclamations might
otherwise occasion, by telling us, that as we
know that we do not deserve them, we render our¬
selves despicable by accepting them.' 2
Conscience, like all of our other moral feelings, is
not something which can be dissociated from the norm, but
is very much dependent upon society. However much the idea
6f 'the man within' suggests innate concepts of morality
which have little relationship to variations in economic
stability, the fact that some members of society do not
possess such checks in full, and that these limitations
vary according to the standards of society, tends to limit
such a theory. The 'general rules of morality':
'are ultimately founded upon experience of what,
in particular instances, our moral faculties,
1. MS, pp. 161,164, 176-177, 184,192-194. Some groups in
the civil society do not feel obliged to conform to
ordinary morality but their moral sentiments are also
social, and indeed, often useful: see below, pp. 61-65.
2. MS, p. 186.
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our natural sense of merit and propriety, approve
or disapprove of. We do not originally approve
or condemn particular actions, because, upon exami¬
nation, they appear to be agreeableor inconsistent
with a certain general rule. The general rule,
on the contrary, is formed by finding from exper¬
ience that all actions of a certain kind, or cir¬
cumstanced in a certain manner, are approved or
disapproved of.' 1
The second major characteristic of the sympathetic pro¬
cess is that it covers all the passions, expresses all sorts
of feelings, and because of this it is seen to be of con¬
siderable importance in the theoretical interpretation in
that it can be used as a consistent factor in the explaining
of the entire range of human response to situations. It
always remains the means, whether in the earliest or the
most sophisticated society, whereby the social experience
and level of sentiment is made known to men. To it, bene¬
volence and interest, or the concern for others and that
for the self, are equal, in that it communicates both and
reflects any changes in social attitudes towards both.
In Smith's opinion, the extent of benevolence is lim¬
ited in any form of society, nor is it something which is
absolutely vital either to man or to the welfare of any
system. These are always dependent primarily on economic
factors. Nonetheless, it is seen by him to be a highly
desirable element, particularly in that man's capacity to
feel for others tends to make society more tolerable and
more peaceful, and permits the development of the more
2
gentle qualities of human nature . This is not to say
1. MS, pp. 224-225.
2. Ibid., p. 330.
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that benevolence is limited to later forms of society, how¬
ever; even though Smith was aware of the limitations imposed
on men in the early stages of society"'", he believed that
benevolence, which is produced by habitual close contact ,
was produced in all forms of society. The social passions,
of love, generosity, charity, kindness and so on , are not
produced by rational reflection but are spontaneous produc¬
tions of social situations, and depend for their emergence
on our belief that our feelings are directed towards those
who are worthy of them. Benevolence leads us to act spon¬
taneously to produce a particular closeness of relationship
that is conducive to happiness and stability:
'All the members of human society stand in need
of each other's assistance, and are likewise ex¬
posed to mutual injuries. Where the necessary
assistance is reciprocally afforded from love,
from gratitude, from friendship and esteem, the
society flourishes and is happy. All the differ¬
ent members of it are bound together by the agree¬
able bands of love and affection, and are, as it
were, drawn to one common centre of mutual good
offices.' 4
It is true, nonetheless, that the nature and extent of
benevolence varies from one form of society to another, and
that not only is it limited in societies where men have little
5
real contact with each other , but that, being the result of
close contact between men, its expression will necessarily
vary with the variations in the components of society. Hence
the term benevolence is used to describe the relationships
of members of families, those which we have between ourselves
See below, pp.82-86.
MS, p. 321.
Ibid., pp. 52 passim.
Ibid., p. 124.
See below, pp. 86-88.
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and the persons with whom we work, and those, for instance,
which are the basis of certain types of society - the kin¬
ship system of Scotland, a natural expression of pastoral
societies, which Smith sees remains of in his own time"'", was
also a form of benevolence. Furthermore, the nature and ex¬
tent of benevolence will also change in relation to changes
within society. In the civil society, for instance, that
closeness which we have come to think of as a natural part
of family life, may be affeeted by the forms of education
which separate children and parents and which thus destroy
2
the close contact that leads to this 'benevolence' , and the
3
gradual sophistication and greater extent of 'justice' may
4
make kinship benevolence superfluous . Such changes are en¬
tirely normal and reflect the stadial and evolutionary
nature of this particular passion or sentiment.
As well as emphasising that this quality varies accord¬
ing to the economic basis of society, Smith is also concern¬
ed to point out both its unphilosophical or irrational ele¬
ments, and the heterogeneous or unintended effects which it
produces. It is true, he feels, that the social passions
5
are those which easily gain approval from the spectator ,
and true also that beneficience is most appropriately a re¬
sponse made to similar feelings which have been directed
towards ourselves . Even if we do not receive the appro-
1. MS_, pp. 326-327.
2. MS, pp. 325-327. However, see Chapter IV below, where
there is a consideration of Smith's feelings about the
interference with the proper operations of the moral
sentiments.
3. See pp. 70-76 below, and also Chapter IV.
4. MS, p. 3 31.
_ -•>.
5. Ibid. , pp. 52 passim.
6. Ibid., p. 331.
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priate response to our own feelings, the sympathetic process
guarantees that this response is nonetheless felt in general,
and 'no benevolent man ever lost altogether the fruits of
his benevolence.'^ He also feels, however, that we often
have an excess of benevolence towards some persons - those
whose wealth and status we respect - and a corresponding de¬
crease in the appropriate sentiments towards those whom we
see as inferior to us and to whom we should act kindly and
2
with charity . Given the particular character of human na¬
ture, however, such 'discrepancies' are entirely natural
and indeed, quite without our intending them to do so, tend
to establish a social structure which is conducive to sta¬
bility"^.
Furthermore, the feelings of benevolence which we have
towards our own country which lead us to support its aims
above those of any other state, are often excessive; cer¬
tainly they lead us to hold somewhat unphilosophical sen-
4
timents concerning the advance of other nations . At the
same time, however, that he points out how much envy over
the material prosperity of other states is both beneath our
dignity and shows that we do not see how much it is basi¬
cally beneficial to ourselves, Smith also indicates that
such sentiments are natural and to some degree, even useful:
'That wisdom which contrived the system of human
affections, as well as that of every other part
of nature, seems to have judged that the interest
1. MS, p. 331.
2. Ibid.
3. See below, pp. 60-66.
4. MS, p. 336.
of the great society of mankind would be best pro¬
moted by directing the principle attention of each
individual to that particular portion of it which
was most within the sphere both of his abilities
and of his understanding.' 1
In this statement he re-iterates what is a common theme
in all of MS, not only the somewhat automatic, unthinking
operations of man and the effectiveness of these because of
the interconnection of all parts of nature, but also that
those factors which are called by him 'virtues' cover a much
wider range of actions than the more traditional concept of
'virtue' ever did. While benevolence itself, therefore, in
its expression through the social passions, is clearly
identifiable with older forms of 'virtue', some of the ways
in which Smith sees it applied especially in modern civilised
society are more unusual. He indicated in some detail how
much different societies possessed different forms of bene¬
volence and these differences, he believed, were due primar¬
ily to the needs produced by each economic form"'". When such
forms changed gradually, so also did the particular express¬
ions of benevolence. At the same time, however, benevolence
is also continued in the more advanced systems, here ex¬
pressing itself through the factors which have replaced, for
instance, the old kinship systems. Hence, while law itself
makes men equal, the various ranks and classes within so¬
ciety nonetheless seek to preserve their own position, through
their feelings of benevolence or relationship with their own
class interests, and the constitution of the society necess¬
arily changes in proportion as they increase or lose their
1. MS, p. 337.
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power. In all of society, then, we may see that benevolence,
like all other passions, is related to all aspects of social
life, and that it is particularly strong in such matters
where feelings - either for the country at large by the
statesman, or by members of any given class - are generally
beneficial: we seek to advance our own causes, or those of
our country, limited ends, if entirely acceptable ones, and
when this ambition is confined within reasonable limits it
produces greater ends, the general stability and security of
the system"'". Benevolence, therefore, is not necessarily
only an abstract form of friendship or respect, but is also
related to our desires for position and status, to our in¬
dividual and class concerns: in other words, it can also
include interest, hence it is not entirely other-related.
In such a process, good can come from lack of the 'philo¬
sophical' and through the normal expression of man's nature.
Even without the particular nature of beneficient feel¬
ings being extended to matters of interest, it is obvious
that Smith's theories consider in great detail the means by
which man advances through his own interest. This vital
element, which produces greater benefits than men intend,
is an integral part of Smith's emphasis on virtues other
than the traditional. Yet, this is not to say that interest
is unsocial or clearly separated from the contact with men
that characterises beneficence. Interest is in fact clear¬
ly a social passion in that it is fundamental to the devel¬
opment of society, because it is the most obvious expression
1. MS, pp.337-344.
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of man's desire to advance himself. In Smith's philosophy,
it is apparent, man always gains what he has through action
- the most characteristic feature of the human being"'" - and
much of this action is automatically and naturally directed
towards the benefit of the self:
'Every man is, no doubt, by nature, first and
principally recommended to his own care; and as
he is fitter to take care of himself, than of any
other person, it is fit and right that it should
be so. Every man, therefore, is much more deeply
interested in whatever immediately concerns him¬
self, than in what concerns any other man.' 2
So long as he observes certain rules which assure that
self-interest may also be expressed by his fellows, 'in the
race for wealth and honours, and preferments, he may run as
3
hard as he can' . This particular passion, it must be
stressed, has no connotation of selfishness because it is
entirely natural that man ascertain his own needs and wants,
and attempt to fulfil these to the greatest extent possible.
Indeed, if he lacks this quality he is hardly fit for society,
because it is individual actions which make the whole society
advance, and because it is through himself that man becomes
aware of his fellow men. If his original capacity for serv¬
ing himself is lacking it is hardly likely that he will be
able to play any part, however much it may be the bare mini-
1. MS, p. 154: 'That he may call forth the whole vigour
of his soul, and strain every nerve, in order to pro¬
duce those ends which it is the purpose of his being
to advance, Nature has taught him, that neither himself
nor mankind can be fully satisfied with his conduct, nor
bestow upon it the full measure of applause, unless he
has actually produced them.'
2. Ibid., p. 119; see also An Inquiry into the Nature and
Causes of the Wealth of Nations (ed. Edwin Cannan, Lon¬
don, 1950, hereafter cited WN) I, p. 475.
3. MS, p. 120.
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mum, within society proper:
'The man who feels little for his own misfortunes
must always feel less for those of other people,
and to be less disposed to relieve them. The man
who has little resentment for the injuries which
are done to himself, must always have less for
those which are done to other people, and be less
disposed either to protect or to avenge them. A
stupid insensibility to the events of human life
necessarily extinguishes all that keen and earnest
attention to the propriety of our own conduct,
which constitutes the real essence of virtue.' 1
For man to exist as a person, as an individual, there¬
fore, he must first be conscious of himself, and self-inter¬
est is the means through which this consciousness is devel¬
oped. Once society is established on certain principles,
and even in its most rudimentary stages, the most essential
contact between men is not through any highly developed
sense of 'virtue' or the love of others, but rather through
love of self. Men, all acting on this principle, will at
least gain not only the minimum for themselves, but also
aid the process through which society develops; and thus
self-love is the means by which any group of individuals
operates, not so much as a collection of separate persons,
but rather as a community:
'Man has almost constant occasion for the help of
his brethren, and it is in vain for him to expect
it from their benevolence only. He will be more
likely to prevail if he can interest their self-
love in his favour, and show them that it is for
their own advantage to do for him what he requires
of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of
any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that which
I want, and you shall have this which you want,
is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in
this manner that we obtain from one another the far
greater part of those good offices which we stand
in need of.' 2
1. MS_, p. 359 .
2. WN,ip. 18.
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The power of self interest comes from the close cor¬
relation between the observance of ordinary rules of be¬
haviour and the laws of economic advantage, which means that
virtue brings reward in proportion. This relationship, in¬
deed, is not based on anything more than fulfillment of
the duties demanded of man by the polished society; for the
laws of nature which ascertain that economic activity, pro¬
perly carried out, is recompensed by achievement of end, is
unaffected by what men may feel, or the spirit which actually
drives them: 'By pursuing his interest he frequently pro¬
motes that of the society more effectually than when he
really intends to promote it.'"'" The knave who cultivates
the soil will prosper, the good man who is indolent will
not; nature has no regard to men, but merely to that which
2
men do . Action rather than ideas will always be of more
importance, at least as far as the 'natural course of things'
is concerned:
'If we consider the general rules by which exter¬
nal prosperity and adversity are commonly dis¬
tributed in this life, we shall find, that not¬
withstanding the disorder in which all things
appear to be in this world, yet even here every
virtue naturally meets with its proper reward,
with the recompence which is most fit to encour¬
age and promote it ... What is the reward most
proper for encouraging industry, prudence, and cir¬
cumspection? - Success in every sort of business.
And is it possible that in the whole of life these
virtues should fail of attaining it? - Wealth and
external honours are their proper recompence, and
the recompence which they can seldom fail of ac¬
quiring. ' 3
The most essential factor in any society which lays a




claim to having established the true laws of morality, of
simple justice or that limitation of self which permits a
proper relationship between interest and prosperity, is that
it permits the free and uninterrupted continuation of the
natural propensity to barter and to trade, which is the basic
support of self-interest and of social advance. From this
comes the division of labour, by which commercial society
is able, theoretically, to extend the benefits of its ex¬
perience and knowledge to all members of the society, and
thereby create that true equality which makes for a natural
justice. As self-interest is spontaneous, so are the ad¬
vantages which result from its free exercise:
'This division of labour, from which so many ad¬
vantages are derived, is not originally the effect
of any human wisdom, which foresees and intends
that general opulence to which it gives occasion.
It is the necessary, though very slow and gradual,
consequence of a certain propensity in human nature
which has in view no such extensive utility.' 1
Yet, however much any society might have reached this
particular stage, and however much its geographic and cli¬
matic situation may provide the fundamental means by which
2
it will prosper , the extent of such prosperity cannot be
determined by such factors. This must always rather be in¬
dicated by any restrictive laws. It is admitted that the
strength of the virtue of self-interest will nearly always
succeed against either political philosophies or economic
theories which are essentially detrimental to it through
restricting the natural liberty of man; but the particular
1. WN, I, p. 17.
2. Ibid., p. 24.
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rate of development can indeed be affected, which leads
Smith to distinguish somewhat between what is natural and
what is normal"'".
It is in the nature of man, for instance, that his own
passions, his growing awareness of interest, will occasion¬
ally lead him into deviations from the natural relationship
between liberty and economic return, and such deviations are
seen as normal. The acceptance of the complexity of man,
and of the ways in which he achieves a form of justice that
we ourselves sympathise with is an integral part of the
philosophical basis of theoretical history; just as much as
interest itself and the effects which it has explains the
variations in human behaviour at the same time as it pro¬
vides a thread of consistency throughout the theoretical
interpretation. The particular effects of the dominance of
the normal is traced in some detail by Smith and Millar,
and what they see led to the general conclusion that Smith
had already arrived at in 1755, that
'All systems either of preference or of re¬
straint, therefore, being thus completely taken
away, the obvious and simple system of natural
liberty establishes itself of its own accord.
Every man, as long as he does not violate the
laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue
his own interest his own way, and to bring both his
industry and capital into competition with those
of any other man, or order of men.' 2
1. See Henry J. Bitterman, 'Adam Smith's Empiricism and
the Law of Nature', Journal of Political Economy, XLVIII
(1940) pp. 487-520, 703-734; see also Chapter III.
2. WN, II, p. 208; see also ibid., pp. 3-209 for a con¬
sideration of the interference in the natural course
of things by ideology, and of the necessity of 'justice',
including limitations on such ideology.
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Interest is a continuous expression in man's life, and
while it is an entirely natural passion, it is always re¬
lated to the laws of sympathy, both as to its expression
and also as to its limitations: because of this, the forms
which it may take, in accordance with the changing of society,
are always expressed through sympathy, and this process re¬
flects many of the means by which we advance ourselves and
society along with us. One of the more interesting of
Smith's arguments in this matter is the study which he
makes of the personal actions of men resulting from the
natural desire which we possess to gain the respect of our
fellows, and also to be worthy of this respect, to actually
possess the qualities which we appear to have:
'Though it is in order to supply the ne¬
cessities and conveniences of the body that the
advantages of external fortune are originally
recommended to us, yet we cannot live long in
the world without perceiving that the respect of
our equals, our credit and rank in the society we
live in, depend very much upon the degree in which
we possess, or are supposed to possess, those ad¬
vantages. The desire of becoming the proper ob¬
jects of this respect, of deserving and obtaining
this credit and rank among our equals, is perhaps
the strongest of all our desires; and our anxiety
to obtain the advantages of fortune is, according¬
ly, much more excited and irritated by this desire
than by that of supplying all the necessities and
conveniences of the body, which are always very
easily supplied.' 1
This is a process which may differ in content accord¬
ing to time or social grouping, but which is always constant
in its basic premise. Such a desire is an integral part of
the sympathetic process, for, even if sympathy is used more
often to transmit suffering rather than joy, it is easier
1. MS, pp. 310-311; see also Millar, Hist. View, IV, p. 274.
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for men to sympathise more with fortune, to enter more fully
into the sentiments which joy or happiness bring; and it is
for this reason that we respect the status, the wealth, and
the possessions of others: 'It is because mankind are dis¬
posed to sympathize more entirely with our joy than with
our sorrow, that we make parade of our riches, and conceal
our poverty.'^ Such need to gain respect or feeling from
others is the cause of our desire to advance, to improve
our material position, even though such improvement may bring
few apparent or even real benefits. While economic factors
are always the most profound basis of the state, therefore,
and the means by which man's passions are expressed, it is
apparent that we must always be aware also of the nature
of man which leads us to express our feelings in an eco¬
nomic fashion:
^Nothing is so mortifying as to be obliged to
expose our distress to the view of the public,
and to feel, that though our situation is open
to the eyes of all mankind, no mortal conceives
for us the half of what we suffer. Nay, it is
chiefly from this regard to the sentiments of
mankind, that we pursue riches and avoid poverty.' 2
In this particular expression of interest, the pur¬
suit of such respect and status has several effects, all
1. MS, p. 70. In this quote, the key word is 'entirely';
man's preference for the feelings produced by security
and status is greater than those produced by suffering
because of the very fact that through sympathy he feels
at least part of what his fellows are experiencing.
If there is diversity of sentiment, then the person
principally concerned must lessen his response in or¬
der for us to enter into it: thus what we sympathise
with, in such instances, is less than the actor him¬
self is feeling: see above, p.46 and also MS, p. 22.
2. Ibid., p. 70.
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of which lead to the heterogeneous progression of society,
assuming the absence of thoroughly inhibiting laws. It is
apparent that our very respect for particular customs or
ranks leads us to maintain particular divisions which al¬
ready exist in the society and which have come about
through the inequalities of property, the superiority of
age or of physical capacity. These divisions are entirely
natural to men, the theoretical writers believed, firstly,
and most importantly, because they are a response to situa¬
tion; and secondly, because the theoretical philosophy em¬
phasised that the idea of the natural and continuing equal¬
ity of men was merely an abstract concept, which bore little
relation to observed fact. It failed to take into account
man's irrational and non-philosophical nature which accept¬
ed and approved of rank and status and discrepancies of
wealth. This emphasis on the naturalness of such divisions
in life and of man's acceptance of them does not necessarily
distinguish the theoretical from general philosophical
writers; but it is noticeable that the theoretical capacity
to use position and possession as a distinguishing factor
of man, as opposed to attempting to suggest that the wis¬
dom and age characteristic of earlier ages was continued
in more sophisticated forms of society, is a distinct sep¬
aration from those political theories which are essentially
primitivistic in their desire to retain the concept of super¬
iority of moral faculties as being the basis of political
power:
'Nature has wisely judged that the distinction of
ranks, the peace and order of society, would rest
more securely upon the plain and palpable differ¬
ence of birth and fortune, than upon the invisible
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and often uncertain difference of wisdom and vir¬
tue. The undistinguishing eyes of the great mob
of mankind can well enough perceive the former: it
is with difficulty that the nice discernment of
the wise and the virtuous can sometimes distinguish
the latter. In the order of all these recommend¬
ations, the benevolent wisdom of nature is equally
evident.' 1
By this means, it is apparent, we increase the like¬
lihood of the stability of the society which is certainly a
prime consideration for Smith as a man of moderation who is
sceptical of the claims of politicians and tolerant of a
wide variety of non-'virtuous' behaviour, provided that it
2
does not invade the rights of men . To some degree, Smith
indicates that the respect which we show for those in a
class above us - our beneficence - encourages certain qual¬
ities in this group such as flippancy and ostentation, that
it is destructive of one sort of morality which depends on
thrift, temperance and hard work. The process of sympathy
leads us to tolerate the factors in the behaviour of the
rich which, to the philosophical or moral eye, are produc¬
tive of great inequities: 'Upon this disposition of mankind,
to go along with all the passions of the rich and the power¬
ful, is founded the distinction of ranks, and the order of
society.'3 Yet it is also his contention, that not only do
we not regard matters from this philosophical viewpoint, be¬
ing able to tolerate a wide range of behaviour without there¬
by disturbing the state, but also that there is more than
one form of morality in the civil society, and the behaviour
of the ordinary man is not in fact affected by his feelings
1. MS, p. 332; see also ibid., p. 125.
2. See below, pp. 69-73.
3. MS, I, p. 73.
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concerning those above him. In this distinction, he dis¬
misses once more the traditional attitude towards human be¬
haviour and reveals the variations which the nature of man
can successfully accept:
'Two different roads are presented to us, equally
leading to the attainment of this so much desired
object; the one, by the study of wisdom and the
practice of virtue; the other, by the acquisition
of wealth and greatness. Two different characters
are presented to our emulation; the one of proud
ambition and ostentatious avidity; the other, of
humble modesty and equitable justice. Two diff¬
erent models, two different pictures are held out
to us, according to which we may fashion our own
character and behaviour.' 1
The existence of these two forms of morality is a
natural product of the varying situation of different groups
within a social system; and while it is obvious that the
particular tendencies of the upper class towards vanity and
status leads the members of this to act in such a manner as
2
will gain admiration it is also obvious that those of the
other classes would come to ruin if they themselves attempt¬
ed to gain the respect of their fellows in a similar fash-
3
ion . To some extent, it may appear that Smith here extols
more the traditional virtues, of hard work and thrift, per
se, and does not explicitly relate these to the economic
and social pressures which produced them. Yet, it is also
apparent that his respect for such qualities and for the
benefits which they do bring, is produced by his awareness
1. MS^, pp. 84-85.
2. MS, p. 78; this process is particularly clearly il¬
lustrated in the decay of the aristocracy at the time
when material goods became much more readily available:
see pp. 101-108 below.
3. See MS, p. 86.
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that they |re natural to a particular group of men at least
and, furthermore, that they are natural in the sense that
they are spontaneously produced. He is not here saying,
therefore, that we must divorce interest from the actual
expression of such traditional qualities; for it is obvious
that, in the theoretical philosophy, these qualities are in
fact produced by interest itself. Our desire for respect,
and also our wish to be in fact truly 'virtuous', that is,
possessing the Smithian virtues, leads us to serve our own
interest.
Here also we see the importance of another virtue par¬
ticularly, that of prudence which, like interest, is fun¬
damentally concerned with the self; and it can only be the
'most frivolous and superficial of mankind'"1' who are glad
to receive reward where none is due. To really gain the
full benefits of the process of sympathy,therefore, we wish
to possess the qualities which lead others to sympathise
9
with us : 'Praise and blame express what actually are;
praiseworthiness and blameworthiness what naturally ought to
be the sentiments of other people with regard to our charac-
ter and conduct. Thus, Nature has 'endowed' man:
'not only with a desire of being approved of, but
a desire of being what ought to be approved of;
or of being what he himself approves of in other
men. The first desire could only have made him
wish to appear to be fit for society. The second
was necessary in order to render him anxious to be
really fit. The first could only have prompted
him to the affectation of virtue, and to the con¬
cealment of vice. The second was necessary in
order to inspire him with the real love of virtue,
and with the real abhorrence of vice.' 4
1. MS, p. 174.
2. Though prudence only gains a cool respect, because it
pertains to the self; see MS_, p. 87.
3. Ibid., p. 183.
4. Ibid., p. 170.
The virtue of prudence, therefore, added to that of
natural interest, and motivated by the natural desire of man
to be in the good opinion of his fellows, leads him to work
to gain this respect, a labour which unintentionally, and
through the process of heterogeneity, clearly benefits the
community:
'In the middling and inferior stations of
life, the road to virtue and that to fortune, to
such fortune, at least, as men in such stations
can reasonably expect to acquire, are, happily,
in most cases very nearly the same ... real and
solid professional abilities, joined to prudent,
just, fir, and temperate conduct, can very sel¬
dom fail of success ... Men in the inferior and
middling stations of life, besides, can never be
great enough to be above the law, which must
generally overawe them into some sort of respect
for, at least, the more important rules of jus¬
tice. The success of such people, too, almost
always depends upon the favour and good opinion
of their neighbours and equals ... In such sit¬
uations, therefore, we may generally expect a
considerable degree of virtue; and, fortunately
for the good morals of society, these are the sit¬
uations of by far the greater part of mankind.' 1
Again, Smith reveals that sympathy tolerates interest
as well as actions concerning others; and the operation of
interest and the ends which are produced through this rein¬
force also the constant thesis of the theoretical writers
that men do not achieve the philosophical through conscious
or planned action or thought. However irrational men's
fancies may be, it is equally unreasonable to expect them
to base their actions always on philosophical thought,
since this will generally involve a conscious reasoning
process as opposed to the more automatic quality of self-
interest. It is absurd to hope to change the manner in
which men think, completely and thoroughly, especially
1. MS, pp. 86-87.
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since much of the irrational is the means by which man pro¬
gresses; man is motivated by many factors, and while self-
interest may nearly always be genuine interest, it is quite
possible that none of the factors which happen to be the
immediate cause of this may appear at all rational. Here,
therefore, we must always distinguish between that which
appears chimerical, and that which may have some good re¬
sulting from it and which may therefore be conducive to
man's progress. There is a particular end, after all, in
the love which man has for position and respect and if
there is no truth in the belief that a man of superior class
has greater security than a poor one, assuming the latter
has certain fundamental needs, we are still impelled to
act as though this were not so:
'Of such mighty importance does it appear
to be, in the imaginations of men, to stand in
that situation which sets them most in the view
of general sympathy and attention. And thus,
place ... is the end of half the labours of human
life; and is the cause of all the tumult and bus¬
tle, all the rapine and injustice, which avarice
and ambition have introduced into this world.' 1
Nonetheless, although certain aspects of such processes may
be detrimental, this is mainly so only because they are un¬
checked; however lacking in rationality, the behaviour of
men in this manner is perfectly sound in economic princi¬
ples. The constant demand for goods and place encourage
men to be virtuous while at the same time it makes possible
those commodities which establish power among the largest
possible number. The principle itself then, can hardly be
seen as wrong.
1. MS, p. 80.
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It is important to remember, Smith indicates, that how¬
ever much things may appear wrong to us, it is perhaps a
greater wrong to seek a balance for society along planned
principles which do not take into account both the inexpli¬
cable nature of some actions, and the gradual and slow
change which is necessary for that prized stability. The
actions of those who had considerable power but paid little
attention to the natural rhythms of the system in which
they lived he considered as irresponsible, because disrup¬
tive of that which represented the real gains of men. Fur¬
thermore, they were, in the long run, unnecessary; the
natural capacity of man to adapt and to better himself is
often sufficient to overcome the inequities and injustices
of life, and does so in a natural manner. The power of self-
interest is so strong that in many cases it will overcome
the immediate disadvantages of particular faults - as it must
have done for us to have a present at all - and will gen¬
erally be able to carry man on through his most difficult
times:
'The uniform, constant, and uninterrupted effort
of every man to better his condition, the prin¬
ciples from which public and national, as well as
private opulence is originally derived, is fre¬
quently powerful enough to maintain the natural
progress of things towards improvement, in spite
both of the extravagance of government, and of the
greatest errors of administration.' 1
Again, this reveals the importance to Smith's theory of the
capacity of the natural process to tolerate many factors
which did not normally come under the older ideas of vir¬
tue, but which did possess the essential meaning of the
1. WN,I,p. 364; see also I, p. 367.
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virtu of the Machiavellian/Harringtonian tradition, that of
public benefit through a wide variety of means, and, as far
as the commonwealth writers were concerned, without either
conscious or self-denying action1.
In his study of the sympathetic process in man, Smith
indicated that it was sympathy also which suggested the ex¬
tent of the actual limitations on man's actions, just as it
had determined the means by which we continue the divisions
in society and the economic advance. If we are permitted
by interest to act for ourselves, we are also necessarily
limited in this process by an awareness of the social pro¬
hibitions on carrying this to excess, a series of inhibit¬
ions which have come about through gradual social develop¬
ment and which have the effect of ascertaining particular
economic benefits. Our desire of being accepted by our
fellows leads us to limit the excesses of our own interests,
so that our need for interaction with others, produced by
sympathy itself, helps to produce justice:
'Though it may be true, therefore, that every
individual, in his own breast, naturally pre¬
fers himself to all mankind, yet he dares not
look mankind in the face, and avow that he acts
according to this principle ... When he views
himself in the light in which he is conscious
that others will view him, he sees that to them
he is but one of the multitude, in no respect
better than any other in it. If he would act so
as that the impartial spectator may enter into
the principles of his conduct, which is what of
all things he has the greatest desire to do, he
must upon this, as upon all other occasions,
humble the arrogance of his self-love, and bring
it down to something which other men can go a-
long with.' 2
While these limitations might appear to be interest,
therefore, they are specifically related to our relationship
1. See Appendix B.
2. MS, p. 120
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with others in society and are not, like interest.and pru¬
dence, directly concerned with the self. They arise not so
much from conscious utilitarian thought but from the need
to protect the various rights which man possesses, in his
life, in his property and in his social contracts:
'The most sacred laws of justice, therefore,
those whose violation seems to call loudest for
vengeance and punishment, are the laws which
guard the life and person of our neighbour; the
next are those which guard his property and pos¬
sessions; and last of all come those which guard
what are called his personal rights, or what is
due to him from the promises of others.' 1
Justice, it is to be noted, does not refer to our actual
2
feelings for others, but our actions towards them , even
though the principle upon which justice operates, in part
at least, is the feeling of resentment. It is through this
feeling that we are motivated to gain revenge on those who
have wronged us and it is apparent in Smith's theory that
this principle is a natural and certainly a very useful
one. While the unsocial passions in particular therefore,
have of necessity to be moderated in order to gain sym*--
pathy, and this in itself is a beneficial lessening of
passions, it is also apparent that we must in fact exper¬
ience such feelings. Resentment, like interest, is a
3
necessary part of man, and is an entirely valid response ,
and it is always an integral part of the proposition of
the dominance of interest - that a man may run as hard as
he please - that 'if he should justle or throw down any of
1. MS, p. 121.
2. Ibid., p. 114: 'The violation of justice is injury: it
does real and positive hurt to sobs particular persons,
from motives which are naturally disapproved of .
3. See MS, pp. 44-45, 50-51.
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them, the indulgence of the spectators is entirely at an
end.' The injured party feels resentment, and society will
support him in this feeling: if we are to regain our fellow-
feeling with men, then, we must always limit our interest
to that which is provided by the law.
As in all other expressions of human response, there¬
fore, we are guided not by the philosophical awareness of
end, but of the response which society itself demands.
Furthermore, it is true to say that this response is in
fact demanded and that, heterogeneously, man creates jus¬
tice which is of considerable benefit to the stability of
the society and hence to the individual himself:
'The moment that injury begins, the moment that
mutual resentment and animosity take place, all
the bands ... are broken assunder, and the differ¬
ent members of which society consisted, are, as
it were, dissipated and scattered abroad by the
violence and opposition of their discordant
affections ...
Justice is the main pillar that upholds the
whole edifice. If it is removed, the great, the
immense fabric of human society, that fabric
which, to raise and support, seems, in this world,
if I may say so, to have been the particular and
darling care of nature, must in a moment crumble
into atoms.' 2
Justice, therefore, is a precise science, and one
which we can enforce because of its precision, as we must
enforce because of its importance to man. Here, again,
Smith, and other theoretical writers, stress that while
benevolence is useful, its absence can be tolerated, while
the absence of justice will mean the destruction of the
society itself. They also indicate in their study of jus¬
tice that while it is vital it can never be seen to repre-
1. MS, p. 120.
2. MS, p. 249. Millar, Hist. View, IV, pp. 245-246,
255-256, 274.
72
sent 'equity*, or any law which is not appropriate to, or
the result of, the existing social circumstances. It is al¬
ways the laws of man, and never the laws of nature or of
what might be the best and most perfect response to individ¬
ual situation. This particular assessment further rein¬
forces the basic theoretical position, that it is not the
individual expression which concerns us, but the general
one, that which is necessarily produced by the whole society/
While it is true, then, that the society itself and
its situation produces the variations in benevolence in a
general sense, it is to the more fundamental manifestations
of the social feeling that we must turn if we are to find
that which is steady and productive of a modicum of secur¬
ity. It must necessarily embody not the isolated and the
conscious denial of self which benevolence itself in ex¬
treme instances may do, but the ordinary and usual express¬
ion of limitation of interest, and desire for sympathetic
interchange. It is only through the inculcation of jus¬
tice, therefore, that we can establish a particular stand¬
ard on which we can depend, and it is this which provides
for that stability which is of such benefit to society.
Duty, the expression of response which we may not actually
feel, and justice, are the very mainstay of the civil sys¬
tem:
'It may perhaps be affirmed with reason, that,
from prudent and well-directed interpositions of
that nature, more diffusive benefit is likely to
arise, both to the public and to individuals,
than from the warmest occasional ebullitions of
tender-hearted and thoughtless generosity. This,
at least, is indisputable, that mere generosity
without the punctual observance of the rules of
justice, is of less consequence to the prosperity
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and good order of society, than the latter,
though without any considerable share of the
former.' 1
Thus, the ordinary actions of man are not thereby de¬
fined as 'virtuous' because 'virtue is excellence, something
uncommonly great and beautiful, which rises far above what
2
is vulgar and ordinary' . But at the same time, there is
a distinction made between being virtuous in this sense,
and practising the various virtues such as those of pru¬
dence and justice. Here Smith is distinguishing between
the usual and the greater amount of response or appropriate
action to situations, and not stating that the virtues of
human society are in effect those of traditional concepts
of morality. His praise for the most virtuous man:
'who joins, to the most perfect command of his
own original and selfish feelings, the most ex¬
quisite sensibility both to the original and
sympathetic feelings of others. The man who, to
all the soft, the amiable, and the gentle virtues,
joins all the great, the awful, and the respect¬
able . '
is certainly sincere, and yet at the same time he is aware
that this level of behaviour, of sympathetic interchange,
is not the norm. It is vastly to the benefit of society
if all men acted as the most virtuous did, although if
this were the case, we should perhaps be obliged to find
a new definition of virtuousness. And we may see at the
same time, that prudence, or the most appropriate response
that the normal man can give, is also of benefit to soc-
1. Miller, Hist. View, IV, pp. 255-256; see also MS,
pp. 229, 230-231.
2. Ibid., p. 28.
3. Ibid., p. 214.
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iety; so that while the prudent man may not gain approba¬
tion or admiration because of the ordinariness of his ac¬
tions , it is noticeable that these are nonetheless of con¬
siderable public benefit, and support the theoretical be¬
lief in the value of the ordinary and steady. Self-command
especially, the moderation of feelings, the steady 'sacri¬
ficing the ease and enjoyment of the moment for the probable
expectation of the still greater ease and enjoyment of a
more distant but more lasting period of time'1, are the
qualities of the prudent man, and those which, in the ad¬
vanced society at least, always gain the full approval both
of the spectator and the conscience. These achieve par¬
ticular benefit perhaps because they are constant and steady,
and therefore contribute more to society than the isolated
actions of the great individuals:
'he sets a much better example than has frequent¬
ly been done by men of much more splendid talents
and virtues - who in all ages, from that of So¬
crates and Aristippus down to that of Dr. Swift
and Voltaire, and from that of Philip and Alex¬
ander the Great down to that of the great Czar
Peter of Muscovy, have too often distinguished
themselves by the most improper and even insolent
contempt of all the ordinary decorums of life and
conversation, and who have thereby set the most
pernicious example to those who wish to resemble
them, and who too often content whemselves with
imitating their follies without even attempting
to attain their perfections.' 2
Again, Smith reinforces the theoretical belief in the empha¬
sis of the whole, and the regular, not the sporadic on which
we can base little; the achievements of society are to be
measured through the norm, and not through those expressions
1. MS, p. 314.
2. Ibid., pp. 313-314.
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of interest which may achieve little that is concrete. In¬
dividual concerns may be the mark of the early stages of
society, but these ought to be something which in the later
stages have little long-term effect.
It is noticeable also that justice must necessarily
vary with the changing circumstances of man as it always
expresses the level of any individual society. Thus, to
some degree, that which is seen as 'equity' in one age may
eventually become an integral part of social opinion and,
later, of the laws of justice itself. Yet, as indicated
above, this introduction of new ideas must have necessarily
been absorbed gradually, and these must express the feelings
of the society itself, and not that of a small group of
men. Therefore they rio longer possess the characteristic
of equity which is something above the norm. Unless jus¬
tice has these qualities, also, it cannot be related in any
sense to the sympathetic process, which demands a response
from others, a general level represented by the spectator,
and which secures 'justice' particularly because of our de¬
sire to gain the respect of our fellow men. We must always
guard against those 'writers of jurisprudence'1, therefore,
whose concern with the older sense of 'morality' as some¬
thing above man which he must attain by extraordinary effort,
blinds them to the fact that not only is 'justice' itself
distinct from benevolence, but also that it is never gained
by any considerable process of conscious or self-denying ac¬
tion. It may involve some limitation of self and some con-
1. Millar, Hist. View, IV, p. 283.
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sideration of others, yet this is in a sense spontaneous and
related to the forces of natural reactions of men. At the
same time, it does not mean that men go outside of themselves
or of what they can afford, because justice is never 'what a
good man, from the utmost propriety of feelings and scruples
of conscience would be disposed to do', but what 'an upright
judge would compel him to perform'^. We become aware of
what justice comprises through our social processes, through
our conscience, through the spectator, through sympathy, and
our desire to gain the approval of others; and in no in¬
stance do any of these demand more than that which is devel¬
oped by the social system in which we live.
The concept of human nature which Smith in particular
developed stresses especially that man is a social being
and thus his standards develop both within a social frame¬
work and without his being aware of the process by which his
actions achieve greater ends than those he himself intended.
The heterogeneous process is spontaneous and is such that it
utilises all the variety of human feelings and passions in
order to lead men towards a stable and more 'philosophical'
society; and the theoretical writers accept a far wider range
of causal factors as the basis of the evolution of society
than do the general philosophical authors, at the same time
as they accept that such factors are rarely rational or
consciously 'benevolent' or utilitarian. Their thesis main¬
tains that great changes occur not only unintended, but as
a result of human interest, that the means by which society
1. Millar, Hist. View, IV, p. 283.
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expresses its sentiments remain uniform throughout time,
that change in sentiments is not individualistic and hence
is not dependent upon the emergence of the great man or the
occurrence of the accidental event.
Such a theory, it is apparent, differs noticeably
from that of writers such as Voltaire, who did not under¬
take to study human nature in such detail or to base its
operation on such basic principles as the capacity to pro¬
gress and the heterogeneity of ends; and it enables the
theoretical writers to account for both past and present
societies through general laws at the same time as it per¬
mits them to account for variations in the expression of
passions and moral sentiments. Allied with the theory of
the economic basis of social change, which is discussed in
the following chapter, this concept of human nature goes
far towards fulfilling the aim of the theoretical history
to show the sequences and connections by which the ex¬




THEORETICAL HISTORY II - THE INTERACTION OF PROPERTY
AND HUMAN NATURE
The second basic thesis of the theoretical philosophy
was that man was endowed with certain propensities which
needed only the right conditions in order to flourish and
develop. This characteristic of the inherent capacity to
progress, however, cannot be seen as an indication that
the theoretical writers believed in innate qualities, for
this is a concept which is contrary to their idea of the
gradual development of man. While men are endowed with
this capacity, and endowed also with the capacity to make
social responses, these do not come into their true or
full nature as far as the theoretical philosophy is con¬
cerned until man acts within his social setting and through¬
out historical time. As Smith points out, for example,
such passions and principles as conscience, interest, and
sympathy all depend on men interacting and responding to
particular situations:
'Were it possible that a human creature
could grow up to manhood in some solitary place,
without any communication with his own species,
he could no more think of his own character, of
the propriety or demerit of his own sentiments
and conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his
own mind, than of the beauty or deformity of his
own face. All these are objects which he cannot
easily see, which naturally he does not look at,
and with regard to which he is provided with no
mirror which can present them to his view. Bring
him into society, and he is immediately provided
with the mirror which he wanted before. It is
placed in the countenance and behaviour of those
he lives with ...' 1
1. MS , p. 162
79
Without the social process, without the development of
men along general lines, there can be no true growth of the
human being, and certainly at best a very limited express¬
ion of his true interest. The potential which we possess,
therefore, is certainly dependent upon other factors; or,
as Millar puts it, we are originally possessed of, or en¬
dowed with, only 'the seeds of improvement' \ which do not
germinate spontaneously. It is only by 'long care and cul¬
ture', by our being free from the pressures of both physi¬
cal and social limitations, that these seeds are capable of
being brought to maturity; it is only through action and
social intercourse at any level that these qualities are
expressed at all. They do not come into being full-grown,
nor can they be said to exist until men act and react;
they will always depend for their expression on the society
in which we live, and they can never develop beyond this
social level.
This thesis, which states further that only situation
- political or profound economic limitations - can thwart
2
man's natural inclination towards liberty , and that if
left to himself his desire to truck, barter or trade will
lead him to economic and hence social freedom, is based in
part on the commonwealth correlation of property and power,
on the relationship between economic independence and per-
sonal freedom . The theoretical interpretation of man's
1. Millar, Origin, p. 198.
2. Ibid,, p. 290.
3. See Appendix B, pp. 526-527.
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nature and the power of self-interest, however, goes far
beyond the commonwealth concepts of the factors which in¬
fluenced human actions, and leads the Scottish writers to
relate the ideas of development of property extension and
economic security to the actual emerging of the character¬
istic human qualities, and to show in detail the importance
of property to social evolution and stability. The common¬
wealth interpretation rests on the more simple proposition
that property determines form of state, and that necessity
eliminates the individual. In the theoretical interpreta¬
tion, on the other hand, there is a detailed study in all
stages of development, in all types of society, of how the
laws which are the basis of human nature prompted man to
act and to achieve certain property situations which deter¬
mine the extent of individualism and dependence in any so¬
ciety, and determine also the extent of the social quali4=
ties^".
This interpretation not only shows that property
forms determine levels of human behaviour, but also indi-
1. Such study, which considers a much wider variety of
social forms than does the commonwealth work, is made
possible through the conjectural process, itself an
integral part of the theoretical capacity to appreciate
the past in its own terms (see above, pp. 16-17). This
process was concisely summarised by Stewart in his ex¬
amination of the development of forms of thought: 'we
are under a necessity of supplying the place of fact by
conjecture; and when we are unable to ascertain how men
have actually conducted themselves upon particular occas¬
ions, of considering in what manner they are likely to
have proceeded, from the principles of their nature,
and the circumstances of their external situation.'
(Stewart, Works, X, pp. 33-34). Conjecture is in eff¬
ect used to supply the 'broken links' in our knowledge
of man, to connect the parts in order to form a whole;
possessing certain facts gained from observation, we
work backwards from the known to what is unknown and
attempt to fill in gaps in order to establish new points
consonant with the general laws which we have estab¬
lished. See also pp. 340-348 below.
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cates how the constant and regular factors that are the
characteristics of men are in continual action, and lead
gradually, and generally imperceptibly, to other forms of
property possession. Hence this explanation emphasises not
only 'moral* over physical causes"'", but also the continual
operation of man's qualities, the constant change and adap¬
tation to new forms of property - features which overall do
distinguish it from the commonwealth work. The gaining of
the necessaries of life and later the conveniences, permits
a gradual unwinding, a slow maturing, of the capacities in¬
herent in human nature; as the first are achieved, the
second will follow. Men 'feel a gradual increase of their
wants and are excited with fresh vigour and activity to
search for the means of supplying them. The advancement
of the more useful arts is followed by the cultivation of
2
those which are subservient to pleasure and entertainment.'
If we consider that man, in changing, develops these
propensities, and particularly if we accept that he is de¬
pendent on forms of subsistence and the security which
these provide for the level of his achievements, then we
must also accept that liberty of freedom to act as we ought,
cannot really exist in the most primitive stages and that
man's propensities are here limited. Such a view of the
past does not necessarily deny the relativism which the
theoretical writers attempted to introduce into their work
but rather stresses that what they see as the most benefi¬
cial expressions of human nature (political, because of
1. See below, pp. 154-161.
2. Millar, Origin, p. 224. See also Hist. View. II, p. 187.
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economic, independence) take a considerable time to develop.
The levels of justice, the degree of sympathy, and even the
extent of benevolence must be impaired or affected by eco¬
nomic uncertainty. They do not exist in any 'absolute' or
ideal form at any time, and certainly we cannot see the most
refined expressions of such qualities at a time when society
is either very individualistic or in considerable disorder:
'Many writers appear to take pleasure in remark¬
ing that, as the love of liberty is natural to
man, it is to be found in the greatest perfect¬
ion among barbarians, and is apt to be impaired
according as people make progress in civilisation
and in the arts of life. That mankind, in the
state of mere savages, are in great measure un¬
acquainted with government, and unaccustomed to
any sort of constraint, is sufficiently evident.
But their independence, in that case, is owing to
the wretchedness of their circumstances, which
afford nothing that can tempt any one man to be¬
come subject to another.' 1
The development of the useful and refined arts is a
process which is achieved or made possible only upon the
establishing of a security of subsistence, an element which
is clearly lacking in the savage system: 'A savage finds so
much difficulty, and is exposed to so many hardships in
procuring even necessaries, that he has no leisure or en¬
couragement to aim at the luxuries and conveniencies of
2
life' ; both climate and his own inexperience will affect
his economic security and thereby his levels of social
interaction. The natural capacity which man has for sym¬
pathy or interaction with his fellows is necessarily af¬
fected by the level of social behaviour, and in the early
stages of life sympathy is extremely inhibited in its de-
1. Millar, Origin, p. 294.
2. Ibid. , p~ 183.
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velopment. Because of the lack of relationships between
men in the earliest stages of society where individuals are
concerned with showing their strength rather than admitting
their weaknesses, the sympathetic process is here limited
to the expression of what are known as the 'awful' virtues
- self-denial, self-control, 'that command of the passions
which subjects all the movements of our nature to what our
dignity and honour, and the propriety of our own conduct,
1 ... 2
require.' Primitive man is only able to express certain
sorts of sentiments because the type of life which he leads
only calls forth certain capacities and qualities. His
subsistence depends upon the availability of game, life it¬
self depends upon skill and endurance, and death at the
hands of enemies is meritorious only if great tortures are
3
accepted with that fortitude which is a necessary part of
everyday life:
'Every savage undergoes a sort of Spartan disci¬
pline, and, by the necessity of his situation,
is inured to every sort of hardship. He is in
continual danger: he is often exposed to the
greatest extremities of hunger, and frequently
1. MS, p. 26.
2. The primitive societies on which the theoretical his¬
torians based most of their interpretation are primar¬
ily those of the German barbarians and the American
Indians; these they saw as roughly similar, though not
identical, the Germans being thought of as somewhat
more advanced: see Robertson, Charles V, Works, V, p.
462 (Note VI). Major sources for the study of the
German barbarians appear to be Caesar and Tacitus
(ibid., pp. 458-462, Note VI).There was a considerable
amount of printed material available on the American
Indians, and Robertson sought to supplement this by
correspondence with the most 'philosophical' of these
authors such as de Pinto, Condamine, and Godin le Jeune
(see America, Works,IV, pp. 531, 530-531, Notes XXXIV,
XLIV,XLVI) particularly in the form of questionnaires:
see, for instance, NLS MSS 3954, ff. 11-16, 17-20,
26-34. See also WN, I, p. 366.
3. Smith, MS, p. 297; 'fortitude' is a passive quality as
opposed to 'courage' which is more active, and reflects
the limited level of sympathy. See also Lectures, pp.
20-21.
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dies of pure want. His circumstances not only
habituate him to every sort of distress, but teach
him to give way to none of the passions which
that distress is apt to excite. He can expect
from his countrymen no sympathy or indulgence
for such weakness.' 1
In such circumstances the form of sympathy that pre¬
dominates is that where each individual brings his exper¬
iences and attitudes to the level of the society and is
accepted only if he does this; the more amiable virtues
are only brought out in a less repressive atmosphere. 'Be¬
fore we can feel much for others, we must in some measure
2
be at ease ours'elves' , Smith believed , and the extent of
personal security in savage life was small. As a result,
3
men were unable to 'cultivate the feelings of humanity' ;
'Among civilized nations, the virtues which
are founded upon humanity are more cultivated
than those which are founded upon self-denial
and the command of the passions. Among rude and
barbarous nations it is quite otherwise - the
virtues of self-denial are more cultivated than
those of humanity.' 4
However much any of the more gentle feelings may be
present or can even develop in such a system, these cannot
be expressed5. Their development is necessarily limited
by social circumstances, and thus they cannot possibly
provide the basis of justice or regular law in this sys¬
tem. Lack of indulgence towards others limits the sym¬
pathetic process itself and certain interactions, as well
as the feelings on which these are based, that are seen as
natural by other societies because they can afford them,
1. MS, p. 297.
2. Ibid.
3. Millar, Origin, p. 176.
4. Smith, MS, p. 297.
5. Ibid., pp. 298, 300, 302.
are to the savage man both irrelevant and indulgent:
'The weakness of love, which is so much indulged
in ages of humanity and politeness, is regarded
among savages as the most unpardonable effeminacy
Even after the marriage, the two parties seem to
be ashamed of a connection which is founded upon
so sordid a necessity. They do not live together
they see one another by stealth only: they both
continue to dwell in the houses of their respect¬
ive fathers, and the open cohabitation of the two
sexes, which is permitted without blame in all
other countries, is here considered as the most
indecent and unmanly sensuality.' 1
Such feelings, furthermore, will be seen in all situa¬
tions. If there is no affection or respect for women, if
the society is predominantly one of the male warrior, then
it is apposite that the position of the female is propor¬
tionately low and in fact is really that of a slave. Marr¬
iage in this system is not so much based on sexual desire
2
(which is inhibited and in any event irregular) but on a
need for security which is supplied by the family. 'By
living at the head of a numerous family' men 'enjoy a de¬
gree of ease, respect, and security, of which they would
otherwise be deprived, and have reason, in their old age,
to expect the assistance and protection of their poster-
O
ity. ' Although marriage exists, then, it is not one of
equals; the wife is a servant, paid for and thought of as
property, liable to punishment, even torture in some soc-
•
4." 4leties.
Such attitudes, however, are neither conscious nor
indicative of 'cruelty' but are simply the products of
1. Smith, MS_, p. 29 8 .
2. Millar, Origin, p. 18' .
3. Ibid., p. 185.
4. Ibid., p. 197.
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society. In a similar fashion we may also see that the
position or standing of children in such systems is limited
by the economic situation; the greater the difficulty in
maintaining life, the more likely it is that whatever 'natu¬
ral' affection a father may have for his children is thwart¬
ed and neglected as are all other emotions of this kind:
'how strongly soever a father may be disposed to promote
the happiness of his children, this disposition, in the
breast of a savage, is often counteracted by a regard to
his own preservation, and smothered by the misery with
which he is loaded.'"'" Savages are moved strongly, but by
few things and these concern mainly the individual. They
have 'no pursuits but such as were suggested by their most
immediate wants', they are 'too little acquainted with the
dictates of prudence and sober reflection, to be capable
of restraining the irregular sallies of passion.'
Prudence and sober reflection are factors which are
the prerogatives of the more civilised states, and the pre¬
carious means of subsistence that we see in the first
stage of society means also that man's capacity or need for
certain institutions is also limited. The absence of fixed
goods or property in land, for instance, means that there is
no need for the forms of government that we ourselves find
necessary to protect established wealth, and which can only
develop with a true awareness of property as fixed and per¬
sonal. Scarcity of goods and general communal possession
or usage of those goods which exist are characteristics of
1. Millar, Origin, p. 230.
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the savage society that have a profound effect on its no¬
tions of law. What government there is is based on the
authority of age or talents which is the first form of dis¬
tinction among men and one eminently natural to this par¬
ticular stage of growth"^".
In this suggestion the theoretical history emphasises
how much 'government' is both a process natural to man and
one which develops over a considerable period of time. That
form which we see in the savage state, for instance, is
clearly rudimentary, perhaps the extension of paternal au-
2
thority , and limited in its responsibilities and powers.
It cannot be said to reveal any of the sophistication, any
of the ideologies, any of the obviously defined rights and
powers that later political theory would claim; while, at
the same time, the very existence of these limitations in¬
dicates that men have always felt the need for control of
some sort. Government and its various forms, therefore,
are an expression of need, not the imposition of certain
abstract concepts of rights that are seen to be timeless
3
and external to man's situation . Such rights are naturally
relevant only to the society concerned and exist only in¬
sofar as they can be afforded. In the early stages of so¬
cial life it is to be seen that men automatically and
through need surrender small parts of their liberty to
those with either superior strength or superior wisdom be-
^ 4
cause this is part of the social process .
1. Smith, WN, II, p. 233.
2. Millar, Origin, p. 224 and see also p. 234.
3. See below, Chapter VIII.
4. Origin, pp. 246-248.
Indeed, any limitations on men in this stage through
government, therefore, cannot be very broad in nature and
must relate primarily to external matters rather than to
those concerning the society itself. If there is no pro¬
perty to be protected, the laws, such as they are, must
apply primarily to individuals. In both the savage and the
barbarous society the control over individual members
appears to be very limited and all punishment to be appro¬
priate to this although obviously not such as to create
what modern man thinks of as stability. For instance, mur¬
der which 'ought' to be punished always by death can often
be compensated for by money, or through some lesser penal¬
ty"*"; and other crimes against men and their freedom are per¬
mitted with little restraint. Such laws and customs, Smith
believes, although they express the true nature of a pre¬
carious society, fall far short of that justice which we
ourselves expect and, more importantly, of that which sup¬
ports the natural course of things:
'In some countries, the rudeness and barbarism
of the people hinder the natural sentiments of
justice from arriving at that accuracy and pre¬
cision which, in more civilized nations, they
naturally attain to. Their laws are, like their
manners, gross, and rude, and undistinguishing.' 2
The change from one form of society to another comes
about spontaneously through interest and is expressed in a
more developed attitude towards property and other institu¬
tions. In the earliest form of society there was no form
of land-holding, and all labour, whether expended on hunt¬
ing or on the caring for subsistence crops, was communal.
1. Lectures, p. 137.
2. MS, p. 502.
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The uncertainty of livelihood and the fluctuation in its
procurance meant that stock or capital in goods could play
little part in the savage life although it is to be noticed
that even here the division of labour is to be found to
some degree. While the description of any society at a par¬
ticular stage may present a static appearance, therefore,
we must always remember that man's capacity to progress,
his ever-present self-interest, will provide the means by
which this stage is eventually superseded by another. That
society which is able to progress beyond the limitations of
physical causes and to slowly develop its form of govern¬
ment, its level of social interaction, its means of gain¬
ing subsistence will eventually be transformed into another
stage, such as one in which herding is the major means of
subsistence"'".
This is not to say, though, that concepts of property
are always changed immediately since many customs continue
in force long beyond the time that they are fully appro¬
priate to the society, for man's mind works slowly and the
period of transition is a long one: 'the acquisition of
wealth in herds and flocks, does not immediately give rise
to the idea of property in land. The different families
of a tribe are accustomed to feed their cattle promiscu¬
ously, and have no separate possession or enjoyment of
2
ground employed for that purpose.' Thus the herding com¬
munity is in effect still one large family, still, to some
considerable extent, devoid of any sophisticated notions
1. Lectures, pp. 107-108.
2. Origin, p. 251.
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of government because there is little need for these. Its
members retain the love of virtually unrestricted freedom
that characterises the savage state, and their forms of al¬
legiance are personal rather than concerned with any develop¬
ed concept of state's needs. There is, of course, some
variation in behaviour between the two according to the ex¬
tent to which the barbarians are aware of property as fixed,
and yet the theoretical interpretation necessarily stresses
also how much the general principles of the herding stage
will mean a similarity in behaviour between one form of bar-
barianism and another. Thus Robertson, in examining the
history of the German tribes who were eventually to estab¬
lish the basic feudal system, saw some resemblance between
these Germans and the American Indian; and the similarity
between the informal yet strong connections of family or
kin in the German tribes, and the Scottish highlanders'
system of relationship did not go unnoticed. What could be
learnt from contemporary societies as well as from reliable
older accounts provided the basis of comparison and of the
conclusions concerning the nature of particular stages of
growth.
In these types of society, for instance, it was believed
that the continuation of family or kinship ties necessarily
limited the power of the form of government, and both in¬
stitutions were created by the existence of moveable as
opposed to stable or fixed property. While there were di¬
visions within groups, therefore, each of these coalesced
into a single unit and loyalty was given to a leader, some¬
times continuously or on isolated occasions, as the individ-
-7 -L
ual chose. The centralisation which did exist, therefore,
was that primarily created by the existence of heads of
tribes or families, and was not based on the authority of
a king: a situation which was to be repeated in the feudal
process itself. The kinship system or the tribe provided
for its members in such a fashion as to make other more
formal institutions unnecessary. Benevolence, or regard
for those with whom we have had habitual close contact, for
instance, is not only clearly more developed in this stage
than in the savage, but is also the means by which wrongs
are righted and the micro-community ruled. Only later,
with the development of justice as a more impersonal in¬
stitution does this aspect of benevolence die out. The
sympathetic process which has clearly made known the duties
of the members of such a system can no longer express that
which the society itself does not need.
The third stage of man's progress, in the theoretical
interpretation, is that of agricultural production on a
consistent level which leads to a more highly developed
sense of the nature of property, that is, its being fixed
and its being an individual possession:
'The improvement of agriculture, which in most
parts of the world has been posterior to the art
of taming and rearing cattle, is productive of
very important alterations in the state of soc¬
iety ... it obliges men to fix their residence
in the neighbourhood of that spot where their
labour is chiefly to be employed, and thereby
gives rise to property in land, the most valuable
and permanent species of wealth.' 1
The communal form of property that we see in the barbaric
herding stage and which is a vital part of the development
1. Millar, Origin, p. 208.
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of man s sense of property, gradually gives way to individ¬
ual possession, thereby leading to one of the most impor¬
tant stages in the evolution of man and his fundamental
characteristics . This is so because it is particularly
through the concept of property in labour and in land that
the major expressions of the laws of economic development
are made possible. The freedom which we have as self-
interested individuals to both act and to retain the fruits
of our labour is the means by which security and hence so¬
cial stability is made possible on a regular basis. The
individual begins to exist or ought to only when his natural
2
interest provides concrete dividends .
'Every one', wrote Millar, 'is desirous of employing
his own labour for his own advantage, and of having a sep¬
arate possession which he may enjoy according to his own
3
inclination' ; and it was only when man was free to do so
that the relationship between freedom and economic benefit
existed in any meaningful sense and the society prospered
through the expression of interest. Labour is in fact the
first form of property^, and as such must always meet with
its proper return which is individual benefit. This is a
necessary part of the rights of man whether these are orig¬
inal and personal or acquired and real. Both are natural
in that they are vital to the proper and most beneficial
organization of society even if those rights pertaining to
1. See Robertson, America, Works, IV, pp. 299, 339.
2. Origin, pp. 252-253.
3. Ibid., p. 252.
4. WN, I, p. 136.
physical freedom may be more obvious than those concerning
property which do not develop until the idea of property it¬
self exists."'"
These rights, furthermore, ought to be the inheritance
of every man-, not just of the few or of the powerful, for
society consists of the many and not the few: 'To hurt in
any degree the interest of any one order of citizens, for
no other purpose but to promote that of some other, is evi¬
dently contrary to that justice and equality of treatment
which the sovereigh owes to all the different orders of his
2
subjects.' While sophisticated notions of rights and pri¬
vileges may depend on the actual development of the philo¬
sophical society, therefore, the right of self-interest ex¬
ists always; and while any given form of property may re¬
flect very limited awareness of both personal and property
rights and a rudimentary system of property holding, it is
nonetheless true that the inhibition of man's natural re¬
turn for labour will severely affect the actual production
3
and morale of the worker . The natural course of things
is always predominant.
This dictum holds true for the feudal state as well
as for the commercial system: 'In the inferior employments,
the sweets of labour consist altogether in the recompence
of labour. They who are soonest in a position to enjoy the
sweets of it, are likely soonest to conceive a relish for
1. Lectures, p. 8; see also William D. Grampp, Economic
Liberalism (New York, 1965) II, pp. 21-22.
2. WN, II, p. 171; see also ibid., p. 95.
3. See Joseph J. Spengler, 'Adam Smith's Theory of Eco¬
nomic Growth', SEJ, XXV, XXVI (1959) pp. 397-415, 1-12.
it, and to acquire the early habit of industry. 1 Any form
of government which denies the worker his natural end there¬
by reduces his incentive and his interest in working. The
natural spirit is dulled, and the inventiveness and interest
which might have been produced is irretrievably lost^, a
process which we can see particularly in slavery both an-
3
cxent and modern , The laws of economic relationships are
always constant and the responses of the American and the
Roman slave are fundamentally the same:
'A slave, who receives no wages in return for his
labour, can never be supposed to exert much vig¬
our or activity in the exercise of any employment.
He obtains a livelihood at any rate; and by his
utmost assiduity he is able to procure no more.' 4
We can also see the same situation, the theoretical
writers believe, in the early stages of individual property
holding in Europe where a similar monopoly of land by a
few leads to the economic dependence of the many, a process
in which both economic and personal rights are severely
affected and many of the uncertainties of the earliest
stages of life are reproduced. While actual form of sub¬
sistence may be more certain because of the concrete advan¬
ces in agriculture and the stability of land possession,
the dependence of the ordinary man on the will of his mas¬
ter necessarily inhibits his social responses. Having no
security in his own livelihood, he is necessarily vulnerable
to those who have stability. Dependence, as Harrington
and the commonwealth writers emphasised, limited one's
1. WN, I, p. 137.
2. Ibid., p. 90; see also Millar, Origin, p. 320.
3. WN, I, p. 411, II, p. 205.
4. Origin, p. 299; see also pp. 302, 317.
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freedom of behaviour, a thesis which the theoretical writers
adopted and developed in terms of its effects on man's na¬
ture. The division of land in the feudal system into large
areas controlled by the individual lord, the gradual con¬
trol by him of all others and the dependence of the economy
on the labour of the depressed classes, is, indeed, an en¬
tirely normal response, even a natural one given the eco¬
nomic and social development of the occupying society and
the particular geographic conditions. Yet, at the same
time, this particular expression of man's natural impulses,
of interest as yet unrestrained by any advanced concept of
justice, clearly interferes with interest, with the natural
return of labour, with the usual correlation between work
and benefit - at least so far as the labouring classes are
concerned. In feudalism the 'most sacred and inviolable'
form of property is violated as an integral part of the
state's operation. Men are no longer free agents as they
once were in the savage and barbarian societies; and yet,
while subordination, differences in rank and wealth are a
natural expression of development, the degree of subordina¬
tion in feudalism not only fails to replace a natural free¬
dom with a certain amount of stability but constantly re¬
inforces the debilitating effects of economic and moral de¬
pendence :
'persons of low rank, have no opportunity of ac¬
quiring an affluent fortune, or of raising them¬
selves to superior stations; and remaining for
ages in a state of dependence, they naturally
contract such dispositions and habits as are suit¬
ed to their circumstances.' 1
1. Millar, Origin, p. 290; see also Smith, WN, I, p. 355.
yb
If men are forced to work for others and are unable
both to choose their own employment and to receive the fruits
of this, this denial of the natural rights of men will have
obvious effects on the actual productivity of the feudal
state itself: 'if great improvements are seldom to be expect¬
ed from great proprietors, they are least of all to be ex¬
pected when they employ slaves for their workmen ... A per¬
son who can acquire no property, can have no other interest
but to eat as much, and to labour as little as possible.'1
The division of land into large areas is economically un¬
profitable in that agriculture demands relatively small
areas for the best form of cultivation, and demands also
free labour. But not only did the feudal system itself
destroy the usual return of labour, and the steady progress
of agricultural improvement, it also interfered with the
natural pattern of advance of economic pursuits which, in
Smith's view at least, must mean that the arts of conven¬
ience are based on the economic strength of the arts of ne¬
cessity:
'As subsistence is, in the nature of things,
prior to conveniency and luxury, so the industry
which procures the former, must necessarily be
prior to that which ministers to the latter. The
cultivation and improvement of the country, there¬
fore, which affords subsistence, must, necessarily,
be prior to the increase of the town, which fur¬
nishes only the means of conveniency and luxury.' 2
This interference with the natural course of things affects
all the institutions in the society, and limits the growth
of men, not only in economic but also in social terms.
If we interpret the feudal system in light of the prin-
1. Smith, WN, I, p. 411.
2. WN, I, p. 402.
ciples which Smith laid down in Moral Sentiments it is ob¬
vious that there is only one form of morality in the state
and it is one which is of general benefit to most of the
lords and their families, but only to these. Thrift and
prudence, insofar as they might be seen to exist in a sys¬
tem where men attempt to do little and to avoid much, bring
no rewards, and the more obviously 'virtuous' system is
clearly beneficial only in the commercial society"'". In
feudalism it is the lord who is omnipotent, and who controls
the lives not only of the serfs but also of those slightly
2
above them ; and such is the nature of man, Smith believes,
that this system was one which pleased the lords' sense of
superiority as well as providing the labour by which they
lived: 'The pride of man makes him love to domineer, and
nothing mortifies him so much as to be obliged to condescend
to persuade his inferiors. Wherever the law allows it, and
the nature of thework can afford it, therefore, he will
3
generally prefer the service of slaves to that of freemen.'
The morality of the feudal state is that which is concern¬
ed with the gaining of status and respect, and the main¬
taining of this through means which are not of particular
benefit to the economic stability of the society as a whole.
The particular nature of man which leads him to desire the
respect of his peers, the particular expression of benevo¬
lence that concerns a strong interest for class and group
position are clearly those which are most dominant here;
and although we may assume some similar process of sympathy
1. See above, pp. 60-66.
2. WN, I, p. 355.
3. Ibid., p. 412.
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in the lower classes, despite their situation, the conjec¬
tural process is not much used either by Smith or Millar
to supplement our guesses: such sympathy, however, would
presumably be limited by the depressed state of the working
population.
If the lords as dominant members of the society are
able to act as they please, they certainly will not need
to moderate their feelings or actions in order to gain sym¬
pathy because the responses of the remainder of society are
irrelevant. They can only be concerned with their own stand¬
ing vis-a-vis their fellows, and hence any modification of
the general chaos and instability can result only from
changes in property as they are reflected in the sympathetic
process. The form of government as it is, is concerned
merely to conserve that power division which exists: 'Civil
government, so far as it is instituted for the security of
property, is in reality instituted for the defence of the
rich against the poor, or of those who have some property
against those who have none at all' ; and the form of jus¬
tice that results is that which is determined by the power¬
ful.
While it might be said, then, that the kinship system
which we see in feudalism provides certain securities for
its members, it does so in terms which are formed by the
nature of the situation. Justice is uncertain and in¬
dividualistic, and those to whom it is applied have little
say in its formation^. Benevolence is what any society
1. WN, II, p. 236; see also Lectures, p. 15.
2. WN, I, pp. 435-436; similar types of institutions may
also be seen in the allodial system: ibid., p. 435.
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deems to be so and a relationship brought about by proximity
does not necessarily lead to any expression of charity or
moderation outside of that imposed by necessity: 'a tenant
at will, who possesses land sufficient to maintain his fam¬
ily for little more than a quit-rent, is as dependent upon
the proprietor as any servant or retainer whatever, and must
obey him with as little reserve.'1 Justice, or the laws of
society, based as they are on the division of land, will al¬
ways support the lords' interests:
'Upon the authority which the great proprie¬
tors necessarily had in such a state of things
over their tenants and retainers, was founded
the power of the ancient barons. They necessarily
became the judges in peace, and the leaders in
war, of all who dwelt upon their estates. They
could maintain order and execute the law within
their respective demesnes, because each of them
could there turn the whole force of all the in¬
habitants against the injustice of any one. No ^
other person had sufficient authority to dothis.'
Because of this the greater part of the information we
receive concerning the effect of property divisions concerns
mainly the upper classes of the feudal system. The con¬
dition of women, for instance, through the increase of se¬
curity, must change from that uncertainty and inferiority
which is natural to the savage system, and:
'is naturally improved by every circumstance
which tends to create attention to the pleasures
of sex, and to increase the value of those occu¬
pations which are suited to the female charac¬
ter; by the cultivation of the arts; by the ad¬
vancement of opulence; by the gradual refinement
of taste and manners.' 3
It is only when material security improves that we can ex¬








unfortunate lot of women in earlier systems resulted from
the insecurity of subsistence, it is apparent that with the
development of agriculture and the greater availability of
food there will be a relaxation of the constant pressure to
survive, and thus different attitudes towards marriage will
emerge. This must be particularly true as far as the lord
himself is concerned as he takes no active part in the pro¬
curement of subsistence: it is something which is owed to
him. The greater personal freedom which some men acquire
through this change provides the atmosphere for the unfold¬
ing of particular human qualities; and the violence and
hatred natural to men are confined to those concerns out¬
side of the domestic where they still continue to be
necessary. Hence, in the upper classes we may note a free¬
dom to 'obtain those pleasures to which they are prompted
by their natural appetites.'^
At the same time, however, these same feelings or
passions are also limited by other expressions of the feu¬
dal system. The greater the opportunities and the fewer
the inhibitions because of the form of subsistence, the
greater also are the social restrictions on fulfilling
these natural desires. Women become something to be cher¬
ished, not despised, and they gain greater status through
being increasingly unavailable. Considerations of class,
of inter-family disputes, all arising from property dis¬
tinctions and the idea of property itself, mean a consequent
deprivation as considerable in its effects as the restrict-
1. Origin, p. 209; see also Hist. View, I, pp. 116-125.
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ions of the savage system: "The introduction of wealth, and
the distinction of ranks with which it is attended, must
interrupt the communication of the sexes, and, in many cases,
render it difficult for them to gratify their wishes.'1
Such restraints, nonetheless, are of benefit; the senti¬
ments of honour which mark feudal chivalry as well as also
distinguishing private warfare, led to a respect, to a
'veneration' and an 'utmost purity of manners' which en¬
hanced the value of those who were the objects of them .
In the feudal system some restraints of the feelings and
passions are a reflection of the property basis.
While it is true that the lack of stock in the feudal
. . 3
system limited the capacity for growth , and the feudal
stage as a whole appears to be a destructive and inhibit¬
ing one, it is nonetheless to be established through ob¬
servation that it itself is a stage in the human develop¬
ment which gives way to another, more sophisticated one,
and that this change, expressed through another form of
property distribution, is a further expression of the self-
interest natural to man. The human process is one which
is in constant action even though this may not be apparent
at particular times within any one stage. At the same time
as the great feudal lords dominate vast areas of land, the
forces which will lead to the gradual breakdown of this are
already beginning to move, imperceptibly perhaps but none¬
theless steadily.
1. Origin, p. 210.
2. Ibid., p. 214.
3. WN, I, p. 410.
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This change, of course, is not an automatic process;
if conditions had not existed that permitted European men
to derive benefit from particular changes such as the cru¬
sades, the opening up of new trade routes, and so on, it
is apparent that feudalism itself would have continued to
dominate as long as the divisioncof land remained the same;
and it is to be seen in certain of the theoretical works
that variations within particular societies are accounted
for through the lack of such opportunities or through par¬
ticular restrictions which limit change itself. On the
whole, however, the theoretical concern is mainly with the
usual or normal, with showing certain general trends that
lead to the fourth stage of man's development.
This is not to deny, of course, that Smith especially
is concerned to point out the particular factors character¬
istic of feudalism itself, as distinct from agricultural
societies per se, that lead to deviations from the usual
correlation between land and returns for labour. As a
part of this investigation of the deviation from the nat¬
ural course of things he points out that 'if human institu¬
tions had never thwarted those natural inclinations'"'', the
relationship between town and country would never have been
upset. Yet at the same time he indicates that the force
of human interest will also be able to overcome such depar¬
tures from the norm, and it is this process which he traces
in some detail. The regeneration of commerce because of
the crusades brought about the independence of the Italian
1. WN, I, pp. 402-403.
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cities at least , and even those societies which were un¬
able to participate in commerce to this extent nonetheless
also developed independent cities that were a check to the
power of the feudal lords. Interest unintentionally pro¬
vides the correction to the distortions of the natural.
In the theoretical viewpoint, the development of com¬
merce in the towns is of particular importance in that it
creates a new form of property which is extended to a much
wider proportion of the population than the feudal division
of land allowed. While men may have been denied the natu¬
ral rights of the fruits of their labour under the feudal
system, those members of the society who have broken away
from the land, who form the population of the towns and
cities, who establish the trades and arts which provide
the luxuries of life, achieve a form of independence through
this property and are able to retain all the benefits of it.
2
The division of labour is not possible in agriculture , an
occupation demanding merely a general knowledge; it is de¬
veloped to a greater extent only within the arts and leads
to a production of goods that maintains an opulence that
permeates society. This, in turn, gives an increased se¬
curity to the general population, thereby affecting their
3
degree of emotional response .
When the more natural freedom of man to act is restored,
1. WN, I, pp. 418 ff; Hist. View, II, Chapters VII and
VIII. This process was considered in some detail by
Robertson in the View: Charles V, Works, V, pp. 65 ff.
See below, Chapter VI. ...
2. WN, I, pp. 7-10, 17; see also Milton L. Myers, Divi¬
sion of Labour as a Principle of Social Cohesion ,
CJEPS, XXXIII (1967) pp. 438-439;
3. WN, I, pp. 410, 441.
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therefore, the heterogeneous process is able to create
more considerable benefits, and the laws of economic return
are, at least theoretically, once more in operation. By
far the most interesting aspect of this change, at least
from the viewpoint of relating Moral Sentiments to the
Wealth of Nations, is the manner in which the growing wealth
of the towns led to the decline in the power of the aris¬
tocracy"'*. If the feudal lords were once remarkable for
2
their spending within their income , this was not the re¬
sult of any automatic prudence or restraint - qualities
which are part of the ordinary morality - but because the
goods available were extremely limited. The lords, in
accordance with the dictates of feudal policy, spent their
wealth in such a manner as to retain their power, on their
supporters or on the maintenance of their lands. When the
manufactures of the city became available to them, however,
they changed from this unconsciously prudent, self-preser¬
ving policy and did so because of their very nature. Their
desire for the respect of their fellows, for status and
position, led them to turn to the new means of demonstrat¬
ing their wealth and this tendency became a characteristic
of such classes. Never having been accustomed to the 'or¬
dinary' virtues concomitant with working for one's live¬
lihood, it was not extraordinary for them to continue their
more frivolous life along lines that were to become as much
a part of their customs as war and violence had been:
'To improve land with profit, like all other
1. See Hist. View, II, pp. 378-384.
2. WN, I, pp. 410, 441.
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'commercial projects, requires an exact attention
to small savings and small gains, of which a man
born to a great fortune, even though naturally
frugal, is very seldom capable. The situation of
such a person naturally disposes him to attend
rather to ornament which pleases his fancy, than
to profit for which he has so little occasion.
The elegance of his dress, of his equipage, of
his house, and household furniture, are objects
which from his infancy he has been accustomed to
have some anxiety about.' 1
This particular characteristic of the aristocracy led
them to search for new capital, to be rid of former encum¬
brances and duties, even though these were in fact the basis
of their long-term power. They began this process by dis¬
posing of limited rights and even possessions to those who
had formerly been under their control, thereby breaking
down that dependence which had had such deleterious effects
on the development of man's qualities. The new indepen-
2dence of property possession , added to the improvements
in agriculture which had taken place, meant a more bene¬
ficial operation of the land through the usual relation-
ship of freedom and production ; and the extension of this
particular form of property to a greater number at the
same time that a new form of property (goods) was achiev¬
ing increasing importance, obviously meant a gradual change
in the balance, because in the distribution, of property.
The constant desire for status and for respect on the part
of the lords, a process in which they were once able to
indulge without detriment to themselves, was the very means
in the emerging commercial state of their downfall. It
was a change, above all, the theoretical writers emphasise,
1. WN, I, p. 410; see also II, p. 317. See above, pp. 60-6 6.
2. Hist. View, I, pp. 136-139, 312, 313; II, pp. 182-207.
3. Ibid-. , p. 383.
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which did not result from plan or foresight, but simply
from the combination of interest and the natural expression
of benevolence appropriate to this class: 'what all the
violence of the feudal institutions could never have effect¬
ed, the silent and insensible operation of foreign commerce
and manufactures gradually brought about.'1 Lacking that
prudence which enables man to look forward, a prudence
which is only developed in a society which has a tradition
of constant self-control and limitation that is noticeably
absent in the feudal state, the limited self-interest of
the aristocracy provided the means by which it destroyed
itself:
'A revolution of the greatest importance to
the public happiness, was in this manner brought
about by two different orders of people, who had
not the least intention to serve the public. To
gratify the most childish vanity was the sole mo¬
tive of the great proprietors. The merchants and
artificers, much less ridiculous, acted merely
from a view to their own interest, and in pursuit
of their own pedlar principle of turning a penny
wherever a penny was to be got. Neither of them
had any knowledge or foresight of that great re¬
volution which the folly of the one, and the in¬
dustry of the other, was gradually bringing about.
It is thus that through the greater part of
Europe the commerce and manufactures of the cit¬
ies, instead of being the effect, have been the
cause and occasion of the improvement and culti¬
vation of the country. This order, however, be¬
ing contrary to the natural course of things, is
necessarily both slow and uncertain.' 2
The particular importance of this heterogeneous pro¬
cess is that it achieves the political, because it creates
the economic, independence of a greater part of the popula¬
tion. As the theoretical writers point out in their study
of the earlier ages of social growth, the degree of freedom
1. WN, I, p. 437.
2. Ibid., pp. 440-441; Hist. View,II, pp. 188-189.
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given to the individual is the means by which his natural
self-interest operates, providing that all other factors are
equal; and it is noticeable in this interpretation that ear¬
lier ages have either had an excess of liberty, or an equal
excess of the invasion of true liberty. Both of these limit
the development of the society, preventing man from achiev¬
ing that property on which his personal security and politi¬
cal freedom depends, and thereby limiting the extent to
which he can afford the sentiments of humanity. The de¬
velopment of the arts and the possession of land by small
property holders, however, necessarily changes this situa¬
tion through making a measure of independence possible to
all. The small landowner is his own master and is able to
retain the fruits of his labour"'". The craftsman possesses
property in his trade, and the nature of this is such that
the success of his undertaking does not depend so much on
the will of the customer because his customers are many
and the effects of the will of one are limited. This sit¬
uation differs from that of the limited feudal society in
which the uncertain will of the single lord was the deter¬
mining force that affected the whole of a man's life. 'Each
tradesman or artificer derives his subsistence from the
employment, not of one, but of a hundred or a thousand
different customers. Though in some measure obliged to
them all, therefore, he is not absolutely dependent upon
2
any one of them.'
The breakdown of the feudal system is clearly of the
1. See WN, I, pp. 432-433, and Hist. View, I, pp. 316-317.
2. WN, 17 P- 438; see also Origin, p. 295.
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greatest importance in the theoretical history, for it is
the means by which human nature may come more into its own,
This spirit of liberty, which is natural to man, has been
engendered by the freeing of the mind from the insecurity
and dependence characteristic of feudalism; and is support¬
ed by an extension of property to a greater number, proper¬
ty which transfers to other classes a proportionate share
in political power:
'It may in general be observed that, according
as men have made greater progress in commerce
and the arts, the establishment of domestic free¬
dom is of greater importance; and that, in opu¬
lent and polished nations, its influence extends
to the great body of the people, who form the
principle part of a community, and whose comfort¬
able situation ought never to be overlooked in
the provisions that are made for national happi¬
ness and prosperity.' 1
The re-distribution of property arising through commerce
and through the actual changes in land-holding which com¬
merce has caused indirectly, have meant that political power
and the nature of the government must change accordingly.
The original alliance with the king that the towns were
obliged to make, gradually gives way to a greater indepen¬
dence and to the political power of these towns based on
their wealth^. And their right to administer the finances
of the state, gained because they represent those who pro¬
vide this money, grants to them a considerable authority,
at least in theory. The general pattern may indeed always
3
be upset by the particular history of a state , and the
1. Origin, p. 316.
2. WN, I, p. 424; Origin, pp. 313-314; Hist. View, II,
pp. 199-205. . n ,
3. This variation is traced by Robertson particularly,
in the View, Section III, Charles V, Works, V, pp.
104-163":;
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emergence of the democratical element is really only the
beginning of the history of the modern state"'"; nonetheless,
it is a change which is of considerable importance to the
development of man's nature.
The emphasis on the unintended or heterogeneous de¬
velopment of modern society is a vital part of the theo¬
retical philosophy particularly because of the role of the
unphilosophical in the emergence of what we call enlight¬
ened society, and because such an interpretation emphasises
the role of interest in the creation and the maintenance
of this society. As Smith had pointed out, the morality
peculiar to the aristocracy was one which was not economi¬
cally productive, especially because of the basis of the
labour that worked the feudal estates. With the change in
property form and holding, however, and in the nature of
the government that was based on this, the rights of men
were in part at least restored, and a more profitable form
of morality was introduced. The merchant, for instance,
whose wealth may enable him to buy property from one of the
old feudal families, brings with him the qualities which
are natural to his business pursuits and applies them to
his management of land. He seeks not so much the ephemeral,
as the lords did, the beautification of himself or his es¬
tate, but its profitable operation; and his interest is of
benefit to the society as a whole:
'Merchants are commonly ambitious of becoming
country gentlemen, and when they do, they are
generally the best of all improvers.^ A merchant
is accustomed to employ his money chiefly in
1. Millar, Origin, p. 292.
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profitable projects; whereas a mere country gen¬tleman is accustomed to employ it chiefly in ex-
pence. The one often sees his money go from him
and return to him again with a profit: the other,
when once he parts with it, very seldom expects
to see any more of it ... The habits ... of order,
economy and attention, to which mercantile busi¬
ness naturally forms a merchant, render him much
fitter to execute, with profit and success, any
project of improvement.' 1
With the development of the arts and crafts, with the
free ownership of land in the country, maintained by politi¬
cal power, there was an independence that permitted a level
of economic production that was formerly impossible and made
it easier for man to gain respect and status through possess¬
ion of material goods. As Smith in particular has indicated,
this is not to say that men become more abstractly or ideally
'virtuous' since the values of thrift and so on are related
only to the economic advance of the individual and hence of
the society. It is rather that the general level of behav¬
iour which is necessary if the middle and lower classes are
to advance is such that it heterogeneously produces par¬
ticular social benefits through the necessary inculcation
of prudence, hard work and self-control - qualities which
we think of as 'virtues'. Here especially is the 'mis¬
guided' desire for status and place the main motive of hu¬
man actions. Our wish to gain the respect and sympathy of
our fellows, our constant desire to be in such a position
as will lead man's natural identification with success to
endow us with social approval, is the basis of our action.
And it is a part of the natural order of things that the
ordinary man cannot gain this approval in the manner which
1. WN, I, pp. 432-433.
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the upper classes can. If he were so misguided as to at¬
tempt this, he would certainly be economically and also
socially destroyed; thus it is only through the virtues
which are natural to our particular situation that we may
in fact attain position, the sympathy of our fellows, the
approval of the impartial spectator, and, at the same time,
increase the security of our society, a factor which leads
to continuing, if unintended, developments. Once property
is instituted on a rightful and natural basis, therefore,
it will ordinarily lead to a constant increase in wealth
and public benefit; a benefit which is achieved through
many virtues that would not have been accepted by earlier
writers but which is nonetheless real and solid in the view
of the theoretical writers. Necessity, they feel, pro¬
duces greater ends than benevolence.
This is a process which Smith traces in some detail
in Wealth of Nations, as an integral part of his belief
that the natural course of things will produce a society
that is economically flourishing, and that any interfer¬
ence with this process will lead to a perversion of the
relationship between freedom and the highest production.
There is, he believes, a necessary relationship between
the general industry and the capital which employs it and
this should not be tampered with in order to favour one
segment of the population, either concerning the trade be¬
tween two or more nations or the domestic economy itself .
If this is done there is a denial of the rights of man as
severe as that which we have seen to exist in the feudal
1. WN, I, p. 479.
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system:
|Though ... a landed nation should be able
to raise up artificers, manufacturers and mer¬
chants of its own, somewhat sooner than it could
do by the freedom of trade; a matter, however,
which is not a little doubtful; yet it would
raise them up, if one may say so, prematurely,
and before it was perfectly ripe for them.' 1
All gains and development ought to be natural and made in
proportion to the capacities of the society as it is at any
given period. A temporary advantage gained through forcing
the rate of growth is not really an advantage at all if we
look at it in the philosophical manner, from our awareness,
through observation, of the laws which govern all of human
society. As man ought to control his present desires for
his future interest, so also should any state prevent the
passing of laws which tend to upset the natural rhythm and
to interfere with its real, steady, and appropriate gains:
'All systems either of preference or of restraint, there¬
fore, being thus completely taken away, the obvious and
simple system of natural liberty establishes itself of its
own accord.'^
The principle of self-interest, it is to be observed,
will have an automatic levelling effect on industry within
and without the state so that such regulations which are
imposed through monopolies, bounties, commercial treaties
or whatever, are not only detrimental to the rights of the
many and a direct invasion of them, but, quite simply, are
also unnecessary. What is good for one will be good for
the society providing the true laws of justice exist: the
1. WN, II, p. 193; see also ibid., pp. 113, 197.
2. Ibid., p. 208.
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private interests and passions of individuals naturally
dispose them to turn their stock towards the employments
which in ordinary cases are most advantageous to the soc¬
iety. ' The same tendency leads man to invest his capital
in the most advantageous manner and it will produce an
appropriate return not only to himself but also to the
population as a whole, a factor which applies also to or¬
dinary labour. Economic 'laws' are valid in all cases:
'The whole of the advantages and disadvan¬
tages of the different employments of labour
and stock must, in the same neighbourhood, be
either perfectly equal or continually tending
to equality. If in the same neighbourhood,
there was any employment evidently either more
or less advantageous than the rest, so many
people would crowd into it in the one case, and
so many would desert it in the other, that its
advantages would soon return to the level of
other employments. This at least would be the
case, where there was perfect liberty, and where
every man was perfectly free both to chuse what
occupation he thought proper, and to change it
as often as he thought proper.' 2
Similarly, in a society which has been allowed to
proceed normally and in that which has made the necessary
adjustments through the strength of self-interest, a man
will invest his capital first in domestic industry and to
O
his own profit ; and in doing so, in advancing his own
interest, he must necessarily advance that of the society
in general:
'He generally, indeed, neither intends to pro¬
mote the public interest, nor knows how much he
is promoting it. By preferring the support of
domestic to that of foreign industry, he intends
only his own security; and by directing that in¬
terest in such a manner as its produce may be of
the greatest value, he intends only his own gain,
and he is in this, as in many other cases, led
by an invisible hand to promote an end which was
no part of his intention.' 4
1. WN, II, pp. 145-146.
2. Ibid., I, p. 111.
3. Ibid., pp. 475, 477-478.
4. Ibid., p. 477.
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'Wherever capital predominates, industry prevails: wherever
1
revenue, idleness' ; thus the productive use and continu¬
ance of capital must always advance the society, however
automatically. The continuation of the virtue of self-
love must encourage the inclination to act, to barter, and
through this the division of labour is developed in order
to produce those improvements which not only increase the
goods of the commercial society but also tend to lower
their price in relation to the income of any given labour-
2
er : 'It xs the natural effect of improvement ... to di-
3
minish gradually the real price of almost all manufactures.'
The operation of the natural process of morality common to
the ordinary man will mean both public benefit and the
achievement of those goals which are dear to the heart of
those who desire to be a part of society and to interact
with their fellows.
We may also see that,in the theoretical philosophy,
the development of commerce as a form of property has
considerable effects on the domestic relationships of man,
and enables the restrictions on the growth of the sentiments
of humanity to be lifted. If men are affected in their
family relationships, as well as in those with their fel¬
lows, by the repression of natural feelings, it is appar¬
ent that the freeing of them from the dependence on the
will of others and the restoration of the natural rights
will profoundly affect the extent to which they are free
to treat their own dependants in a more generous manner.
1. WN, I, p. 358.
2. Ibid. , p. 275.
3. Ibid., p. 269.
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If Smith has indicated that benevolence comes not so much
from natural passions, but from prolonged close contact be¬
tween particular groups of persons, it is also to be seen
that this close contact can only produce what the general
level of the society makes possible. If the process of
sympathy is limited in its operation, if the concepts of
justice are oppressive because of the feudal powers, for
instance, if insecurity of position restricts the human
responses, then benevolence in the earlier stages of de¬
velopment must necessarily be of a very limited type. It
may extend to the identification of dominant groups (such
as the nobility) with each other, it may also lead to the
extension of favour and rights from the lord to all those
who are a part of the kinship system, but it can hardly
be seen to operate in the more 'unselfish' aspects. It is
only when there is civil freedom, then, and men become in¬
dividuals, that they are free to act as such, and only
then that freedom is extended to all persons in proportion
to the degree that situation makes this possible.
As both Smith and Millar indicate in some detail, the
general situation of the society will determine the par¬
ticular laws and customs that affect the role of both women
and children, and also of servants. When government gives
considerable powers to the husband, father, or master, ei¬
ther directly or because of its lack of control over indi¬
viduals, those persons under the command of the individual
father or master must be dependent on his will and on the
favour of others for any moderation of this. If such mod¬
eration or intervention is not a part of the normal social
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attitude then the position of such persons is little better
than that of slaves . It is only with the breakdown of
feudalism, the increase of security and the freedom from
the arbitrary and capricious will of others that resulted
from this, that a greater personal independence could be
extended to all members of the community and this could be
reflected in the attitude towards women and children. If
the condition of women is improved by the greater freedom
of the men and the certainty produced by self-interest
operating with less restriction, then those freedoms allow¬
ed to the upper-class women of the feudal period can be
extended to a greater number.
These freedoms, however, will necessarily be of a
different kind in keeping with the vast changes in the
nature of the state; chivalry, being the product of an
earlier form of government, must eventually, if slowly,
2
die out . The increasing importance of the merchant and
trading class, to which the militaristic virtues were for¬
eign, led gradually to a change in customs and to the de¬
velopment of those more appropriate to the new class. Se¬
curity, mobility and independence meant the emergence of
trust and peace within the family and in the relationships
with others: 'the advancement of people in manufactures and
commerce has a natural tendency to remove those circumstan¬
ces which prevented the free intercourse of the sexes, and
i 3
contributed to heighten and inflame their passions. It
1. Smith, Lectures, p. 94.
2. Millar, OriginT" P* 209.
3. Ibid. , pp"i 218-219.
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is in this society, then, that the talents which women do
have, the qualities which are distinctively theirs, are
valued; this situation marks a very clear distinction be¬
tween this and earlier societies"'". In comparison espec¬
ially with the savage society it is those qualities and
talents which are peculiar to women which are respected,
and while we may consider the nature of marriage in some
earlier ages to have been 'imperfect', 'limited' and not
'fully established', we cannot say the same of the modern
2
form . Because of man's nature, marriage must be some¬
thing other than a master/servant relationship or a contract
between a superior and an inferior; it must be rather a
relationship between equals, Millar believes, and one in
which the different qualities of the two partners are taken
into consideration. Thus it is only in the commercial
state which permits a greater emotional, because physical,
security that a true appreciation of women as individuals
can arise, that marriage can be wholly natural:
'In this situation, the women become, neither
the slaves, nor the idols of the other sex, but
the friends and companions. The wife obtains
that rank and station which appears most agree¬
able to reason, being suited to her character
and talents.' 3
We may also trace a similar attitude towards the
position of children in the commercial society, the pater-
4
nal authority being reduced within narrower bounds .
Children, Millar believes, have rights like all other mem-
1. See above, especially pp. 85-86, 99-101.
2. Origin, p. 199.
3. Ibid. , p. 219.
4. Lectures, p. 91.
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bers of society and these rights must be observed^. While
parents may love their children automatically, while they
may have a 'natural affection' and a 'humanity'2 in regard
to them, this should not be exploited to the detriment of
the child. As much as men in general have, or ought to
have, a freedom from oppression from the sovereign, so also
ought children to have the right to love and obey their
3
parents with moderation . As has been indicated above,
the situation of earlier societies necessarily had detri¬
mental effects on the nature of the father/child relation¬
ship, those children who could not be supported being left
to die, and the 'normal' feelings of parents being non-
4
existent or impossible of fulfillment . Only when society
is based on more solid principles do the harsh necessities
of another stage give way to the 'natural'; the father in
more tolerable circumstances is able to be 'himself', to
fulfil his natural duties as a parent:
'By living in affluence and security, he is more
at leisure to exert the social affections, and
to cultivate those arts which tend to soften and
humanize the temper. Being often engaged in the
business and conversation of the world, and find¬
ing, in many cases, the necessity of conforming
to the humours of those with whom he converses,
he becomes less impatient of contradiction, and
less apt to give way to the irregular sallies of
passion. His parental affection, though not per¬
haps more violent, becomes at least more steady
and uniform.' 5
If the feelings which developed in security were more
natural than those which existed prior to this, Millar also
Origin, p. 243.
2. Ibid., p. 241.
3. Ibid., p. 243.
4. Ibid., p. 230.
5. Ibid., p. 316.
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believes that we must also see as 'imperfect1 those systems
which demanded too great a respect, love and obedience from
their children; hence, we must learn that the natural is
the moderate, in this case at least. He concedes that it
is natural that the earliest form of authority and power is
derived from that respect which men give to the experience
and knowledge which comes from or is associated with age1,
and it is natural also that this respect is extended to
2
fathers . Yet it is an attitude which has often been ex¬
ploited and this exploitation limits the development of the
individual, in much the same manner, we may suppose, that
the dependence of men in feudalism limits their own growth.
Any laws which grant excessive power to parents, then, must
be seen as an 'abuse' of the natural, and demand 'correct-
3
ion' . When the commercial society brings security and
individuality, this independence will be recognised; and
children will no longer need to depend on their parents
either emotionally or materially:
'The children, at an early period of life, are
obliged to leave their home, in order to be in¬
structed in those trades and professions by which
it is proposed they should earn a livelihood, and
afterwards to settle in those parts of the coun¬
try which they find convenient for prosecuting
their several employments. By this alteration of
circumstances they are emancipated from their
father's authority. They are put in a condition
to procure a maintenance without having recourse
to his bounty, and by their own labour and indus- ^
try are frequently possessed of opulent fortunes.
Smith, whose opinions differ in some details from those
of Millar, believes that the process of benevolence itself
1. Origin, pp. 230-231; see above, p. 87.
2. Ibid., p. 232.
3. Ibid., p. 241.
4. Ibid., p. 241.
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is necessarily affected by the commercial society; so that,
far from having too much authority over their children,
for instance, modern parents are unconsciously permitting
a situation in which the bonds that we have come to think
of as natural are being gradually destroyed. The erosion
of the ties between parents and children means that contact
is maintained only through a rather cool, detached, and
'dutiful' response, and that if we wish to maintain the
older, more traditional actions, we must move away from
the tradition of educating our children away from their home:
'Do you wish to educate your children to be duti¬
ful to their parents, to be kind and affectionate
to their brothers and sisters? put them under ne¬
cessity of being dutiful children, of being kind
affectionate brothers and sisters: educate them
in your own house.' 1
'Respect for you', he believes, 'must always impose a very
useful restraint upon their conduct; and respect for them
2
may frequently impose no useless restraint upon your own. *
In this way does Smith point out what is not always ob¬
vious in Millar's work, that the advances of the commercial
society also bring many problems and can lead to a denial
of the nature of things as effectively as earlier stages.
Interest is a constant force, and the manner in which it
is expressed, its reflection in sympathy and benevolence,
for instance, may not always be that which we might wish.
It is typical of Smith's philosophy, and indeed, of
the basis of all theoretical history, that the constant
principles seen as motivating man's actions are believed
to continue into a society where man's nature is , more
*
1. MS, p. 236.
2. Ibid. ,
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fully expressed, and to provide the basis of future change
from this. As an integral part of this belief in the con¬
stancy of basic principle, there is the recognition that
the same denial of the rights of others that we have seen
to exist in earlier societies will be continued, and for
much the same reasons. Even if the commercial system, the
growth of democracy, the re-distribution of property, has
meant an increase in the more humane sentiments, this is
merely an expression of situation. More 'generous' sen¬
timents are not the result of conscious or self-denying
action but of processes which have developed unconsciously
and as such have become a part of justice, of what society
makes known through sympathy. They are not to be seen as
benevolence or charity, upon which we cannot depend, but
are formed into laws which we must obey.
Such sentiments, furthermore, do not end our original
and most basic passions; the process of self-interest con¬
tinues to operate though it is restrained by the system of
justice that is appropriate to the commercial system. And,
because Smith in particular accepts that this interest
will often be unjust and that, at the same time we cannot
control all expressions of injustice and discrimination,
he emphasises in true philosophical fashion that we ought
to become aware of the real interest of man which will both
leave us free to express our natural desires, and benefit
all of society because of the natural course of things.
Such a philosophy, it would seem, is not by any means ob¬
vious even in the more enlightened society? and prudence
is often overruled by the desire for immediate gain. An
awareness of our real interest, then, will tend to support
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existing justice or lead eventually to more philosophical
forms of this.
In Wealth of Nations^" Smith studies in some detail
the various systems of thought and attitudes of men which
tend to upset the natural course of things and which are
thereby an affront to the philosophical interpretation.
Systems which tend to advance the few will necessarily de¬
prive the many, he thought, and although he was tolerant
of the Physiocratic theory in some respects , he nonethe¬
less was obliged to point out how it aM all others like
it failed to take into account all parts of the society,
and concentrated only on some. Such attitudes, which were
seen as more appropriate to earlier, less philosophical
ages, did not form a whole that expressed the entirety of
man's development. The physiocratic denial of the bene¬
fits of the merchant and manufacturing classes, for in¬
stance, ignores the relationship of these to other sections
of the community, and the necessary connection between the
country and the towns . Society must function through the
self-interest of all segments so that no group is dependent
on another, and revenue will increase naturally in propor¬
tion to the labour of all:
'It can never be the interest of the pro¬
prietors and cultivators to restrain or to dis¬
courage in any respect the industry of merchants,
artificers and manufacturers. The greater the
1. See especially Book IV, II, pp. 3-208.
2. Ibid., p. 189.
3. Although Smith does not explicitly say so, it may be
that he is here condemning the physiocratic theory
because it appears somewhat primitivistic, too much
concerned with the emotional and ideological connota¬
tions of 'land' - thrift, hard work, etc.
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liberty which this unproductive class enjoys,
the greater will be the competition in all the
different trades which compose it, and the cheap¬
er will the other two classes be supplied, both
with foreign goods, and with the manufactured
produce of their own country.' 1
The same interest not to oppress or interfere is also
applicable to the merchants themselves, and that which they
themselves seek should also be granted by them to others:
a moral which is clearly denied by the theories of those
such as the mercantilists and all others which emphasise
excessive regulations of trade. In Smith's view, the basic
nature of commerce or trade is that it should benefit both
parties, not that one shall demand to benefit excessively
to the disadvantage of the other. If this should be the
case, then the whole will suffer. All philosophies which
encourage interference, restriction, and force must deny
2
the natural course of things . To blockade in order to
help a home industry, to buy expensive when buying cheap
was possible, invades the proper correlation between in¬
dustry and capital; to produce for ourselves what we could
buy more cheaply elsewhere is a denial of the development
of the division of labour , and indicates a sort of mind
which is not appropriate to the needs of commercial trad-
. 4
mg .
Further, though we may concede that men naturally,
and from benevolence, are opposed to the economic devel¬
opment of a neighbouring state"', we ought to at least
1. WN, II, pp. 189-190.
2. Ibid., I, pp. 515-516; II, p. 190.
3. Ibid., I, p. 480.
4. Ibid., pp. 518-519.
5. Ibid., p. 519.
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remember that commerce 'ought naturally to be, among nations
as among individuals, a bond of union and friendship'.
Thus, if we cannot hope to change the operation of the hu¬
man mind we should avoid as much as possible any detrimen¬
tal consequences of our natural feelings1. The same dis¬
advantageous results will come from all such limitations
upon the natural flow of goods and services, from bounties,
treaties, and so on, and while it may appear that such
matters will affect only the few, it is in fact to be seen
that in the long run the entire state is injured. Whether
a foreign nation is given an advantage in order to encour-
2
age its own sales , or whether a nation's merchants are
permitted to interfere with the rightful and appropriate
flow, it is always the entire society which is affected,
especially in the right of men to 'exchange the produce
3
of their labour for what they please' . Not only, there¬
fore, is the economic balance upset, but other factors of
life also; to disturb the natural pattern is to disturb
the natural operation of rights or freedoms. Man's lib¬
erty can be invaded as efficiently by a denial of the
laissez-faire operation as if he had been wrongfully im¬
prisoned.
In all disturbances of the natural order, then,
there will be a denial of personal rights and also a den¬
ial of the true interests of those who perpetrate such
invasions. Monopoly will slow down the growth rate, and
while as a form of acquired right it may be defensible,
1. WN, I, p. 519. _
2. ibid., II, p. 53; see also ibid., pp. 8, 10, 11, lay.
3. Lectures, p. 205.
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it ought always to give way to the general good - but
rarely does. If we have a right to a proper price based
on labour, a monopoly will always destroy this: 'The riches
of a country consist in the plenty and cheapness of pro¬
visions, but their effect is to make every thing dear.'"'"
Such restrictions, moreover, affect especially those who
can least afford to be limited in their purchasing powers;
as it is also the working man who is most affected by the
restrictions of institutions such as apprenticeships , or
by such factors as the restriction of the free circulation
of labour. The property which all men have in the capacity
to work is the first form of property and one that ought to
be inviolable.
Smith does not believe, however, that simply stating
these facts will be sufficient in itself to bring about
change. In the first place, of course, he believes that
mankind has often progressed in spite of such institutions
and regulations, and in the second he feels that we should
not appeal to the generosity of those in power but rather
to their self-interest. This is a principle integral to
the development of the independent society: 1 nobody but a
beggar chuses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of
his fellow citizens.' Moreover, it is to be seen that
interest and the inculcation of rights can be successfully
combined; if, for instance, it is true that any commercial
system depends on the labour of its working classes, then
it is obviously in the interest of this society to maintain
1. Lectures, p. 130.
2. WN, I, p. 137.
3. Ibid., p. 18.
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the welfare of such classes. A family that is properly
cared for through its breadwinner receiving an adequate
wage and other securities/ not only ascertains the appro¬
priate return for labour but also increases both the capi¬
tal and the population of the state1. The needs of men
are simple but they ought always to be certain; when they
are a situation is produced which is clearly advantageous
to the whole: 'what improves the circumstances of the
greater part can never be regarded as an inconveniency to
2
the whole.'
'No society can surely be flourishing and happy,
of which the far greater part of the members are
poor and miserable. It is but equity, besides,
that they who feed, cloath, and lodge the whole
body of the people, should have such a share of
the produce of their own labour as to be them- ^
selves tolerably well-fed, cloathed and lodged.'
Through a combination of interest and action, the
heterogeneous and the deliberate, those benefits which
ought to be developed by the commercial society, and which
ought to be extended to all in this society, are more like¬
ly to become a solid part of the principles of the state.
While accepting the constancy and uniformity of man's
faults and imperfections, then, the theoretical history
also believes that other expressions of man's nature will
eventually lead to a more profitable and natural system,
even if never a perfect one; and it bfelieves also that
while we should let the natural course of things act as
it will - 'if a nation could not prosper without the enjoy¬
ment of a perfect liberty and perfect justice, there is
1. WN, I, p. 89; see also ibid., p. 88, and II, p. 78.
2. Ibid., I, p. 88.
3. Ibid. ; see also Origin, pp- 317-321.
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not in the world a nation which could ever have prospered'^"
- it also believes that interest itself becomes more philo¬
sophical and that/ in the modern state there are, or oudjht
to be, institutions which enforce this philosophical spirit.
This is a view which is most fully developed in the theo¬
retical consideration of the relationship between the con¬
stant principles of man's nature and the operation of
government.
1. WN, II, pp. 194-195; see further on this matter,
Warren J. Samuels, 'The Classical Theory of Economic
Policy: Non-Legal Social Control , SEJ, XXXI (1964)
pp. 1-20, 87-100; and George J. Stigler, Smith s





THE MAINTENANCE OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY
The opinion of the theoretical writers concerning the
role of government in life is necessarily dependent upon
their general philosophy concerning the manner in which
man achieves that which is most beneficial to him. As we
have seen above/ the Scottish interpretation is always lim¬
ited by the philosophical basis that man is governed by
constant laws; and because of this philosophy the emphasis
in the study of any part of the human experience is always
on that which is natural, which is achieved within the
framework of man's situation and through his needs. In¬
herent in this belief, if not always expressed consciously,
is a criticism of all theories which advocate the active
and consistent interference by government in man's life,
particularly of those ideas which seek to establish 'rights'
and feelings which are not a natural expression of men at
a particular stage, and seek also the precise observation
of these as if men were amenable to continual and rational
intervention. For the theoretical writers, the free oper¬
ation of interest, the freedom of man to act in unphiloso-
phical ways, to search constantly for place and the respect
of his fellows^, is the only principle of life, the only
'natural course of things', the only way in which balance,
if it is to exist and be maintained, will come into being.
1. MS, pp. 263-264.
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Furthermore, because of the constancy of the laws natural
to human society, this general principle is true both of
the domestic and the international balance of power. If
the philosophical exists here it is as a result of the
gradual development of men^; and even the more philosophi¬
cal society is maintained by those principles natural to
man. If in the commercial society, for instance, we see
that man is more moderate and humane, he is so because such
principles are made a part of the laws of justice which
control his actions; and moderation and humanity are con¬
tinued through interest as they have developed through the
heterogeneity of ends and the capacity of man to progress.
In the theoretical view, then, the role of government
and the relationship between man and government must be
considered in terms of these principles. As has been
pointed out above, the factor which most affects the be¬
haviour of men is the desire which they have to gain the
2
approval of their fellows . Our desire to gam place,
allied to the operation of benevolence which leads us to
feel respect for those above us and to maintain our own
privileges, is the basis of the attitude of men towards
governmental actions and towards political change in gen¬
eral. These feelings are reflected in the two forms of
morality which exist in the civil society, each of which
is necessary for the maintenance of stability - even though
3
the morality of the nobility may appear useless , the
1. See below, p. 201.
2. See above, Chapter II.
3. MS, pp. 73-74, 79-80.
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parts are always inextricably a whole. As the ordinary man
acts in a prudent', more traditionally 'virtuous' fashion
in order to gain seemingly unphilosophical ends which are
nonetheless useful, the more apparently self-interested ac¬
tions of the aristocracy are also of value to the society.
The principle of sympathy for, identification with, those
who are above us in rank leads us both to feel much for our
superiors , and to have the greatest reluctance to act
2
against them ; and it is not hope for personal benefit, nor
a sense of the utility arising from such a situation that
is the basis of our feeling. The great may despise us, in
accordance with their own sense of superiority, yet it is
not this attitude which makes the greatest impression on us:
we continue to respond favourably to them as before. It re¬
quires a great amount of invasion, oppression and complete
indifference to the 'rights' of the ordinary man by those
above him before any response is made, and even this re¬
sponse may be painful to the citizen because of the fall
3
from greatness which it involves :
'Even when the order of society seems to require
that we should oppose them, we can hardly bring
ourselves to do it. That kings are the servants
of the people, to be obeyed, resisted, deposed, or
punished, as the public conveniency may require,
is the doctrine of reason and philosophy; but it
is not the doctrine of nature ... The strongest
motives, the most furious passions, fear, hatred,
and resentment, are scarce sufficient to balance
this natural disposition to respect them: and their
conduct must, either justly or unjustly, have ex¬
cited the highest degree of all those passions,
before the bulk of the people can be brought to
1. MS, pp. 73-76, 79-80.
2. Ibid., pp. 74-75.
3. Ibid., p. 79.
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oppose them with violence, or to desire to see
them either punished or deposed.' 1
Such sentiments, however unphilosophical they may be,
are in fact the basis of the stability of government since
they mean that change is likely to be prompted only when
of the greatest necessity. Ordinarily, the division of
ranks within society, the benevolence which makes each
member of a particular group seek to support the interest
of his own, as well as the respect which we have for those
above us, are the most stabilising factors in the civil
society. The existence of individual or group interest
may be thought of as a challenge to the welfare of the
whole, but this is so only if we think in 'rational'
terms; in reality, this 'unjust' feeling of partiality is
not only natural to men in this stage of development but
it has a much more philosophical end than we might have
thought:
'This partiality ... checks the spirit of in¬
novation. It tends to preserve whatever is the
established balance among the different orders
and societies into which the state is divided;
and while it sometimes appears to obstruct some
alterations of government which may be fashion¬
able and popular at the time, it contributes in
reality to the stability and permanency of the
whole system.' 2
For Smith, the stability of the state is of major
importance and this belief affects the whole of his po¬
litical philosophy. Benevolence, he feels, is ordinarily
sufficient for us both to love our country and to wish for
its benefit"^, and both of these feelings can ordinarily
1. MS, p. 74.
2. Ibid., p. 339.
3. Ibid.
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be accomodated by the usual manner in which we express
our interest. But on those very rare occasions when it
may seem necessary to change the government we must be more
careful as to the real nature of our interests, and ascer¬
tain whether, under the guise of a truly enlightened public
spirit or desire for the welfare of others"'", men are not
attempting to put forward their own very limited pleas for
reformation. Smith, it is to be noticed, does not deny
the necessity for change, even of planned and conscious
change; it is rather that he denies the supposition that
claims of others to be working wholly on the behalf of men
2
in general can be taken wholly at face value. Ordinarily,
then, we may not need to evaluate our political system
consciously and rationally; but it is to be expected that
we take advantage of the natural and unplanned philoso¬
phical or rational attitudes that have become a part of
our mores in order to benefit ourselves:
"in such cases ... it often requires, perhaps,
the highest effort of political wisdom to de¬
termine when a real patriot ought to support
and endeavour to re-establish the authority
of the old system, and when he ought to give
way to the more daring, but often dangerous,
spirit of innovation.1 3
This particular expression of benevolence - love of
country and the desire to be a good citizen - clearly de¬
mands some action and some careful consideration of issues;
but this is not to say that the introduction of a more
1. MS, pp. 265-266.
2. ibid., p. 341; 'a certain spirit of system is apt to
mix itself with that public spirit which is founded
upon the love of humanity*. See also ibid., p. 266
for Smith's opinion on the meaning of public spirit.
3. Ibid., p. 340.
133
conscious or rational element means that this form of bene¬
volence must be distinguished from other, earlier express¬
ions of this quality. Such action and consideration is
still based on interest, on an awareness created by the
philosophical society of our real benefits and of the false¬
ness of those doctrines which claim to be able to change
all 'wrongs' at one time^". If we do accept the need for
change, we do so from a more philosophical interest.
This emphasis of the theoretical writers on the gen¬
eral, on the natural, and on the relationship of the parts
to the whole is an integral part of their attitude towards
government; and because of this they necessarily go far
beyond the theories of earlier schools which limit the
types of change which the society can absorb. The theo¬
retical historians' study of the development of man has
led them to believe that it is through the extension of
property to all that greater developments of human nature
have come about, and thus that commerce itself cannot be
1. MS, p. 341. See also Lectures, p. 31. The theoreti¬
cal position here was summarised by Stewart in his
study of the changing patterns of European thought:
'In enlightened ages ... there cannot be a doubt,
that political wisdom comes in for its share in the
administration of human affairs; and there is reason¬
able ground for hoping, that its influence will con¬
tinue to increase, in proportion as the principles of
legislation are more generally studied and understood.
To suppose the contrary, would reduce us to be mere
spectators of the progress and decline of society,
and put an end to every species of patriotic exertion.'
(Works, I, pp. 191-192. See also ibid., pp. 491-492,
and his Lectures on Political Economy, New York,
1968, hereafter cited Lectures , I, p. 48).
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seen as necessarily detrimental to man"^. Furthermore,
they also show that in the commercial society the operations
of the human mind remain similar, sotthat if any question
of corruption occurs, it must be both recognised and dealt
with in a manner appropriate to the age. Because of this
we may see that while the theoretical history has certain¬
ly learnt much from the commonwealth works, it also goes?
beyond these to find commerce beneficial and to find also
that the correction of the abuses of the commercial system
2
can be achieved with a limited amount of action . The na¬
ture of man tends to develop solutions along with changes,
whether these be automatic or demand a more conscious ex¬
pression of the philosophical spirit.
In his consideration of the operation of the modern
commercial society Smith concentrated particularly on the
limitations of political power and on the invasions of
rights which resulted from the discrepancy between appar¬
ent and real interest. For the theoretical writers, the
evolution of the modern system and the growth of science
3
and philosophy, particularly in the more modern ages ,
necessarily affected the concepts of law and of 'justice*
which governed men, these changes being ifeflected through
1. See, for instance, Stewart, Lectures, I, p. 35: 'it
was the general diffusion of wealth among the lower
orders of men which first gave birth to the spirit of
independence in Modern Europe, and which has produced
under some of its governments ... a. more equal diffus¬
ion of freedom and of happiness than took place under
the most celebrated constitutions of antiquity'. See
also Hume, 'Of Commerce', Essays, pp. 259-274.
2. For a brief examination of the commonwealth philoso
phy, see below>, Appendix B.
3. Millar, Hist. View, III, pp. 7, 144-145, 213; IV,
pp. 281-282, 308-310.
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the sympathetic process. The actual extent of the philo¬
sophical nature of society, therefore, is not in itself a
denial either of the heterogeneous process (since there is
always an awareness of the unintended and natural factors
which produced such changes) or of the limitations of bene¬
volence or generosity in human society. The philosophical
spirit that does exist has both grown gradually and become
a normal part of the human response to situations: we are
not motivated consciously by the more rational, this being
simply a part of our virtu or of the means by which we
maintain the political benefit:
'Philosophy has been constantly advancing in all
the departments of science; has been employed in
reducing all the works of art, all the appearances
of nature, to their principles; and has not ne¬
glected to push her researches into political as
well as other branches of speculation. The mys¬
teries of government have been more and more un¬
veiled and the circumstances which contribute to
the perfection of the social order have been laid
open.' 2
This growth of man is the result of the heterogeneous
process, the capacity of man to progress, of the force of
the quality of self-interest, which are all expressed in
economic terms. The freedom of man in his possession of
property has enabled him to expand his mind sufficiently
in order to be aware of the dangers of society that he was
once completely vulnerable to, at the same time as it has,
generally speaking, provided the means by which he and his
representatives can maintain their freedom. The spread of
wealth and related factors such as the division of labour
leads Millar to believe that 'we cannot entertain a doubt
1. See below, pp.526-529.
2. Millar, Hist. View, IV, pp. 304-305; see also III,
pp. 149-150, 231.
'of their powerful efficacy to propagate corresponding
sentiments, of personal independence, and to instil higher
notions of general liberty'1, the truth of which statement
he illustrated by the philosophical rejection of the
Stewarts by the greater part of the Scots in both 1715
2
and 1745 . Our financial independence which is produced
by our possession of property in land, labour, or goods
enables us to both develop our minds towards a more philo¬
sophical appreciation of life, and to enforce the con¬
clusions which we have reached from this natural philoso¬
phical process.
While there is some dependence left in the society,
then, particularly among labourers, the greater part of
the members of the commercial state is both free and en¬
abled to act together in order to check invasions of lib-
3
erties . In the view of Millar particularly the tradit¬
ional basis of political power, property or superior quali
4
ties, is supported by man's natural respect for wealth
and known as authority. This authority is an expression
of an automatic process, of the natural operation of the
human mind, and, free from any other limitations imposed
by the rights of men, is the foundation of the Tory po¬
litical theory. Utility, on the other hand, or the scien-
1. Hist. View, IV, pp. 124-125.
2. Ibid., III, p. 7.
3. Ibid., pp. 114-115, 116-127; see also IV, pp. 128,
137: 'The voice of the mercantile interest never
fails to command the attention of government, and
when firm and unanimous, is even able to controul
and direct the deliberations of the national councils
4. Ibid., p. 289.
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tific examination of the actual basis of much political
ideology (and thus, to some degree, the basis of the Whig
philosophy) is a natural expression of the more philosophi¬
cal society, and reflects our capacity to judge indepen¬
dently of the pressures of others. It is more likely,
therefore, that utility is the predominating influence in
the modern commercial government: 'the diffusion of know¬
ledge tends more and more to encourage and bring forward
the principle of utility in all political discussions.'1
This is not indeed to say that the philosophical so¬
ciety has become totally practical and is always conscious
of the manner in which it acts; 'authority', Millar be-
2
lxeves, like Smith, always has a place . It is rather
that authority remains the factor that limits 'the rash
and visionary projects' that influence men in the modern
3
as well as in older societies , while utility gradually
becomes a part of the attitudes of the whole, and thus of
the nature of government. The combination of the two is
generally of considerable benefit to all, so long as nei¬
ther element gains the public imagination, so long, in
short, as we neither consistently attack every apparent,
wrong, nor submit ourselves to tyranny and oppression:
'In reality, men, when they come into society,
are bound to preserve the natural rights of one
another; and, consequently, to establish a gov¬
ernment conducive to that end. Good government
is necessary to prevent robbery, murder, and
oppression; and if a man be supposed to have
promised, that he would support or obey a govern¬
ment of an opposite tendency, it would be his




duty to break such an illegal compact, and to
reform such an unjust constitution.' 1
The jtjore philosophical society necessarily differs in
several respects from earlier societies and these differ¬
ences are believed by the theoretical writers to be ex¬
pressed in all aspects of government. The contents of
our moral sentiments naturally change with our situation,
and it is a vital part of the philosophical basis of theo¬
retical history that we become aware of this. It is also
necessary, particularly as regards the question of con¬
scious behaviour,that we continually relate the natural,
heterogeneous development of the philosophical elements in
society to the attitudes which the theoretical historians
hold concerning duties and responsibilities within the
state; and not to think that actions which they see as re¬
sulting from an entirely unthinking and spontaneous divis¬
ion of power are an indication of their belief in conscious
and genuinely dis-interested action for the benefit of the
whole. While the contents of the moral sentiments, of
what we think and feel about our fellows may have changed,
the means by which we interact, gain the respect of others,
and promote our own interest, remain constant. In this at
least the theoretical philosophy is able to indicate that
all our 'utilitarian' actions are simply a continuation
of our usual responses and do not demand a cessation of
interest or an increase in benevolence. Virtu, then, or
the qualities which maintain society, is in constant evo¬
lution, and is always existing; it does not necessarily
1. Hist. View, IV, p. 301; this attitude is^also to^be
seen in Hume's essays, 'Of the Original Contract and
'Of Passive Obedience'.
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disappear with the change in the balance of property^".
To some degree Smith's interpretation of the modern
society is an answer to the problems of some commonwealth
writers concerning corruption and invasion of rights, in
that the generally philosophical situation which he sees
as existing means that unintended events have overcome
these very drawbacks of which earlier writers spoke. He
has also indicated that if men cannot ordinarily deal with
the limitations of their rights, they ought either to accept
this, or to see that their failure is an expression of a
natural inability to overcome certain factors:
'In the greatest public as well as private dis¬
asters, a wise man ought to consider that he
himself, his friends and countrymen, have only
been ordered upon the forlorn station of the uni¬
verse; that had it not been necessary for the
good of the whole, they would not have been so
ordered; and that it is their duty, not only
with humble resignation to submit to this allot¬
ment, but to endeavour to embrace it with alac¬
rity and joy.' 2
Yet he does also consider that in the modern society
at least there are, or ought to be, some legal limitations
of detrimental effects, and that any existing limitations
have evolved through the political division of power and
ought to be a part of the executive authority. The re¬
storing of the natural course of things, therefore, through
the development of commerce, does not preclude the exis¬
tence of natural checks on continuing interested actions
of men. Indeed, it is an integral part of the 'system of
natural liberty'"^ that the executive possess certain duties
1. See below, Appendix B.
2. MS, p. 347. See also ibid., p. 502.
3. WN, II, p. 208.
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which are to be carried out on a regular basis and not
through erratic benevolence.
While Smith to some degree suggests a state in which
the king was limited by the philosophical nature of society
and obliged from the same factor to act for the public
benefit , thereby apparently dismissing the problems of
the commonwealth writers, he does also show some awareness
of the problem of corruption. The difference, however, be¬
tween commonwealth and theoretical writing and ideas is to
be seen especially in the manner in which virtu is to be
restored, and the relationship between this virtu and the
nature of the society itself. For Smith, virtu is the
appropriate expression of the moral sentiments, and it is
vital that this be restored if it has been upset or over¬
balanced by the property situation or by man's lack of
control:
'In some cases the state of the society
necessarily places the greater part of individ¬
uals in such situations as naturally form in
them, without any attention of government, al¬
most all the abilities and virtues which that
state requires, or perhaps can admit of. In
other cases the state of the society does not
place the greater part of individuals in such
situations, and some attention of government
is necessary in order to prevent the almost
entire corruption and degeneracy of the great
body of the people.' 3
While it may be that the heterogeneous process will
1. WN, II, p. 208; that the king's actions were to be
seen as duty is evident from the fact that he was to
be paid: ibid., p. 338.
2. Smith does not use this term as such, but it is clear
that the proper operations of the moral sentiments ^
are an expression of what earlier writers called virtu.
3. WN, II, p. 302.
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eventually solve these problems, perhaps if only through
the inevitable decline of the state"^", it is apparent that
Smith believes we must also act as our situation or our more
philosophical awareness both permits and directs us to.
Smith's basic position on this issue of the adverse effects
of the commercial society, and that of Millar also2, is that
man is affected in the active operation of his mind by the
debilitating effects of the division of labour, the same
factor that has contributed also to the emergence of his
real freedoms:
'In the progress of the division of labour,
the employment of the far greater part of those
who live by labour, that is, of the great body
of the people, comes to be confined to a few very
simple operations; frequently to one or two. But
the understandings of the greater part of men are
necessarily formed by their ordinary employments.
The man whose whole life is spent in performing
a few simple operations, of which the effects too
are, perhaps, always the same, or very nearly the
same, has no occasion to exert his understanding,
or to exercise his invention in finding out ex¬
pedients for removing difficulties which never
occur. He naturally loses, therefore, the habit
of such exertion, and generally becomes as stu¬
pid and ignorant as it is possible for a human
creature to become. The torpor of his mind ren¬
ders him, not only incapable of relishing or bear¬
ing a part in any rational conversation, but of
conceiving any generous, noble, or tender senti¬
ment, and consequently of forming any just judg¬
ment concerning many even of the ordinary duties
of private life. Of the great and extensive in¬
terests of his country he is altogether incapable
of judging; and unless very particular pains have
been taken to render him otherwise, he is equally
incapable of defending his country in war. The
uniformity of his stationary life naturally cor¬
rupts the courage of his mind, and makes him re¬
gard with abhorrence the irregular, uncertain,
1. Lectures, p. 32
2. See also Ferguson, Essay,
'The Political Economy of
Adam Smith', PEP, n.s. 21
pp. 214-218; and E. G. West,
Alienation: Karl Marx and
(1969) pp. 1-23.
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'and adventurous life of a soldier. It corrupts
even the activity of his body, and renders him
incapable of exerting his strength with vigour
and perseverance ...'1
While Millar obviously shares Smith's view on the
basic effects of the alienation of the moral sentiments,
it is apparent that Smith goes much beyond Millar in his
relating the effects of this division of labour on the mind
and body to the usual principles which affect the manner
in which man acts and is a member of a society. He empha¬
sises again that man acts through a desire to gain the re¬
spect of his fellows, that he achieves his knowledge of the
world through the sympathetic process when he points out
how we are limited in our understanding and judgment by
the narrowing of our horizons: 'happiness and misery,
which reside altogether in the mind, must necessarily de¬
pend more upon the healthful or unhealthful, the mutilated
2
or entire state of the mind, than upon that of the body.'
In the first place, the 'mental mutilation, deform¬
ity, and wretchedness' which besets us must necessarily
limit our justified self-interest, our major concern to
look out for ourselves without which the whole cannot pros¬
per; and without which, indeed, we cannot develop any
sense of, or interaction with, others. If we lack the nor-
3
mal responses of revenging or defending ourselves , for
instance, we are denying the qualities which are a vital
part of the social process. Certainly we gain none of
that sympathy on which we ordinarily depend. This
1. WN, II, pp. 302-303; see also Hist. View, IV, pp.
145-146, 151-152, 159-160, 186-188.
2. WN, II, p. 308.
3. Ibid.; see also pp. 46-47 above.
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ennervation or corruption of our sentiments, therefore, must
clearly be detrimental to the society as a whole, quite
apart from the effect which it has on the individual.
Through sympathy, through ascertaining the social norms,
we not only gain approval or disapproval and express this
to others, but we also gain knowledge of the ordinary levels
of behaviour which affect the position and spirit of the
state. Here especially does the true meaning of Smith's
concern with the martial spirit become obvious"'", since if
we are deprived of approbation and disapproval we are also
deprived of the expression of benevolence. We can neither
feel much for others, nor can we feel the particular ex¬
pression of benevolence which naturally leads us to both
2
love our country and wish to defend it . If we do not
naturally possess such feelings, then, the interest of the
3
socxety demands that they be created by other means .
The existence of a martial spirit, of a desire to act
for the welfare of the state both against foreigners and,
if necessary, against a standing army, is the means by
which Smith believes the problems of the modern army are
to be met. And, in relation to the commonwealth problems
of the 'militia', the 'standing army' and so on, Smith's
consideration of the necessary relation between situation
and change is of particular importance to our understand¬
ing of the manner in which he overcame the problems posed
by the commonwealth philosophy. He states specifically
1. WN, II, p. 307.
2. MS, pp. 334-336.
3. See J. M. A. Gee, 'Adam Smith's Social Welfare Func¬
tion', SJPE, 15 (1968) pp. 283-299, and Stigler, op. cit.
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that possession of the martial spirit is vital to the com¬
mercial society - 'the security of every society must al¬
ways depend, more or less, upon the martial spirit of the
great body of the people' - and at the same time he shows
in considerable detail the former relationships between
social level and military capacity"'" which existed in other
societies and were extended, without much effort (because
of the political/economic situation) to the greater part
2
of the inhabitants . The conclusions which he draws from
this study are both that 'the virtue of courage appears,
in all the nations of modern Europe, to have declined in
proportion to their advancement in commerce and manufac-
3
tures' , and that it would be against the natural rhythm
of the commercial society to re-introduce the militia in
which all citizens were soldiers rather than craftsmen.
In this indeed both Smith and Millar challenge the common¬
wealth belief in the concept of the militia as being
necessary at all times - although such a theory itself is
a product of an age in which commerce was not dominant.
In the theoretical viewpoint the force most suited to the
modern society is that of the standing army - a term which
for them has no automatic meaning of repression - and the
4
militia is seen as 'adverse to the spirit of the times' .
The modern system of warfare demands obedience to superiors
5
and familiarity with one's equipment , both factors which
1. WN, II, pp. 303-304.
2. Ibid., pp. 307-308.
3. Hist. View, IV, p. 188.
4. Ibid.
5. WN, II, p. 222; obedience, presumably, may be rein¬
forced by benevolence or our respect for those above
us.
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cannot easily be provided by the militia. It also demands
a professional spirit and competency, and this can be main¬
tained only by the standing or professional army even when
it is rarely actively employed in battle1.
Smith also argues against the commonwealth insistence
on the importance of the militia when he suggests that a
standing army will be as beneficial to the interests of
the state as the older form would, particularly in its
abilities to meet the pressures which develop in opulent
2
nations . When there exists a military force which is led
by the king and served by the nobility and gentry as officers
3
there is no corruption . The interests of the principal
members of the society are clearly to maintain that soc¬
iety. This presumably is so because a balanced state does
exist, and to this extent there is no real conflict be¬
tween Smith's idea and that of the commonwealth writers;
it is rather that the latter were concerned to show that
this balance did not exist, and that a nobility without
land, and a court in search of power would necessarily act
against the interests of the other property-holding mem¬
bers of society.
While Smith concedes the validity of such concerns
'wherever the interest of the general and that of the prin¬
cipal officers are not necessarily connected with the sup-
4
port of the constitution of the state' , he is more inter¬
ested to show that there are other dangers and that in
1. WN, II, p. 228.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 229.
4. Ibid.
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these situations society benefits by having a strong and
efficient army. This can be used to support the establish¬
ed powers against 'every popular discontent', to be, in
other words, 'favourable to liberty'1. The responsible
must be protected from the irrational elements. In this
respect the ordinary soldier appears to play only that role
which is allotted to him, fighting for the propertied
against those who have no such material goods; he is not,
as in the commonwealth, fighting for his own and thereby
the public benefit, he is fighting as a soldier and not
as a citizen. This is entirely appropriate to an age in
which men are primarily employed in professions other than
that of citizen, a situation which reflects circumstances
that the commonwealth theories had not thought possible -
that the greater part of the population could pursue its
own interests and leave its defence to a professional army.
By such arguments Smith may indeed avoid some of the
2
problems which the commonwealth writers faced , but he none¬
theless does establish the modern military system on
necessity and thereby does away with the less philosophi¬
cal belief that the institutions of a society should re¬
main fixed and unchanging. At the same time, however,
his own feelings concerning the necessary revival of the
martial spirit for those who are presumably no part of the
1. WN, II, p. 229.
2. For instance, he does believe that the standing army
can successfully incorporate many of the features of
the militia and implies that balance and (perhaps)
proper moral sentiments of the people will prevent
corruption and misuse of this force. See below, pp.
529-530.
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professional army demand a close examination. The lack of
operation of the moral sentiments in society, he believes,
cannot be changed completely by the actions or thought of
those who are free since the power of individuals is nec¬
essarily limited"'". The spirit itself ought to be restored
and men enabled to regain their social feelings; and to
some degree he believes that education itself, by exercis¬
ing the mind, is conducive to the restoration of the sense
of self, and thereby to the more normal operation of the
senses and the moral processes, a restoration which is of
benefit to the state:
'The more they are instructed, the less liable
they are to the delusions of enthusiasm and super¬
stition, which, among ignorant nations, frequent¬
ly occasion the most dreadful disorders. An in¬
structed and intelligent people besides, are altr
ways more decent and orderly than an ignorant and
stupid one. They feel themselves, each individ¬
ually, more respectable, and more likely to ob¬
tain the respect of their lawful superiors, and
they are therefore more disposed to respect those
superiors.' 2
This process of re-education and of restoring the qual¬
ities natural to man is also strengthened, in Smith's be¬
lief, by the possession of a martial spirit. If a man
lacks this, if he is cowardly, then his mind is prevented
from expressing those natural sentiments which are vital to
him. The renewal of the spirit, therefore, serves the same
end as education, in making the ordinary working man a part
of society. Smith also believes that it is necessary for
men to be able to express their natural patriotism and
their benevolence towards their country; for, though this
feeling is ordinarily evident in our attitude towards other
3
states and those with whom we may trade , there are occas-
1. WN, II, p. 304. However, see below, pp. 150-152.
2. Ibid., p. 309; see also MS, pp. 340-341.
3. MS, pp. 335-336.
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ions when it may need to be expressed more concretely.
If so, then the martial spirit is not extraneous in the
state which has a professional army. It may be of use
both in supporting this body, and in providing some defence
against it if it should be used against the national in¬
terests . In such situations an active spirit is an ex¬
pression of interest and benevolence. In this argument
there is certainly no lack of correlation between situation
and the sentiments which are natural to man, and in this
respect Smith's ideas are consonant with his general
philosophy. The only unanswered question is that concern¬
ing the means by which this martial spirit is to be re¬
stored, and Smith is not explicit on this, perhaps imply¬
ing that education will also fulfil this purpose.
While we may see in the work of Millar a greater
interest in the specifically commonwealth problems of
corruption - the standing army, the lack of ministerial
responsibility, and so on - it is also evident that his
opinion of the operation of government in the modern state
goes beyond this. 'We are not ... to dream of perfection
2 ...
in any human workmanship', he believes , and it is evident
that he feels it to be a part of the natural course of
things not only that there be change but that imperfection
3
is a part of man and his society . Because of this Millar
feels that we can have neither an immortal commonwealth
nor a balance of power that will prevent such changes.
1. WN, II, p. 307.
2. Hist. View, IV, p. 78.
3. Ibid., pp. 94-95.
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Corruption, in some sense, will always be with us and will
not necessarily be eradicated by the constitution, by a
separation of powers, or by balance through conflict. We
must accept the present and the future, and accept also
that man himself will adapt to, and overcome, many of the
modern forms of imperfection and injustice.
It is here particularly that the belief of both Smith
and Millar in the increasingly philosophical nature of so¬
ciety is of importance as a part of their capacity to
accept what social change brings, and here also that the
importance of their theories concerning education and the
duties of executive power is to be found. As situation
affects the nature of earlier constitutions, so also will
it affect the means by which current problems are to be
dealt with; and the influence of interest, the actions for
the king by the ministers within the houses of parliament,
and the extension of influence to a great part of the
political body is not necessarily disastrous to 'freedom'
but can be balanced gradually and naturally. While we may
be affected by interest, this, in Millar's opinion does
not limit our capacity to act. Our situation in the com¬
mercial society is not precisely the same as it was in the
earlier systems, for there is both a greater amount of
political power and of independence among the commercial
class and among others in the society. While dependence
is not eradicated by the extension of property to a greater
number, therefore, it is of a much milder kind, not one in
which man loses his whold sense of being, nor one in which
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he is wholly at the mercy of another"'": 'the circumstances
of a country, highly advanced in commerce and manufactures,
are such as, naturally, and without any interposition of
government, have a tendency to moderate those great diff¬
erences of fortune, which, in a rude age, are usually the
source of tyranny and oppression.'
Furthermore, Millar believes, we are so firmly en¬
trenched in our concerns and in the expression of our in¬
terest that we are not likely to surrender the benefit of
this to the state if the oppression of government becomes
obvious to us; this is so because the commercial society
is a close one and has the capacity to unite when necessary:
'As the inhabitants multiply from the facility of procur¬
ing subsistence, they are collected in large bodies for
3
the convenient exercise of their employments.' As far as
the merchant class is concerned, then, it has not, like
the labouring population, lost its capacity to defend it¬
self and its interest; it is rather that this capacity is
rarely expressed because there are few reasons for calling
it into play:
'If the oppression of government should be
carried so far as to aim at the destruction of
property, the mercantile people would, probably,
be the first to burst the bands of fear, and be
actuated by a desperate valour in defence of
those objects to which they are so immoderately
attached. The effect of great commercial opu¬
lence, therefore, is to produce caution and
long-suffering under the hand of power, but to
ensure ultimately a vigorous opposition to such








'the fundamental rights of mankind. This, in
reality, seems to point at the due medium of that
submission which men owe to their political gov¬
ernors: for nothing is more inconsistent with
the happiness of society, than the frequent re¬
currence of the people to resistance upon slight
and trivial grievances; and when there is a real
necessity to resist the usurpation of the sover¬
eign, he commonly pulls off the mask in sufficient
time to give warning to his subjects, that they
may be fully justified for uniting in defence of
their privileges.' 1
While Millar may not be particularly involved with
questions of the corruption of the moral sentiments, then,
he does reveal in this passage especially how much the con¬
stant principle of interest will maintain that which has
been achieved, and how much the commercial society neces¬
sarily produces defences against corruption that are
appropriate to itself. Furthermore, he is sufficiently a
disciple of Smith to also support the theory of the need
for educating those groups whose capacities have been so
severely limited by the division of labour as to impede
their ability to act as full members of their society -
hence his combination of both interest and the enlightened
or philosophical to explain the maintenance of that which
2
has been achieved .
This emphasis on interest in the theoretical work,
particularly on real as opposed to apparent interest, is
not only an argument which goes much beyond the common¬
wealth theories, but is also one which reinforces the
theoretical historians' belief that all the expressions
of human society are appropriate to the level of economic
1. Hist. View, IV, pp. 200-201.
2. Ibid., pp. 158-160, 309.
security. While it is true that there are many problems
in the commercial society, then, it is true also that men
have the capacity to overcome many of these and to help
maintain a social structure which is seen to have a satis¬
fying role for a greater number. The whole of society is
brought within one body in order to benefit equally from
the advances which have been made. Those who have been
able to express their interest and their moral sentiments
without much hindrance use their interest to benefit them¬
selves, and this also benefits others. The spread of
philosophical opinions or actions resulting from this free¬
dom will, or ought to, lead to the institutionalisation of
those duties by which the more repressed are enabled to
develop the moral sentiments necessary for the fuller ex¬
pression of human nature.
It is natural, then, for men to correct abuses, to
attempt to remedy defects in the moral sentiments. Never¬
theless, it is also natural that the present society will
give way to another, and that we neither can nor should
attempt to change this process: 'A fated dissolution ...
awaits every state and constitution whatever.'"'" Such
change is inevitable because of the unintended effects of
our actions, because of man's capacity for change. The
principles which have been the basis of human action in
past societies will also be the cause of future evolution
and progress; and all the parts of human experience are
thereby united into a whole. This inevitability men must
1. Smith, Lectures, p. 32
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accept and accomodate themselves to; to do so indeed, is
to be eminently philosophical, to truly understand the laws




The general theoretical principles of the heterogeneity
of ends and of the capacity of men to progress qualitative¬
ly through economic change, are the basis of this whole
historical philosophy and of the entire theoretical inter¬
pretation of the general and particular past of mankind.
The understanding of the operation of the human mind, the
expression of the two basic laws in economic and thence
social terms, and the concurrent denial of the rational or
planned nature of change (except when this is a natural
part of society) permit the theoretical historians to stress
that non-philosophical factors are the predominant causal
elements in their philosophy, and that the 'scientific'
observation of past and present human societies enables
the historian to establish an interpretation which empha¬
sises the impersonal and the unintended.
In particular, the peculiar force of these laws that
provide the basis of the theoretical interpretation results
from the fact that they tend to eliminate the isolated fac¬
tors, the individualism and the greater dependence on for¬
tune which are characteristics of the type of philosophical
history written by Voltaire. The general patterns of hu¬
man development which are produced by the varying economic
situation of each society, the overwhelming importance of
situation to the ripening of human potential, and the theo¬
retical exphasis on the long-term and the unplanned, means
that theories of 'accident',of the importance of individ¬
uals and of such factors as climate and geography play a
very limited role in this historical philosophy.
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Though there is some indication in certain of the theo¬
retical works that older ideas of the role of climate con¬
tinue , there is in general a greater concentration on the
manner in which men overcome the effects of temperature ex¬
tremes. The theoretical interpretation does make some con¬
cessions as to the effect of physical factors when men are
likely to be vulnerable to these, but finds the influence
of them to decline in proportion to the extent to which
man controls life in general. Dependence on the unpredict¬
able elements of life necessarily predominates when man does
not gain his subsistence on a regular basis; as soon as he
progresses beyond such an elementary stage, and can estab¬
lish greater personal security and self-sufficiency, the
extent of his subordination to the physical world declines.
It is true, indeed, that particular types of climate
will limit men through encouraging disease, through causing
vegetation which is difficult to clear, thus preventing
2
emergence of agriculture ; and the major xmportance of
climate in the earliest form of human society lies in the
fact that this element itself often determines the rate of
human growth. Climatic factors, then, are really most im¬
portant in the first ages of man: 'The talents of civilized
1. See, for instance, Ferguson, Essay, pp. 114-115, and
Robertson, The History of Scotland (title given in
Historical Works edition, originally published as The
History of Scotland during the Reigns of Queen Mary
and of James VI ... With a Review of the Scottish His¬
tory Previous to that Period, hereafter cited Scotland)
Works, I, p. 109. See also America, Works, III, pp.
252, 297.
2. Ibid., p. 361.
'men are continually exerted in rendering their own con¬
dition more comfortable ... But the improvident savage
is affected by every circumstance peculiar to his situation.
Yet, even in the most primitive stages, we cannot see that
climate is the sole causal factor ; thus, though it is
true that a cold climate may help develop man through mak¬
ing it necessary for him to develop his qualities in order
3
to survive m a harsh landscape , moral qualities also en-
4
ter into our assessment of men in torrid zones . The fact
is that variations in society, especially in the more de¬
veloped institutions characteristic of later stages of de¬
velopment, result from more sophisticated and more compli¬
cated factors; men are more profoundly affected by the in¬
stitutions which have been created in the past at the same
time as they achieve a greater stability because of their
dependence on such elements as trade and agriculture.
If physical factors do continue to have a place in
human society, this can only be a limited one, according
to the theoretical writers. Climate as cause is indirect
or secondary, and while it may have been the original cause
of the emergence of a particular type of social structure,
it is no longer the main causal factor, always being lim¬
ited by 'moral' qualities - human ideas and institutions.
In short, as man develops and becomes more involved with,
and dependent on, moral causes, the physical basis of so¬
ciety is of less importance: the moral factors lead to the
1. America, Works, III, p. 361.
2. Ibid., p. 362.
3. Ibid., p. 271.
4. Ibid., p. 362.
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formation of institutions and customs which have a continu¬
ing life of their own. 'Geography', for instance, becomes
'property' in the particular theoretical sense of the term,
and this concept itself involves complex social and eco¬
nomic relationships which preclude dependence on anything
so variable as climate. Moreover, knowledge and experience
in themselves, given physical situations which are not en¬
tirely inhibiting, can often achieve considerable ends, so
that the members of a more advanced society will apply
their inherited skills and enjoy a more productive life
than those men of an earlier stage of development who live
in the same area"'".
Another indication of the lessening importance of
physical factors is that while the indirect and secondary
influence may continue, men are no longer vulnerable to
the adverse effects of this; what might once have been a
major causal element gradually becomes no more than a tem¬
porary effect when the most dominating circumstances of
life are the form of state and the effect of past tradi¬
tions and customs. This is seen, for instance, even in
the theoretical interpretation of particular events as in
Robertson's history of European power struggles in the
first half of the sixteenth century. While certain cli¬
matic curiosities might occur, and may have some effect
1. See, for instance, Robertson, America, Works, III,
p. 254: 'If another direction were given to the active
powers of man in the New World, and his force aug¬
mented by exercise, he might acquire a degree of vig¬
our which he does not in his present state possess.
The truth of this is confirmed by experience.'
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on a particular situation, they do not necessarily have
the capacity to entirely reverse the history of nations:
men are more liable to recover from the unexpected because
they have an established background to fall back on1.
The same restrictions which apply to the role of cli¬
mate are also to be applied to that of geography. While
we can see in the theoretical history, as well as in works
such as Spirit of the Laws, that the older correlations be-
2
tween size of state and form of government continues , this
is by no means a relationship dependent only on physical
factors. First, actual size of any society depends to a
considerable degree on human elements since the state it¬
self only comes into being with men. Secondly, these
physical factors have no value in themselves and must be
related to the form of the particular society occupying
the land: there must, in fact, be an interrelationship be¬
tween the physical and the moral factors. Thus, for in¬
stance, there is a belief that a large area of land, occu¬
pied by men at a barbarous level, will generally develop
into a feudal society: large tracts generally mean separate
states and independent rulers, yet this is so only when the
social level is such as to tolerate social interaction, per¬
sonal loyalty and the particular means of subsistence ne-
3
cessary to maintain the feudal state . While the theoreti¬
cal belief in common forms of government resulting from
common forms of landholding is necessarily an integral part
of the theoretical philosophy, then, this emphasis on land-
1. See Charles V, Works, VI, p. 501.
2. See, for instance, Millar, Origin, p. 292.
3. See Robertson, Scotland, Works, I, pp. 19-20.
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holding goes far beyond geographic factors: it also includes
the moral. Similar large areas inhabited by a savage so¬
ciety, for instance, which is still primarily concerned
with the individual and which depends on hunting and fish¬
ing for subsistence, do not in themselves produce any form
of government of the type that we associate with the feudal
state. This being lacking, the two situations are necess¬
arily separated by moral factors. In a like manner we can
also see that a small number of people, who are at a civil
stage of society, and who live in a relatively narrow terri¬
tory, are protected because of this by a centralised form
of government, itself resulting from the interaction be¬
tween physical and moral factors. This combination of ele¬
ments means that they do not develop feudalism, but live
under another form of government altogether."'" It is ob¬
servable then, that while mountains may mean freedom, and
flat countries result in despotism, this is so not because
of any vague, romantic reasons, but because of the influ¬
ence of the moral on the physical. And, in any event,
geography itself does not necessarily form the state even
in man's first efforts towards development.
It is also obvious that the national spirit, or the
particular social level of any system, is much more vital
than actual geographic factors in themselves, since the
former is an expression of man's growth and of his capac¬
ity to act for himself. As Robertson suggests in America,
the actual existence of particular geographic features such
1. Millar, Hist. View, I, pp. 107-108.
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as rivers and good ports is of considerable potential be¬
nefit to those states which possess them1. Yet the key
word here is 'potential', for such factors in themselves
mean nothing; they do not, for instance, bring about the
change from overland to marine commerce which was to have
such an effect on human society. The theoretical history
is fundamentally concerned, as is philosophical history in
general, with the history of the human mind, with that which
has led man to be able to make use of these natural facili¬
ties. The geographic features are permanent in that they
are always in existence; it is not these continuing factors
which explain change, therefore, but the changing human
process, the advance of man's capacities. This is par¬
ticularly clearly revealed by Robertson in his summary of
the advance in the mind of the European man especially,
in America, in Charles V and to some extent in India also.
The interaction of the physical and the moral may have
helped ascertain particular developments by particular so¬
cieties in matters such as trade etc., yet these advances
in themselves were totally dependent for their actual ori¬
gins on the desires of men.
As Smith and Millar in particular reveal in their
study of the basis of human society, it is the operation
of the human mind, the desire to improve one's lot, the ir¬
rational and yet productive (because of the heterogeneous
process) elements which affect men that are the most basic
causal factors in society even though these may be in some
degree originally limited by physical factors. Thus, as
1. America, Works, III, pp. 216-217.
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Robertson, for instance, indicates in Charles V, conditions
which are abstractly ideal for trade and commerce are of
little benefit to men as such. The advance of the English
in this particular field was always dependent not only on
the moral factors that advanced the society to the commer¬
cial stage itself, but also on those moral factors that
underlie any political system"'". While man may continue to
be affected by irrational elements, therefore, it is appar¬
ent that these will have effect only because they are moral,
and the results which they do bring are of a type vastly
different from the isolated, limited and obvious results
of climate and land formation. The theoretical historians
moved away from the obscure and constantly sought to estab¬
lish the more certain and less sporadic as the basis of the
variation and constancy that was human progress,, a position
which was summarised precisely Millar when he wrote that:
'in the history of the world, we see no regular
marks of that secret influence which has been
ascribed to the air and climate, but, on the con¬
trary, may commonly explain the great differences
in the manners and customs of mankind from other
causes, the existence of which is capable of be¬
ing more clearly ascertained.' 2
Because of the theoretical dependence on general levels
of achievement, on the multitude of primarily moral causes
which affect man, and on the necessary relationship of all
actions to the social process, there is also little empha¬
sis given by this interpretation to the role of individuals
or the great man in history. This is not to deny that in
1. Charles V, Works, V, pp. 547-548 (Note XXX). See
also Millar, Hist. View, II. pp. 378-390.
2. Millar, Origin, pp. 179-180.
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the early stages of life the individual concern with self
is not the most distinguishing feature of man, but is rather
to indicate that even in the most primitive social gather¬
ing any advance is made through what any particular group
can achieve, and this advance itself made through the eco¬
nomic changes which have occurred. In no sense can any
isolated practice of such economic levels, even if this
were possible, lead to the unfolding of human nature on a
general level:
'The reality ... of certain establishments
at Rome and at Sparta, cannot be disputed: but
it is probable, that the government of both these
states took its rise from the situation and gen¬
ius of the people, not from the projects of sin¬
gle men; that the celebrated warrior and states¬
man, who are considered as the founders of those
nations, only acted a superior part among numbers
who were disposed to the same institutions; and
that they left to posterity a renown, pointing
them out as the inventors of many practices which
had been already in use, and which helped to form
their own manners and genius, as well as those of
their countrymen.' 1
Theoretical writers do not deny, either, that par¬
ticular forms of government may lead to a concentration of
individual or small-group power, as is to be seen in feu¬
dalism particularly. This is necessarily produced by the
economic situation of the society and is supported by the
particular institutions which naturally grow up in such a
society, such as individual service and loyalty to one,
rather than to the state, and the centralisation of power
within miniature states. At the same time, however, it is
the entire society which is affected by this process, even
1. Ferguson, Essay, p. 124.
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if the effect is detrimental to their evolution. The lords
exist as rulers only because of the labour of the serf class
and the respect of the lesser lords, the whole of which is
produced by the economic nature of the society. The entire
feudal system, therefore, is one in which certain individ¬
uals can act as they please and can change society to suit
their whims, but who must also be limited by this society
itself. They are as affected in their manners, their sense
of "rights' and of "duties', their customs and institutions,
as are all those less materially fortunate.
Furthermore, the theoretical history does not deny
the achievements of the various individuals who have con¬
tributed to social development through inventions, travel,
discoveries and similar factors."'" These achievements and
that to which they have led over time - the opening up of
new trade routes, for instance, and the breakdown of old¬
er forms of property holding - have been of considerable
benefit, and yet even these actions are limited. But they
point out that while inventions depend for their existence
primarily on the individual, the actual usefulness of them
and perhaps the basic cause of the invention itself, must
necessarily come from the extent to which the society is
prepared to accept and use it. There can be no major change
or breakthrough outside of the social process itself, in
the sense that all discoveries, information gleaned from
travel and so on, achieve their fullest meaning only when
incorporated into practice and into common usage. Further-
1. Of particular interest here is Robertson, America,
Works, III, pp. 1-59.
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more, we may also see that the major benefits of particu¬
lar innovations often result from the later, unplanned
benefit which is gained from them, and this can in no way
be connected with the individual originally involved.
The great man, who can change the society, and from
whom vast changes come, is more a feature of general philo¬
sophical writing which lacks the theory of interconnect¬
ing and long-established causal factors to explain pro¬
found changes, and which does not so much emphasise the
necessary relationship between great men, and the back¬
ground in which they work"'". The theoretical writers' po¬
sition on this is especially clear in the specific reject¬
ion by them of the concept of the 'legislator', for, they
make clear, any major set of laws, as well as being pe¬
culiar to each individual system, must also come from the
social experience. As they believe that law itself is the
result of the experience and social level of any particular
group, so also do they believe that laws cannot be said to
exist until they are an integral part of social life. Of
the division of classes in India, Millar wrote:
'This division of the people, which goes back in¬
to the remotest antiquity, has been ascribed,
by historians and political writers, to the posi¬
tive institution of Brama, the early, and perhaps
fabulous legislator of that country; but, in all
probability, it arose from that natural separa¬
tion of the principal professions or employments
in the state.' 2
More specifically, Ferguson mentioned the principle
of heterogeneity as forming a necessary part of our inter¬
pretation of all customs and institutions, and as being
the basis for our critical assessment of earlier accounts
1. See Chapter I, pp.25-33.
2. Millar, Hist. View, I, pp. 325-326.
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of development of states: 'we are ... to receive, with
caution, the traditionary histories of ancient legislators
and founders of states. Their names have long been cele¬
brated; their supposed plans have been admired; and what
were probably the consequences of an early situation, is,
in every instance, considered as an effect of design.'"'"
Yet he believes, with all theoretical historians, that
design of this kind is not possible; it suggests conscious
planning by an individual which is not to be found in any
system, and suggests also a sophisticated philosophy of so¬
cial needs that really only developed in the enlightened
age.
As the theoretical philosophy does not accept the im¬
portance of the individual person in any society, so also
does it deny the importance, at least in the civil state,
of what is described as 'accident', of the isolated and
unexpected action. Philosophies which stress this element
are generally of a spectacular nature in that they lack a
principle of stability, emphasising that man is continually
subject to fortune, and that he is constantly tossed about
by factors far beyond his control. Such interpretations,
whether teleological or not, tend to see man as simply just
another factor in a complex world, and fail to establish
any basis from which such fluctuations as are experienced
can be overcome. The theoretical philosophy itself attempts
to break down this interpretation of the past, and it does
so through its central features of the capacity of man to
1. Ferguson, Essay, p. 123.
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progress, and of the heterogeneity of ends especially as
expressed through the possession of property in all its
various forms.
There is, in particular, an emphasis in the theo¬
retical works that, although in the history of states there
may be certain isolated incidents that have a particular
effect, this effect is necessarily related to the general
level of development of any state and that in the civil
society matters which are genuinely unique do not gain
any permanent place in the social structure. In Millar's
interpretation of the English constitution, for instance,
he points out the reasons for the particular degree of po¬
litical freedom"'" in the society, which is greater than that
of other similar European societies, and he also points
out how each particular aspect of this freedom becomes an
integral part of the social structure. Although he may
indicate, therefore, that such processes can sometimes be
considered accidental in the sense that they are unique
and because we cannot necessarily predict the form changes
will take, they can never affect the society profoundly
unless they are institutionalised by the tacit acceptance
of all members of the society. As the individual man, the
legislator, therefore, must always be seen as working with¬
in a particular framework, so also must each new event of
1. This 'freedom' is that which is produced by the best
development of the human mind relative to the theo¬
retical limitations; hence, it is not an 'absolute'
state of liberty but one always related to and depen¬
dent upon the particular economic level, as well as
on certain social advances which are at least possible
because of this economic situation.
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major signidicance be seen in relation to its effect on an
entire system.
In Millar's work this is illustrated in the develop¬
ment of more widespread popular powers through the repeat¬
ed appearances of the lesser gentry in parliament; had the
original appearance of these, resulting as it did from po¬
litical reasons, been an isolated one, then the uniqueness
of the event would have been retained, and the effect on
later development of political divisions been very small.
The heterogeneous benefit here is dependent on certain con¬
sistencies, certain continuations of events. The import¬
ance of the institutionalising of events is also to be seen
in the benefits achieved from the failure of Henry VIII to
consistently use very wide-spread powers which had been
granted to him"'", this failure leading such powers to become
isolated and unique events which did not form a part of the
constitution:
'If these powers had been ascertained, and
confirmed by usage, the government of England
would have become as absolute as that of France
was rendered by lewis the Eleventh. Fortunately,
the English monarch, from the obsequiousness of
parliament, had little occasion to exercise this
new branch of prerogative; and, as he did not
live to reduce it into a system, the constitution,
in the reign of his successor, returned into its
former channel.' 2
It is apparent from these instances that the vital
elements of 'accident' are those which totally upset any
system, and which achieve their effect through being for¬
eign to the social experience. When we establish that par¬
ticular factors are always relevant to economic levels,
1. Millar, Hist. View, II, pp. 441-442. See also below,
pp. 350-351.
2. Hist, View, II, pp. 442-443.
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that, apart from the devastating effects of climate and the
unexpected on primitive man, we are generally not affected
by such isolated matters, then man is seen to achieve a
greater stability. He can no longer be profoundly disturb¬
ed by life and he is able to control it through the natural
expression of his developed qualities.
The fundamental laws of this historical philosophy,
based on the 'scientific' observation of man and the coll¬
ection of data from many forms of society, shift the at¬
tention from the physical and the isolated and concentrate
it instead on the constant and regular elements that mark
human existence. By these means the theoretical writers
consider the general rather than the unique at the same
time as they relate the unique to the general, thus reveal¬
ing what they see as the interconnection of all historical
facts, and thereby creating a historical philosophy which
overcame many of the difficulties faced by earlier writers.
